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Abstmct 
The past two decades have seen an almost exponential growth in publications on 
the topic of divine eternity and the general area of' God and time'. Increasing appeal is 
made to arguments and resources which ranges widely through contemporary science 
and the philosophy of time, whilst retaining commitments to traditional historical and 
philosophical theology. This thesis aims to make a methodological contribution to the 
debate that will be of use to partisans of all views of divine temporality and 
atemporality, as well as to isolate more specific philosophical foundations which, it is 
urged, would be required for a defence of divine timelessness. In arguing for the 
plausibility of these foundations, a case is made for the desirability of such a defence. 
This thesis argues for a methodology of constraints in which the key features 
are, first, that the theology of divine eternity can be affected by logical constraints 
introduced by arguments from 'outside' as well as 'inside' itself, and, second, that such 
a structure is reliant upon the integration of a corresponding understanding (provided by 
the work of Katherine Hawley) of how science might support metaphysical claims and 
how alleged support might be challenged. The resulting structure is offered as a general 
philosophical foundation for debates in the field of 'God and time'. 
This thesis also argues that the most vital factor in the structure IS the 
ontological status of the present. The denial that the present should be metaphysically 
favoured is explored, as a general philosophical foundation for a defence of divine 
timelessness, through topics in language and ontology, science, and epistemology. 
Results from this analysis are incorporated into the overall structure advocated by the 
thesis, together with considerations both of their effect on the debate, and of candidates 
for philosophical foundations from 'inside' theology which fit within the wider 
methodology of constraints on the theology of divine eternity. 
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I shall use the following abbreviations for sources in order to facilitate clear 
presentation (a statement of the full detail shall be made at the first instance of reference 
for each work contained in them): 
CCAq :Norman Kretzmann, and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
CCAr : Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
I shall use the following abbreviations where appropriate for textual clarity: 
STR: The Special Theory of Relativity 
I declare that no part of the material of this thesis has previously been submitted for a 
degree in the University of Durham, or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without their prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
'Time again - time is the reef upon which all our frail 
mystic ships are wrecked.' 
'You mean because it has never yet been proved that 
the past the present and the future are not one and the 
same thing?' 
Noel Coward, Blithe Spirit 
3 
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Introduction 
My aim in the chapters that follow is to provide some philosophical foundations of a 
defence of divine timelessness, these being both methodological (how do we go about 
discussing God and time in the first place?) and also specifically focussed on 
philosophical elements that will ground arguments for, and accounts of, divine 
timelessness. But why, the critic might ask, would anyone want to defend divine 
timelessness when most theologians these days think that God must be in some way 
temporal? The simplest reply will invoke just those considerations, both generally 
methodological and more specific, that are to be found in the thesis. The best way to 
make things rather clearer is to explain all of this in terms of what the thesis is not, and 
why. 
This thesis is not an open inquiry into divine eternity, seeking to arbitrate fairly 
between all the different views available on the basis of considering their grounds and 
supporting arguments. Such a work is a mammoth undertaking: William Lane Craig's 
synoptic assessment of the areas of debate runs to three volumes', well in excess of 
seven hundred pages, and there has been plenty written on the subject since. 
Nevertheless, my methodological discussion is not designed to be solely for the benefit 
of the defender of divine timelessness: my contention is that the structure I develop 
should be helpful for anyone debating 'God and time'; even its total rejection would aid 
the debate, since everyone would be clear on what was being rejected and why. 
Similarly, the defender of divine temporality may find here a useful resource for their 
project - primarily by virtue of seeing a need to rescue various of the more specific 
philosophical elements from criticism, for use in the philosophical foundations of their 
own undertaking. 
This thesis is also not an exhaustive defence of divine timelessness, presenting 
extended and comprehensive arguments for the position and fashioning a coherent and 
complete account. For such a work would also be a vast project: Leftow's defence and 
account of divine timelessness2 is well over three hundred pages, and Craig's work, 
whilst being a survey, is also a defence of divine temporality which supplies 
considerable critical material that the defender of divine timelessness would have to 
engage with. Work that has been done in the area since Leftow's monograph also 
1 William Lane Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000); William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); William Lane Craig, God, Time, and Eternity 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 200 I) 
2 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) 
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means that the defender of divine timelessness must work harder to differentiate their 
position from a variety of others (as opposed to simply from 'unqualified divine 
temporality' 3), and this means in terms of motivation and advantage as well as in terms 
of content. More nuanced positions that have been developed include Craig's own 
position, which holds God to be timeless sans creation whilst the act of creation brings 
God into temporality4, and the view of Alan Padgett that God is outside created time5, 
but nevertheless basically temporal in an 'unrnetricated divine time' reliant upon God's 
being. Most recently, Garrett DeWeese has developed an account of omnitemporality6 
which he attempts to distinguish from both Padgett's and Craig's positions. 
The complexity alluded to above suggests that some sort of structure is required 
whereby we can identify how the various arguments interact, the relative importance of 
the bases they appeal to, and which issues are the most vital to address. But surely such 
a structure already exists, given the amount of work done in the field? I hope to 
persuade the reader in what follows that the answer to this question is unfortunately for 
the most part in the negative, and that it is time to remedy the situation. It will also 
become apparent that the closest candidates for such methodologies have been 
developed by those who then go on to argue for divine temporality; this might be 
considered reason enough to view things in terms of divine timelessness for a change. 
Even if it is not, I aim to provide a more direct reason to be interested in defending 
divine timelessness: that, within the more neutral methodological structure I suggest, the 
arguments constituting the topic of keenest debate - that is, the metaphysical status of 
the present - would be foundational to a defence of timelessness or temporality, and 
examining them leads us to conclusions that will favour the former, and not the latter. 
Thus, I present them (after having considered them myself) as philosophical 
foundations for a defence of divine timelessness, under the rationale that scholarship 
needs to see what such a structure and foundations look like, and preferably from the 
viewpoint of someone who is persuaded of their value. Whether a good account of 
divine timelessness can be provided through their use, and how that account would be 
developed, is a question for another thesis. 
3 E.g. Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'Unqualified Divine Temporality', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and 
Time: Four Views (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), p.l87-213 
4 For a brief treatment of this, see William Lane Craig, 'Timelessness & Omnitemporality', in Gregory E. 
Ganssle, ( ed. ), God and Time: Four Views (Downers Grove: InterV arsity Press, 200 I), p.l29-160 
5 For a brief treatment of this, see Alan G. Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in Gregory E. 
Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), p.92-IIO 
6 Garrett J. DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 
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In summary, then, what this thesis is about is how we ought to handle the topic 
of 'God and time', and more particularly how we ought to handle it if we are interested 
in what the once-popular traditional view of divine atemporality can have to say for 
itself in the current academic context. 
I begin from an intuitive position expressed as follows: If we want to say 
something about God and time, we had better be able to say something about time. 
Philosophy and physics say a great deal about time, so the most important question is 
what their relationship with theology is, and how much of what they have to say we 
need to hear. I should note that I also begin by assuming that science, philosophy and 
theology in this field of study all make truth-claims - that is, that science makes claims 
about what we can expect to occur in reality under certain circumstances, that 
philosophy/metaphysics makes claims about the structure of that reality, and that 
theology makes claims about the existence and nature of God and God's relation to 
reality. In short, whatever the case is in other areas of science, philosophy or theology, 
when we talk about relativistic effects on particle decay, the reality of the present 
moment, or the existence of God in a non-physical time, we are not just looking for 
ways to enrich our imaginative engagement with each other. 
My exploration begins with history, since the defender of divine timelessness 
needs to know where the idea comes from, and the context of its development. 
Consequently, the first chapter of the thesis explores three classic sources: Augustine, 
Boethius and Thomas Aquinas. This yields the following points: First, that in its most 
developed form the (Thomistic) concept of divine timelessness seems to share the 
concern with philosophy and science- albeit in the context of the day, which is prior to 
the formation of the sciences as such. Nevertheless, Thomas makes full use of 
Aristotle, Averroes and Avicenna (whilst remaining indebted to the Neoplatonic roots 
of his intellectual tradition) in order to form his view. So my approach has some 
common ground with historical approaches. 
Second, Augustine asks the same sort of question but does not necessarily have 
the apparatus to form the answers. He and Boethius demonstrate that there may be 
some issues which are distinctively theological in tone, entirely to do with God in God's 
self or in His relation with human beings, which ought not to be papered over with 
reliance on philosophy and science. This acts as a reminder to be prepared to identify 
what issues these might be in the contemporary debate. 
Finally, the importance of the overall philosophical context m Thomas' 
development of divine timelessness will be seen, and how it flows naturally from other 
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questions. This is important because a change in philosophical context (in short, no 
longer relying on an Aristotelian or Neoplatonic world view) may produce very different 
results even from similar approaches. 
Having attended to the historical background, I turn to the bigger picture in its 
contemporary setting, with a question of methodology for the second chapter. If 
theology needs to relate to philosophy and science, how is this relationship to be 
conducted? I attempt, briefly, to illustrate the current state of engagement with science 
in the literature on 'God and time' and conclude that we are in need of a more rigorous 
methodological commitment than has been provided heretofore. The first step is to 
focus the inquiry on a 'nuts and bolts' level, regarding the demand for an arbitration of 
truth-claims that the debate seems to expect. A way to engage with this is made 
available by Katherine Hawley's discussion of 'science as a guide to metaphysics' 7. 
She provides a structure within which to understand the following: first, the idea that a 
metaphysical claim may garner support from science (via the idea of 'involvement' in 
an empirically successful scientific theory); second, the options open to the critic of 
such a metaphysical claim, or the proponent of a rival claim; third, the importance of 
empirical adequacy and the implausibility of empirical data straightforwardly entailing 
metaphysical theses. 
I argue that it is clear that theological claims will not operate in the same 
structure as Hawley's science/metaphysics interaction, and, building on some work by 
Garret DeWeese8, I then develop a way of understanding a structure of boundaries or 
constraints on theology resulting (among other things) from science and philosophy. I 
suggest that the issue of divine eternity is an instance of philosophical theology 
incurring logical constraints from outside itself on account of the nature of the topic: 
these will spring, in the first instance, from the philosophy of time; however, if we are 
to take Hawley's structure seriously her schema must be embedded in the methodology 
of constraints, since the 'science of time' may act as a guide to the philosophy of time, 
which will in turn place constraints our view of God as temporal or atemporal. The 
philosophical foundations referred to in the title of the thesis must therefore be in two 
parts: first, an understanding of the methodology of constraints (which, why, and to 
what effect?), and second the principles or premises which provide the content of those 
constraints. 
7 Katherine Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', Synthese 149 (2006), pp.451-470 
8 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, pp.4-7 
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The third chapter addresses the first of these parts. I introduce the terms of the 
contemporary debate regarding the philosophy of time and the theology of eternity, and 
demonstrate strong links between theories of time which emphasise the present 
metaphysically/ontologically (broadly, 'tensed' or 'A' -theories) and theories of divine 
temporality, and similarly strong links between theories of time which deny such 
importance to the present (broadly, 'tenseless' or 'B' -theories) and theories of divine 
atemporality. I argue for the construal of this in terms of constraints, these constituting, 
at their strongest, a serious bar to developing a particular theory of divine eternity when 
its antithetical theory of time is taken to be the superior. I illustrate the strength of this 
argument by reference to a growing acceptance and exposition of its component 
elements (in whole or part) in the contemporary literature. 
The final part of the third chapter is dedicated to setting up discussion of issues 
that will identify the detailed contents of the constraints and the development of 
philosophical foundations for defence of divine timelessness. I argue that the idea of 
the present as ontologically favoured is the key to this process, and that critical 
engagement with theories that allocate maximum metaphysical importance to the 
present (which I term 'presentist' taken as the claim that only the present moment of 
time exists) are most likely to result in the removal of constraints barring divine 
atemporality and the augmentation of B-theoretical positions which promote divine 
atemporality. Craig's work, as an extended argument for presentist theory and divine 
temporality, represents the primary source of such a bar on divine atemporality. 
I focus on three areas of debate which integrate perfectly into the 
methodological structure developed from Hawley: language and ontology, the alleged 
incompatibility of 'presentist' A-theory with relativity theory, and the epistemological 
arguments over the importance of our experience of the present. Since the scientific 
incompatibility issue is generally taken as constituting support for B-theory from 
science, each of these three topics has components corresponding to a strategy of 
challenging such a 'scientific metaphysics'. These are, broadly and respectively, 
independent arguments which may also augment a revisionary science; arguments 
challenging scientific support and/or providing a revisionary science; and arguments 
which could potentially overwhelm any scientific support, should it be bona fide. 
Chapters four, five and six each take one of these topic areas and examine it. 
Chapter four is concerned with language and ontology: are there tensed facts, and what 
makes tensed and tense less propositions true? I argue in favour of the view that treating 
something as ontologically significant on account of its role in language is a strategy 
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which demands extreme caution, and address three areas of interest. First, the presentist 
critique by Craig of Mellor's account of language and facts in Real Time If, where I 
contend that a stalemate is reached in which Mellor's account can be considered 
successful only on the failure of A-theoreticaVpresentist theories resulting from separate 
arguments. Second, I assess arguments from Ted Sider claiming that the presentist 
cannot account for cross-time spatial relations or provide ontologically robust grounds 
for facts about the past. Once again, there is something of a stalemate since Sider 
refuses to consider scientifically revisionary presentist theories; if such were 
successfully argued for, perhaps the critique would lose some force. Finally, I analyse 
Craig's own model of presentism and argue that it is threatened by incoherence; it is 
therefore unable to marshal clinching independent arguments for the metaphysical 
importance of the present from consideration of the area of language and ontology. 
Whether it can marshal suitable arguments in the light of discussion of science remains 
to be seen. 
The fifth chapter duly addresses considerations of science. This is split into 
several sections. In the first section, I trace the evolution of relativity theory, 
concentrating on the ideas involved and the motivations behind each development. This 
structure is then related to the methodology of involvement and constraint already 
considered, and arguments set out concerning relativity theory's alleged support for the 
tense less philosophies of time, and it's destruction of presentism. The key features here 
are, first, that empirical observations lead to specific theoretical content; second, that 
this content involves (in the relevant sense) a claim that there is no absolute present 
moment and that this claim is (in the relevant sense) supported by the empirically 
successful scientific theory; third, that this claim cannot be reconciled with presentism; 
this invites the conclusion that relativity theory provides a reason to deny ontological 
favour to the present. 
In the second section, I look at Craig's use of a neo-Lorentzian approach to 
relativity and his rationale for employing it - likewise relating this to our 
methodological structure. The main points here are, first, that Craig regards several 
points of the formulation of relativity theory to be gratuitous and not demanded by the 
empirical content; second that he holds his selected neo-Lorentizian position to be 
adequate in relation to the empirical content; third that the neo-Lorentizan content 
involves a claim that there is an absolute present moment and that this claim is 
supported by the theory; finally, that by conducting his argument in this way Craig is 
9 D. H. Mellor, Real Time II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998) 
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buying into an optimistic view of science as able to lend support to metaphysical 
positions, and not attempting to rebut this view in favour of a more pessimistic one. 
I then construct a critique of Craig's position, based both on an understanding of 
relativity theory and on how his position copes with the methodological demands. The 
key arguments here are, first, that Craig's criticisms of relativity theory do not succeed 
in casting doubt on it sufficiently to remove its support for the relevant metaphysical 
points (in the language of the methodological structure, it is not shown to be relevantly 
formulation-dependent, and it erroneously attempts to spread the failings of specific 
claims equally across all philosophical claims involved in the theory); second, that 
Craig's selected neo-Lorentzian theory does not attain full empirical adequacy, and that 
consequently it does not fulfil the requirements for grounding the claim(s) of an 
alternate metaphysic - i.e. presentism - and, finally, that the standard interpretation of 
the theory is explanatorily superior to Craig's approach (even giving him the most 
charitable options). Furthermore, and just as importantly, I argue that Craig has an 
inconsistent methodological approach in two respects: first, that when the science is 
unfriendly to his agenda he is pessimistic about the capacity for science to support 
metaphysics, whilst when the science is friendly to his agenda he is optimistic; second, 
that he presents his discussion of divine eternity as neutral pending arbitration of the A-
vs. B-theory debate, but on the key issue in that debate (i.e. science) adduces to his 
argument for a neo-Lorentzian revision of relativity theory the consideration that a 
temporal God is to be desired. 
Arguing that the presentist fails to establish a level scientific playing field, and 
that this casts further doubt on the ability of the arguments in chapter four to provide 
support for the presentist position, I turn to epistemological considerations in chapter 
six. The main points of the chapter are as follows: first, that what is at stake in Craig's 
discussion is not just the epistemic basis of tense, but the epistemic basis of presentism 
- this opens several critical opportunities for the defender of a tenseless approach, 
among them the argument that we may have temporal beliefs that are compatible with 
attributing presentness to things, events or experiences, but are incompatible with 
believing in a presentist metaphysic. Second, that a gap can also be opened up between 
our beliefs in the presentness of experiences, things, or events, and the belief that the 
present is ontologically favoured, and so (since Craig allows that physical theory can be 
an epistemic corrective) this opens up the possibility that failings in the scientific 
material will have a knock-on effect in his epistemological arguments. Third, that 
empirical phenomena, as opposed to scientific theory, may allow the defeat of belief in 
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the presentness of things/events/experiences, in addition to the defeat of beliefs in the 
present as metaphysically favoured, or beliefs in presentism. Finally, that Craig's use of 
the specious present (what can be spoken of or experienced as present) is vital to his 
response to the foregoing material, but deeply flawed both through his philosophical 
employment of it in his theory - something which is criticised in chapter four as well -
and through the episternic expectations he has for it, which are misplaced. 
The seventh and final chapter attempts to bring the entire discussion together in 
a coherent whole. In the first section, I summarise the methodological and topical 
findings of the thesis, presenting suggested philosophical foundations for a defence of 
divine timelessness in terms of the methodology and structure I have argued for, of the 
denial of the ontological importance of the present which results from the various 
critiques of presentist metaphysics, and of the more cautious derivative elements which 
the discussions have given rise to. In the second section, I give examples of the 
foundations and structure of constraints in action, diagnosing the difficulties with two 
arguments for divine timelessness and critical responses to them, and showing how the 
approach I have argued for presents a better option for the defender of divine 
timelessness. In the third section, I look at two arguments that potentially provide 
philosophical foundations for a defence of divine timelessness but which are outside of 
the primary structure of constraints on which chapters three to six have concentrated -
i.e. the category of logical constraints which come from 'outside' theology. I argue that 
they succeed in providing philosophical foundations of varying strength and are worth 
pursuing further, in terms of defence and exposition in philosophy of religion, and that 
they come within the wider structure of constraints that I develop in chapter three - in 
this case in the category of logical constraints developed within theology or philosophy 
of religion. 
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Chapter I- Historical Resources: Philosophical and Theological Contexts 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I wish briefly to consider some traditional and interconnected 
treatments of God's relationship to time. The main focus of this will be Thomas 
Aquinas, who specifically asks, in the Summa Theologice10, what eternity is, whether it 
pertains to God and whether, if so, it pertains solely to God, and, in De .!Eternitate 
Mundi, whether the world began to exist or has always existed. It might also be 
expected that Aquinas would have most to offer on the topic for reasons of historical 
context: scholasticism was at full throttle and the Summas (Contra Gentiles and 
Theologice, but especially the latter) were attempts at more systematic out-workings of 
theology; furthermore, the argument over the eternity of the world was more urgent for 
Aquinas than for previous theologians on account of the influence of Arabic and 
Aristotelian ideas on the topic. 
However, in the process of exploring these discussions in Aquinas, I shall also 
consider Augustine and Boethius, since they are - directly or indirectly - the main 
Christian authorities upon which he constructs his arguments. My aim is twofold: first, 
I want to establish concisely a picture of the traditional view of divine eternity, showing 
that - despite an historical interval of over eight hundred years between Augustine's 
consideration of eternity and Aquinas' work on the concept- a clearly compatible view 
emerges, which, through Boethius' intermediary arguments, forms the foundation of the 
so-called 'timeless view' of eternity. However, equally vitally, I wish to lay the 
foundations for a demonstration of the importance of science and philosophy for divine 
eternity, foundations which in Aquinas take the form of engagement with Aristotle, 
Moses Maimonides, A verroes and A vincenna. The concern here is not to show that the 
methodology espoused in this thesis is identical to that of a traditional defender of 
divine timelessness, or to give a complete historical methodological assessment. 
Rather, it is to show that, historically, divine timelessness was not developed and 
defended by a wholesale rejection of the philosophy/science of the day, but by an 
engagement with it- and thus to suggest that equivalent engagement should be sought 
by contemporary defenders of divine timelessness. This counts as much against those 
10 Aquinas, Summa Theologice, trans. T. McDermott (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), Q.l 0; 
pp.l35-143; hereafter in the format ST la.IO.etc. excepting commentary 
l3 
who would return solely to scholastic resources as a foundation of a defence as it does 
against those who would reject philosophical/scientific concerns as such. 
Aquinas in Context 
Questions of interpretation and method might be appropriate as a starting point. 
In particular, it is important to try to avoid the pitfalls of reading Aquinas too readily 
through modern eyes. The issue of how philosophy and theology relate for Aquinas is 
naturally a somewhat vexed one, but a few disclaimers and caveats are worth going in 
to. 
Mark Jordan has argued that 'no single work was written by Aquinas for the 
sake of setting forth a philosophy'n, a claim which requires some clarification of both 
itself and other authors who chooses to see Aquinas as both philosopher and theologian. 
It is, at first glance, particularly contrastive with the article 'Aquinas' Philosophy in its 
Historical Setting', with which it shares a book. The key distinction here is, I think, 
between 'a philosophy' and 'philosophical commitments'. The essence of Jordan's 
argument is that Aquinas doesn't develop 'a philosophy' because he is a theologian and 
believes that, since philosophy takes on what is valuable in philosophy and transforms it 
in line with faith, to develop a philosophy would be a disappointing activity when there 
is so much theology to sort out. Aertsen affirms this in his own article when he explains 
that, for Aquinas, 'philosophy offers no prospect of a fulfilment of human life' 12 
because our final end is the vision of God, and not theoretical knowledge (by 
'philosophy' he here means non-Christian reasoning) 13 . All of this does not of course 
equate to a lack of philosophical commitments, and Aertsen's article is consequently, in 
part, an exercise in exploring what there is in Aquinas which is philosophically 
informative for us today, and how it is to be understood. 
My first disclaimer, then, should be to note that I am not presuming to find in 
Aquinas 'a philosophy of time', or a defence of divine timelessness which is designed, 
explicable and debatable on purely philosophical terms. However, this does not mean 
that there will not be interesting philosophical material, or that philosophical and 
11 Mark D. Jordan, 'Theology and Philosophy', in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.233 
12 Jan A Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in Kretzmann and Stump (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.33, cp Jordan, 
'Theology and Philosophy', in CCAq, p.235 
13 The fuller argument for this relies upon the Neoplatonic premise of the fmal end of a substance being a 
reuniting to its source (circularity of reality), the premise of God as source and the premise of intellect 
being the only way a human being can be united to its beginning. 
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theological commitments will not be identifiable. In particular, I am interested in the 
idea that it is Aquinas' philosophical commitments which facilitate his view of divine 
timelessness. The next point of discussion should be a clarification of exactly how 
philosophy and theology relate for Aquinas. 
At the end of his article, Jordan has the following to say by way of summary: 
We are left, then, with two responses from Aquinas to the modem reader's question 
about the relation of philosophy to theology. The first response is that the question 
must be reformulated so that it asks about theology's transforming incorporation of 
philosophy. Theology is related to philosophy as whole to part. The second response is 
that a Christian theology done well ought to speak more and better things about matters 
of concern to philosophy than the philosophers themselves can say. If a Christian 
theology cannot do this, Aquinas would not count it theology done well. 14 
Jordan's explication of the first of these responses makes use of Aquinas' analogy of 
'water into wine' ('those who use philosophical texts in sacred teaching, by subjugating 
them to faith, do not mix water with wine, but turn water into wine' 15). He characterises 
this subjugation by three points16: first, that theology can take on philosophical truth but 
grounds it in God; second, that theology can correct philosophy; third, that the 
motivation of the discourse must be Christian. He also suggests that, for Aquinas, 
theology strengthens and improves philosophy17. 
Note that Owens, who uses the same analogy and quotation, employs a 
translation replacing 'subjugating them' with 'bringing them into the service of 18 - this 
might be thought to fit better with the idea that philosophy can do valuable work on its 
own without theology needing to 'control' it19 - something that Aertsen brings out when 
he explains on Aquinas' behalf that '[d]riven by the natural desire to know, it seeks the 
causes of what is seen and critically discusses the achievements of earlier thinkers. ' 20 
This guards against too strong a reading of Jordan's 'whole to part' relation for theology 
and philosophy. 
Indeed, Aertsen complements Jordan's three points with three 'principles' ofhis 
own which characterise the relationship between philosophy and theology - principles 
14 Jordan, 'Theology & Philosophy', in CCAq, p.248 
15 In BDT 2.4, ad 5; Jordan, 'Theology & Philosophy', in CCAq, p.235; cfp.247. 
16 Jordan, 'Theology & Philosophy', in CCAq, p.235-6 
17 Jordan, 'Theology & Philosophy', in CCAq, p.247 
18 Joseph Owens, 'Aquinas and Aristotle', in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump ( eds. ), The 
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.44 and n.9 
19 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.35; cp p.27-28 
20 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.35 
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which themselves have corollaries in an article by John Wippel21 . First, he says that the 
relationship is harmonious because both faith and reason come from God- their truths 
must therefore be compatible (even though faith takes precedence and reason can be 
defective)22. Second, philosophy cannot be reduced to theology, because 'faith 
presupposes knowledge as grace presupposes nature'23 . Third, 'faith is the perfection of 
natural knowledge' 24 because 'grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it' 25 -
consequently, philosophy can help provide an account of the truth offaith?6 
There is a sense to be had of the relationship between philosophy and theology 
in Aquinas as more of a spectrum than a definition: sometimes theology looks down on 
philosophy as dwelling in the penumbra of truth, and sometimes holds it up as a guiding 
light for faith. The key here seems to be in the second of Jordan's responses on behalf 
of Aquinas, quoted above: Aquinas can identify some of the subject-matter and tasks of 
philosophy and theology without taking purely philosophical works as equal authorities 
with the deliverances of faith. Nowhere is this clearer than in Wippel's assertion that 
'[flor Aquinas, metaphysics, first philosophy and a philosophical science of the divine 
(scientia divina) are one and the same. ' 27 
The tensions, such as there are, in the above discussion may be seen to reflect 
Aquinas' political and cultural context as much as anything. There was a delicate 
balancing act to be maintained for the theologian wishing to engage with Aristotle in the 
thirteenth century28 . Burrell's reflections on this allow us a valuable methodological 
insight, for he says of Aquinas' project: 
It was questioned from two sides: the conservative Augustinians, who pretended to be 
invoking a pure tradition of faith against the "new learning," and the Latin Averroists, 
who were so enamoured of Aristotle as to make of his teaching a virtual revelation for 
the philosophically minded. 29 
21 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.85-127 
22 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.34; cp Wippel 'Metaphysics', in 
CCAq, p.86 
23 ST Ia 2.2 ad I; Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.35; cp Wippel, 
'Metaphysics', inCCAq, p.87 
24 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.35 
25 ST la.l.8 ad 2 
26 Cp Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.87; also Owens, 'Aquinas and Aristotle', in CCAq, p.44 
27 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.85; cf Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in 
CCAq, p.32 quoting SCG 3.25- note that this is not simply assertion but has grounds in the discussion of 
what these topics are, a discussion as important to Aristotle as to Aquinas (cp Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in 
Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), pp.66-l 08, especially pp.l 01-108 
28 For broad comments on this see Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, 
pp.20-27 
29 David B. Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore 
Stump ( eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
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Welcome support for Aquinas, Burrell tells us, came from Moses Maimonides, 
whose Guide for the Perplexed became available in translation in the early thirteenth 
century, and whose approach to the relationship between reason and revelation aided 
Aquinas' own formulation, which we have been discussing30 . What all of this suggests, 
in addition to a more rounded view of Aquinas' intellectual foundations, is another 
caveat: Aquinas had to choose from a range of methodological and intellectual 
commitments and steered clear of the extremes that were available, the dangers of 
which are perhaps clearer to see at an historical distance. When faced with the 
temptation to make science, or indeed a specific church tradition, the only basket into 
which we put our theological eggs, wisdom may well still counsel caution. 
Aquinas: Metaphysical Underpinnings 
Having got a sense of the relationship between philosophy and theology for 
Aquinas, we can now go on to ask what philosophy is employed by (or incorporated 
into) Aquinas's work in his development of the theology of eternity. The key elements 
are Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Islamic (Averroes and Avicenna), but before looking 
at their interactions, something more general should be noted. When we say 
'philosophy' in this historical context we must understand the term to be broader than 
we might now intend by use of the word. Previous comments have tended to assume 
the content to be metaphysics (as the subject of being qua being, and thus as almost 
identical with the science of the divine) but it should be remembered that there were 
also categories of natural philosophy, or physics (being as a subject of motion) and 
mathematics (being as quantified). As Wippel observes, Aquinas discusses these topics 
and their definitions in Exposistio super librum Boethii De trinitate 5.1, Sententia super 
Peri hermenias 1.1.3 and Sententia super Metaphysicam IV.1.53231 . 
This is important because natural philosophy and maths are closer to what we 
would now regard as science, and they abut/overlap metaphysics when it comes to 
Aquinas' discussion of time, as we shall see. Nevertheless, they are not what we would 
now regard as 'the practice of science' (Herbert Butterfield has argued that 'it was 
p. 70. Further discussion of the Augustinian side can be found in E. Gilson, Pourquoi Saint Thomas a 
critique Saint Augustin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1986), and of the Averroist side in 0. Leaman, Averroes and His 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 
30 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.70ff. 
31 See Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.85 and p.ll7 n.2 
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Aristotle rather than Ptolemy who had to be overthrown in the sixteenth century' 32 in 
order to make room for the Copernican revolution; this is as much about the practice of 
science as it is about geocentrism versus heliocentrism), so one must be careful in what 
conclusions one draws. One thing that could be said is that 'Thomas Aquinas' notion of 
a science of nature owes a good deal to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. He is in full 
agreement with the view that man has no knowledge, on earth, which does not originate 
in sense experience. In this St. Thomas is fundamentally an empiricist. ' 33 
Consequently, although one might not be able to argue that Aquinas engages science 
much as he engages philosophy, one might still say that his philosophy in its entirety 
(including natural philosophy) is not inevitably opposed to scientific concerns as we 
now understand them, still less to theoretical structures which contemporary science 
uses to explain empirical data Furthermore, his considerations of concepts as they 
impact upon the topics of time and eternity suggest a full and frank engagement with, as 
opposed to a rejection of, the discussions available to him concerning the nature of the 
physical world. This is sufficient to lend support to my methodological contention that 
the resourcing of traditional accounts of divine eternity should not exempt us from 
philosophically and scientifically responsible scholarship, suggesting that the modem 
defender of divine timelessness should take contemporary philosophy/science seriously 
even if they value theological tradition over contemporary philosophy as a starting point 
(and bearing in mind that taking something seriously does not mean taking it as 
universally authoritative). 
Since a complete account of Aquinas' philosophical context and development 
would be excessive, I will restrict myself to four topics. First, I shall provide some brief 
notes concerning Neoplatonism - these will be referred to throughout much of the 
chapter as we discuss Aquinas and Boethius. Second, I shall discuss the distinction 
between essence and existence which Aquinas developed, showing its genesis through 
Greek and Islamic thought. Third, I shall outline the ideas of actuality, potentiality and 
change, showing how Aquinas' ideas of divine simplicity and immutability relate to 
them. Finally, I shall look at the concept of accidents, which Aquinas appropriates from 
Aristotle. Inevitably, on account of the structure of Aquinas' thought, these 
considerations will give us a sketch of Aquinas's views on time simply by showing the 
philosophical underpinnings ofhis work. 
32 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Free Press, 1997), p.35. Butterfield 
provides other examples of developments in science linked to the giving up of Aristotelian ideas. 
33 Vernon J. Bourke, 'Introduction' in Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, trans. R. J. 
Blackwell, R. J. Spath and W. E. Thirlkel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p.xxvii 
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Turning to Neoplatonism, then, one might first observe, with Burrell, that two of 
the most authoritative texts of Aquinas' age - The Theology of Aristotle and Liber De 
Causis- were in fact works in extract and/or translation by the Neoplatonists Plotinus 
and Prod us respectively. 34 Since Aquinas was the first to point out the latter 
identification35 , we may presume a certain familiarity with Neoplatonic works (and that 
he knew what he was doing in this respect when he later uses the Liber when discussing 
divine eternity in STlal0.3)- a presumption which is reinforced when one is aware of 
his commentaries (unusually extensive for the thirteenth century36) on Boethius, 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus. This familiarity was a key component in Aquinas' 
ability to develop his innovative philosophical and theological manoeuvres, as we shall 
see. 
Padgett sees Plutarch and Plotinus as, respectively, the first instence of 
associating timeless eternity with God, and the most extensive early out-working of 
absolute timelessness37. In the emanative series of Being, Mind/Intelligence and Soul, 
eternity is the life ofMind and time the life ofSoul.38 Eternity, says Plotinus, 'is always 
the selfsame without extension or interval,' 39 which Padgett takes to mean 'without time 
and without duration. '40 How did this impact Aquinas, and how in the philosophical 
underpinnings of his ideas did Aristotelian metaphysics and Neoplatonic philosophy 
interact? 
A good place to begin is with a tension m Aristotle: he is interested m 
individuals (preferably medium-sized dry goods/creatures) as the fundamentals of 
knowledge and reality, but he has difficulty - in retrospect, at least - in fitting together 
how we know them with how we describe their composition. The interpretative 
difficulty arises because Aristotle discusses similar topics in both the Categories and the 
Metaphysics41 - in the former, he is more interested in classification, and in the latter 
more interested in composition; but beyond interpretation, this is also what gives rise to 
the tension. In the Categories, 'first substance' refers to individuals and 'second 
substance' to the corresponding universals (e.g. this horse versus 'horses' or 'horse-
ness'). Second substance is secondary simply because it doesn't occur in reality except 
34 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.63 
35 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.22 
36 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.22 
37 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.42-43 
38 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.43 cfPlotinus, Enneads 3.7.11 
39 Plotinus, Enneads 3.7.3 
40 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.43 
41 Quite apart from the fact that the view of what metaphysics is has several variations in the Metaphysics 
-see Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, pp.66-108 passim. 
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where there are individuals (there is no horse-ness without a horse). 42 In the 
Metaphysics, things are more difficult because substance is discussed in terms of 
composition: 'what is substance?' 43 . Barnes puts it well: 
Hence a tension - or rather, the threat of a simple inconsistency. Substances are 
individuals: Mozart is a substance, man is not. Substances are definable: man is a 
substance, Mozart is not. 44 
Aristotle says in Book Delta of the Metaphysics that a substance is 'a this so-and-so 
which is also separable' 45 ; Barnes suggests that this gives us the key to individuation, 
since one can specify individuation through a demonstrative and a commitment to the 
right sort of object as its demonstrandum (as Wippel nicely puts it 'separate from other 
things in the sense that it cannot be ontologically communicated to them. ' 46) The 
composition that Aristotle reaches is 'matter plus form', and the way he tries to unite 
this with the definability of the substance is with the concept of essence. As Barnes 
tiredly observes, although matter and form start off as simply stuff and shape, they soon 
get used in a broad range of ways (especially when describing the human being as body 
and soul). Matter takes on form to compose substance, and form frequently sounds like 
second substance- i.e. like a certain sort of universal. Essence is an attempt to get back 
a more definitional approach - what it is to be a so-and-so.47 Wippel has a concise 
account of the situation: 
In particular, one should not identify substance taken as . . . essence with second 
substance. In matter-form composition, substance taken as essence ... is related to 
substance taken as subject as formal part to concrete whole. But the concrete subject or 
whole includes individuating characteristics as well. Thus we cannot say "Socrates is 
humanity." We can, however, predicate second substance of first substance, for 
instance, by saying "Socrates is a man." It follows, therefore, that second substance is 
not to be identified with substance taken as essence. 48 
Consequently, it can be suggested that an essence should be understood in part 
as 'that this matter has this substantial form', which gives a nod at getting around 
42 See Robin Smith, 'Logic', in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.55-56 and Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p.78-80 
for more depth here 
43 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Zeta I I 028b2-4 
44 Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p. 91 
45 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Delta 8 I 0 17b23-25 
46 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.l07 
47 See Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p.99 in the context ofp.97-IOO for more depth. 
48 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.l 08 
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individuation by 'demonstrative plus separability' whilst emphasising that essence does 
not quite equate to form as an abstract genus. 49 
Neoplatonism can be seen as attempting to get around all of this tension by 
concentrating on the concept of emanation. Taking Plotinus for a typical case, 
emanation employs a hierarchy of causation from the One, which is Being, through 
Intelligence and Soul - this could be characterised as a move from the more general to 
the more specific50. Emphasis is then placed on essence, since the alternative, matter, is 
only 'the receptacle for the unfolding of Soul in its lowest aspect, which projects the 
forms in three dimensional space' and 'has no positive existence' 51 . The approximate 
picture, then, is of individuals coming last as localised clusters of forms (i.e. essences). 
Clearly this simply swaps the tension of substance and essence for the problem of how 
to reconcile an Aristotelian view of individual entities as the main subjects of 
knowledge and reality, with a Neoplatonic view of emanative being and forms as 
ontologically prior. This is made clear, for Burrell, in Boethius, who utilises 'the realist 
conception of universals prior to things (ante res) when needing to express their 
containing priority, and the conceptualist view of them as dependent on things (post res) 
when deferring to Aristotle's insistence. ' 52 
Aquinas familiarity with Boethius, and Neoplatonism generally, helps him to 
develop a key feature of his theology - the essence/existence distinction. The final 
catalyst is the work of Avicenna, who, in Burrell's words, is 
less preoccupied with Aristotle's quandary regarding the proper way to characterize 
existing individuals so as to secure their exemplary status, than he is to concerned to 
find a way of characterizing essences so that their existences in things may be properly 
I . d 53 exp rune . 
What A vicenna brings to the table, as it were, is the idea that an essence can tell us what 
it is to be a table but not whether there actually is one. Avicenna's deliberations get him 
as far as this: 
identifying a new mode of composition in everything that is not necessary. It is a 
''composite duality" - not that of matter and form, which he presumes throughout, but 
one of essence (mahiyya) and some other factor that causes the individual thing to be. 
49 Stephen Everson, 'Psychology', in Jonathan Barnes ( ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.l71 
5
° CfBurrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.64 
51 John. M. Dillon, 'Neoplatonism', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2"" ed. 1999), p.605 
52 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.64 
53 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.65 
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That factor is never identified as such, although it would be tempting to identify it as 
anniyya . . . yet . . . anniyya expresses "the real existence of a particular individual" 
rather than identifying what it is that makes the individual exist. 54 
Essence has thus been drawn far enough away from a Platonic or Neoplatonic 
commitment to the concrete separate existence of abstract universals to enable Aquinas 
to make the requisite step: to make 'existence' something that the individual has that 
means its essence is actual. That this was not a simple move can be seen from, first, the 
critical flak Avicenna's work takes from Averroes' misunderstanding it and deciding 
that existing was accidental for him 55, and, second, that after Aquinas' death the 
existence/essence composition principle was embroiled in critical battle56 . 
Nevertheless, the achievement undergirds much of Aquinas' philosophical and 
theological progress, since it allows him (with strong justification) to identify 
metaphysics as the study of being as being whilst reasserting the importance of the 
individual entity as the subject of knowledge and categorisation of reality, thereby 
getting him out of Aristotelian trouble regarding substance and essence, and 
Neoplatonic trouble regarding emanation, in a more satisfying way than the haphazard 
Boethian approach. He gets out of Aristotelian trouble because he can talk about 
'being' and about what it is for an entity to exist (or come to be) without having to 
provide an account resolving the concepts of first substance, second substance and 
essence using solely Aristotelian resources - but he can still concentrate on individual 
things in the world. He gets out of Neoplatonic trouble because he can talk about 
'being' as something that individual things in the world have without having to suppose 
an emanative gulf between the two, or reducing being to an accident; individual entities 
are not an afterthought or final iteration of the infinitely more important 'being', nor are 
they simply a conglomeration of universals. Most importantly, it allows him to provide 
a link between God and the creature, by arguing that God is what gives existence to an 
individual entity, making it actual without that needing to imply causation of change in 
something already there. 57 
By way of summary, allowing us to see clearly the connection with creation, 
Aertsen describes Aquinas' view of the progression of philosophy as going through 
54 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.66 
55 Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.69 
56 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.99tf. 
57 For more detail on this development, see Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p. 100-l 03; Burrell, 
'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, p.68-70; Owens,' Aristotle and Aquinas', in CCAq, 
p.49-52 
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three stages: alteration, generation and creation58 . The pre-Socratic philosophy allows 
for alteration, since a substance, which is matter, takes on accidental forms- changes in 
properties and relations as we might now see it. Aristotelian philosophy allows for 
generation, since matter is eternal and takes on substantial forms to become actualised 
as individual entities, which can then change in their accidents. But Aquinas' break-
through of considering existence as such allows for creation, since it opens the question 
of a cause of being-at-all in addition to a cause of being-this( -rather-than-that) and 
being-this-thusly. 
This philosophical evolution means that creatio ex nihilo (where nihilo means 
literally from no previous extant stuff, as Aquinas is at pains to point out against the 
philosophical presumption that the nihilo would refer to formless prime matter) is now a 
philosophical possibility to an extent which goes beyond assertion or internal coherence 
- after all, both Augustine and Anselm asserted it and made it coherent, as Aquinas was 
well aware59. It is grounded in a strong metaphysical construction and understanding of 
what it is for an individual to exist. It also has important work to do laying the 
groundwork for Aquinas' treatment of divine eternity and of the debate over whether 
the world is eternal, as we shall soon see. 
If we look again at Aertsen's characterisation of the progression of philosophy 
under the headings of alteration, generation and creation, having grasped roughly what 
the basis of creation is for Aquinas, the next step is to fmd an analysis of change. This 
in turn will enable a grasp of why, for Aquinas, God is simple and doesn't change - an 
important stage in understanding his view of God and time. 
The core of change for Aristotle is the causing of matter to take on or alter form, 
although it should be noted that matter is a logical concept here rather than a specific 
'stuff' (hence clay is the matter substrate which remains stable throughout the formation 
and destruction of a pot, but clay itself can be analysed as a composite and so could 
come to be or cease to be clal0). This causation is four-fold and can fortuitously be 
illustrated by chocolate buttons: the material cause is the chocolate, the formal cause is 
button-ness, the efficient cause is the machine that injects and moulds chocolate, and the 
final cause is something like our desire for button-shaped chocolate. 
58 Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting', in CCAq, p.20-30 
59 In, for example, De /Eternitate Mundi. 
60 SeeR. J. Hankinson, 'Philosophy of Science', in Jonathan Barnes ( ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.ll8-122 especially p.ll9, and Barnes, 
'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p.94-98 for more detail 
23 
Aristotle uses the distinction of actuality and potentiality to do a lot of the work 
here. 61 Potentiality describes a capacity for something to become actual through a 
cause; generally it is the case that it is matter that has the potential and the cause is 
efficient or final, but a substance can also be in potentiality with respect to something 
(e.g. Socrates with respect to being sunburnt). Since nothing is defined by its 
potentiality, potentiality is accidental and not essential. In a difficult move, Aristotle 
also makes actuality fundamentally prior to potentiality; the best we can make of this is 
that something must already be x in some way if it is to cause something else to be x 
(this is less problematic for motion, but more so for chocolate buttons).62 
For Aquinas, it is clear that Aristotelian metaphysics provides for accidental 
change and substantial change (roughly corresponding to the headings of alteration and 
generation): Wippel gives the example of a piece of wood being either a bed or a bench 
(accidental change) compared to air becoming water (substantial change)63 . Aquinas 
has different options to Aristotle, however, on account of his reasoning about existence, 
which we have already seen. First of all, 'in composite entities, there is a twofold 
actuality-potentiality composition. Matter is potentiality with respect to substantial 
form. Arid material being's composite essence is itself in potentiality with respect to the 
thing's act of being (esse). ' 64 (The essence is composite in a material being because it is 
subject to the limiting principle of prime matter, which also provides individuation65). 
To clarify: the key move here is that any essence is potential until actualised by 
existence- this is a move outside of Aristotle's capacity. 
Aquinas can then do better with making actuality prior to potentiality because 
every essence is potential until caused to exist, and clearly only something that exists 
can cause something else to exist. This could be extended to reasoning that only 
something that exists can cause a change in another existent, which makes more sense 
than the Aristotelian ideas that Aquinas nevertheless supports. 
All of this gives rise to the following line of argument: because essences need to 
be given existence, we require an existence-giver. Things cannot give themselves 
existence, since something needs to exist in order to act. Whatever gives existence 
cannot have an essence separate from its existence, since if it did the essence would 
61 Perhaps too much work- see Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p. 96, for comments on this. 
62 See Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in CCAr, p.94-96 for more detailed treatment. 
63 Wippel, 'Metaphysics' in CCAq, p.llO 
64 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.lll 
65 By contrast, angels are not material and have no prime matter component in their essence -
consequently Aquinas has to argue that each angel is a separate 'species', since individuation between 
two angels with the same defining essence is impossible- cf Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.lll-112 
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have to have received existence from something else before it could exist66, and 
Aquinas will not accept infinite causal chains67 as a resolution of that difficulty. This 
gets us to subsisting existence: an entity in which essence and existence are identical 
(note the echo of Neoplatonic Being as the primary reality, but sans emanative 
baggage). From here, we must affirm that subsisting existence is wholly actual, because 
there is nothing of it to be actualised - no essence which is not already actual, and no 
matter because there is no essence needing actualisation and individuation through 
material corning-to-be. This also fits with actuality being prior to potentiality; 
subsisting existence can actualise any potentiality and has no potentiality itself. It 
should be quite evident that there can be no accidental change or substantial change for 
subsisting existence. The former is ruled out because it requires matter and the 
concomitant potentiality, whilst the latter is ruled out because there is no matter and no 
form separate from existence itself. 
Naturally enough, Aquinas' subsisting existence is indeed Aquinas' God. He 
even, with a philosophically cheeky flourish, makes the link between this view of 
subsisting existence and the Old Testamental pronouncement of 'I am He who is' 68 . 
The bare bones of the above description are fleshed out to become the foundations of 
divine simplicity and divine immutability. Mutability is comprehensively ruled out by 
most of the account, but can be summarised by 'lack of potentiality'. Simplicity is 
fundamentally true because God is the only one who is not a composite of essence and 
existence (since the two are identical), and not just because God is immutable as 
Augustine and Anselm described it69. One ought to be able to see straightforwardly 
from this that there will be an effect on the doctrine of divine timelessness: Aquinas 
accepts Aristotle's definition in the Physics that time is 'the numbering of before and 
after in change' 70, so it follows that we should expect time not to apply to the simple, 
immutable God about which we have been talking. However, there is a second 
philosophical foundation to this position which is routed through the concept of 
accidents. 
The final step, therefore, is a brief consideration of Aquinas adoption of 
Aristotelian accidents. Aristotle categorises the following nine accidents in addition to 
66 For a take on this from the angle of the metaphysics of participation, see Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in 
CCAq, p.94-95 
67 For the Islamic background in this see Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in CCAq, 
p.65-68 
68 ST la.l3.11 
69 Brian Davies, "'Simple": Introduction', in Brian Davies ( ed. ), Philosophy of Religion A Guide and 
Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.S34-536 and n.l4. 
70 Aristotle, Physics, IV, II.220a25, cited in ST la.10.3 
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the category of substance: (i) quantity, (ii) quality, (iii) relation, (iv) location, (v) time, 
(vi) position, (vii) having, (viii) doing and (ix) being affected71 . To give a compact 
example: (i) two (ii) blonde (iii) giants were (iv) in the market place (v) yesterday, (vi) 
sitting (vii) wearing armour and (viii) throwing dice while (ix) getting sunburnt. 
Aquinas holds that there are ten categories, and that they are not reducible72. Emphasis 
should be placed here on the point that properties and relations are accidental insofar as 
they are not definitional of a substance - i.e. they are not in the essence of an entity. 
Wippel describes them as 'different modes or ways in which being is realized', when a 
substance (the first category) is being per se 73 . 
The category that we need to pay attention to here is that of time. From what we 
have seen, it should be clear that accidents require a potentiality and a cause to bring 
them about - if the substance exists already, then accidental change suffices, otherwise 
the essence will need to be given existence such that a potentiality is actualised both in 
terms of creation and substantial change, and then (not necessarily a temporal then, but 
a logical or ontological one) the substance can take on accidents. 
The concept of God as subsisting existence, it is apparent, does not fit with the 
idea of having accidental properties. No essence is in potentiality to be actualised, no 
potentiality exists to take on various modes of being; philosophically, God is cut off 
from the possibility of having accidents. Since temporal qualification is among the 
categories of accidents, it follows that God's being cannot be temporally modified, in 
the same way that God's being cannot play dice or get sunburnt. It is also notable that 
the categories of accidents entail that God does not really have relations to the world (x 
sustains y), even though the world really has relations to God (y is sustained by x): as 
Craig observes, this permits a smooth avoidance of objections to divine timelessness 
based on God's creative relationship with his temporal creation74. 
What I hope I have been able to show is just how much work Aquinas' 
philosophical commitments (and indeed innovations) do in the development of his 
theology. This is important for three different reasons. First, and most obviously, it 
will make the discussion of his work on eternity more straightforward and less arcane or 
arbitrary for the modem reader. Second, it feeds into the methodological considerations 
with which my thesis is concerned, by showing how important philosophical 
developments were for Aquinas' work- if there are good arguments for the interrelation 
71 See Smith, 'Logic', in CCAr, p.SS 
72 See Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.l09 and further reading provided in his n.95 
73 Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in CCAq, p.92 
74 Craig, 'The Tensed vs. Tense less Theory of Time: A Watershed for the Conception of Divine Eternity', 
in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions ofTime and Tense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.225 
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of philosophy and theology of time and eternity today (which I intend to show that there 
are) then we should expect no less of an interreliance. But no less importantly it shows 
that taking Aquinas as an authority on divine timelessness is not wise if it simply 
involves quoting his theological formulations - not even if it involves recourse to 
demonstrating how those formulations spring from others concerning divine simplicity 
and immutability- and it is certainly not wise to think that one can cherry-pick divine 
timelessness and disagree with Aquinas elsewhere. By and large the metaphysical 
milieu has altered enough, especially with regard to the concept of existence75 , that we 
should be highly cautious of adopting theological positions that demand problematic 
metaphysical commitments, and I hope this is a persuasive argument for persisting with 
the approach of this thesis. 
Aquinas on Eternity 
The Boethian definition of eternity is the cornerstone of Aquinas' discussion, 
and he quotes it almost immediately: 'eternity is the instantaneously whole and perfect 
possession of unending life.' 76 Aquinas engages with this definition in the usual 
scholastic way by first offering several objections, targeting various elements to varying 
degrees. In the first place, he asks whether we should employ a negation- 'unending' -
in defining eternity, since this implies a defect where there is none77. The thought here 
seems to be that being 'without an end' causes a tension with concepts such as 'whole 
and perfect', suggesting that something is lacking from the complex concept of eternity, 
which makes it less than it should be. 
Secondly, he disputes that eternity is a concept which has to do with duration, 
suggesting that the correct ontological complement of eternity is not 'life', as Boethius 
has it, but 'existence', since 'duration is connected with existence rather than with 
life. ' 78 On the same basis, Aquinas argues that possession is conceptually unconnected 
with duration, and that since eternity has to do with duration, the use of 'possession' in 
the definition is not correct.79 
75 As the literature on the ontological argument alone will attest, see e.g. Graham Oppy, Ontological 
Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) for bibliographical 
resources and literature review. 
76 De Consolatione v, prosa 6. PL 63, 858; ST la.IO.l 
77 ST la.IO.l obj I 
78 ST la.IO.l obj 2 
79 ST la.IO.l obj 6 
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Thirdly, Aquinas questions the conjunction of 'whole and perfect', saying that 
the former implies that eternity has parts on the grounds that 'one uses the word 
"whole" of something having parts' 80, and if eternity is simple and has no parts then the 
word 'whole' is misleading or incorrect. He goes on to argue that 'perfect' ts 
superfluous because 'whole' and 'perfect' have the same basic conceptual content. 
Finally, he provides a Scriptural objection, citing Micah and St. Paul81 , who both 
use the word 'eternity' in conjunction with 'days' and 'times' respectively ('days of 
eternity' and 'times eternal'). Aquinas points out that 'several days or several times 
cannot occur instantaneously. ' 82 He posits the conclusion that 'eternity therefore is not 
instantaneously whole. ' 83 
There are two key arguments that Aquinas uses to construct replies to these 
points. The first, which he uses throughout the Summa Theologice, is that we generally 
come to know the simple through the complex, or grasp what we do not know by using 
what we do know. In this case, the argument is that we come to know eternity through 
knowing time. The first objection, concerning negation, can therefore be answered by 
arguing that negation can be constructive; we need to negate the composite in order to 
grasp the simple, and clearly 'unending' removes the complex elements of beginning 
and end ('for both may be regarded as ends' 84). 
His second argument is that time 'is merely the numbering of before and after in 
change' 85 , which quotation he extracts from Aristotle's Physics (IV, 11.220a25). In 
other words, change implies succession and by numbering successive parts we obtain 
the phenomenon of time. Thus, Aquinas argues, the notion of something changeless 
produces the notion of something timeless: eternity. He characterises eternity in two 
propositions and employs these, together with the first argument, to answer the 
remaining objections. Essentially, eternity has no beginning or end, and no succession. 
Thus, first, 'anything existing in eternity is unending, that is to say, lacks beginning and 
end,' since, 'one can assign a beginning and end to any changing thing. ' 86 Secondly, 
'eternity itself exists as an instantaneous whole, lacking successiveness,' 87 smce 
succession implies change. 
80 ST la.IO.l obj 3 
81 ST la.IO.l obj 4; Micah 5:2; Romans 16:25. 
82 ST la.IO.l obj 4 
83 ST la.IO.l obj 4 
84 ST la.IO.l 
85 STla.lO.l 
86 ST la.IO.l 
87 STla.lO.l 
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We can here see Aquinas' conception of eternity arising primarily out of his 
conception of change (which point we can relate to the philosophical underpinnings 
which we have already seen) - although it should be noted that here Aquinas is 
interested primarily in characterising eternity rather than God, and so does not make use 
of other points, for example concerning subsistent existence. 
Aquinas answers some of the objections more convincingly than others. For 
instance, the objection to eternity being called 'whole' he defeats easily, saying 'eternity 
is called whole, not because it has parts, but because nothing is lacking to it. ' 88 We can 
see the structure of his objection to using both 'whole' and 'perfect' more clearly in 
light of this: some may find it odd that Aquinas considers an objection relying upon the 
identity of these two concepts, but given that his interpretation of Boethius' definition 
takes 'whole' to mean 'nothing lacking' - which is much closer to the concept of 
perfection- we can see that the objection needs to be addressed. Aquinas does indeed 
address it, by the following argument89. 'Instantaneously whole', he says, is used to 
emphasise that what is in eternity is not in time; eternity is not successive. 'Perfect', on 
the other hand, is used to remove the possibility that eternity as an instant is like a 
temporal instant; the latter is 'imperfect' in that it is only temporarily actual, as part of a 
succession, and is not 'whole' since it is only a part of the temporal sequence. Thus, 
'instantaneously whole and perfect' means, for Aquinas, that eternity is neither 
successive (as time is) nor incomplete, like a 'frozen now', but rather is akin to an entire 
'time' which consists solely in a 'now'. One might suggest the respective analogies of a 
still from a reel of film and a single photograph, where the first makes sense only as one 
of a succession of images, whereas the second stands alone for us to make what we will 
of it. 
Concerning the Scriptural question, Aquinas reasonably points out that God is 
described in bodily terms and eternity in temporal terms, but that in both cases metaphor 
is being employed90 . Thus, the Scriptural uses of 'eternaVeternity' should not be 
considered normative for our technical definition of such terms. 
Aquinas replies less convincingly to the objection which suggests favouring 
'existence' over 'life' for Boethius' formulation, by saying that 'in point of fact, that 
which is eternal is not only existent but living,' 91 that living is more associated with 
88 ST la.IO.l ad 3 
89 ST la.IO.l ad 5 
90 ST la.IO.l ad 4 
91 ST la.IO.l ad 2 
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activity than IS existence, and that duration may be seen in activity more than in 
existence. 
Similarly, on the point of 'possession', Aquinas argues simply that 'to possess 
something is to hold it firmly and immovably' 92 and that the use of 'possession' 
signifies 'the unchangeableness and constancy of eternity. ' 93 
Aquinas then turns his attention to the question of whether God is eternal. He 
cites four possible points against such an attribution. The first is again based upon 
Boethius, who says that 'the flowing instant produces time, and the abiding instant 
eternity. ' 94 Aquinas argues from this that God cannot be called eternal because 'one 
cannot ascribe to God something produced. ' 95 Similarly, he notes that Augustine states 
that 'God is the source of eternity. ' 96 Both Augustine and Boethius, therefore, could be 
accused of ruling out the attribution of eternity to God on these grounds. It is important 
to note that the Boethian point is a problem for Aquinas metaphysically because if 
something is produced then what it is produced in must in some way have potentiality 
(not a problem that Boethius would be thinking of, because he is operating within a 
Neoplatonic structure). Again, the Neoplatonic language is causing problems with the 
Augustinian point; presumably if eternity is produced by God, it is something other than 
existence- how can Aquinas fit this with his concept of God as subsistent existence? 
Aquinas uses a parallel approach to argue that one cannot ascribe eternity to God 
because one cannot measure God, and 'eternity is a sort ofmeasure.'97 He provides two 
further arguments based loosely on Scripture. The first is that eternity cannot measure 
that which exists before or after it, and yet the Liber De Causis and Exodus suggest that 
God exists respectively before and after eternity. Similarly, Aquinas notes that past, 
present and future cannot apply to eternity, and yet Scripture uses all three tenses when 
speaking of God. In all of these points, he asks whether God could in fact not be 
eternal. 
Aquinas provides a strong reply to these problems, based upon the assumption 
(argued for in his previous chapter) of God's unchangeableness. He argues that, if God 
is entirely changeless, as he has shown, then our concept of eternity must follow on 
from this. Thus, primarily, he argues that eternity is only 'produced' 'according to our 
way of conceiving the situation.' Boethius, therefore, must be speaking of how we 
92 ST la.IO.I ad6 
93 STia.IO.Iad6 
94 ST la.10.2; De Trinitate IV; PL 64, 1253 
95 ST la.I0.2 obj I 
96 ST la.I0.2 obj I; Liber 83 Quaest. 23; PL 40, 16 
97 ST la.I0.2 obj 3 
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derive a concept of eternity (since we do not experience it as God does). Augustine's 
point - God as the source of eternity - Aquinas explains by considering it under the 
concept of 'shared eternity'; he wishes to assert that God can share His 
unchangeableness and His eternity with 'other things. ' 98 
Aquinas once again adopts the strategy of referral to the derivation of human 
concepts to address the problem of eternity as measure; he argues that in actuality 'God 
and eternity are the same thing ... the notion of measurement arises only in our way of 
conceiving the situation. ' 99 What Aquinas wishes to argue here should, for clarity, be 
split into two propositions. The first is that we think of temporal concepts as being a 
measure of time, with eternity being at one extreme - as the 'instantaneous present' 
without succession. It is a mistake, however, to place eternity on a spectrum; rather, 
eternity as timelessness is more akin to the absence of the temporal spectrum - this, it 
seems, is a presupposition taken from previous arguments, but we can also see how 
Aquinas would think of it as making evident sense within his metaphysical scaffolding 
- if time is an accident, atemporality is not placed on a spectrum with this as also 
accidental. Aquinas' second point, which is explicit, is that God is the only being who 
properly possesses and is its own eternity. This is reinforced in the next article, where 
Aquinas asks whether eternity belongs to God alone. Aquinas' grounds for equating 
eternity with God are underpinned by his concept of divine simplicity, for which he 
argues in Question 3 of the Summa, and therefore takes as already established - once 
again, we have seen the structural features of this already. The overall force of the 
point, then, is that our notion of any concepts having to do with time carries the 
implication of measurement of time, but not only is eternity a denial oftemporality, it is 
also intrinsic to God rather than being a condition of God's existence. Eternity cannot, 
therefore, be applied to God as a measure without being in some sense erroneous, since 
it is neither external to God nor strictly a measure of duration. 
Aquinas approaches the two objections from textual authority in a very similar 
way. His most direct and brief response is to the challenge that past, present and future 
tenses are used of God. He argues simply that these are used not because God changes 
and is in some sense 'subject to' past, present and future, but rather because '[God's] 
eternity comprehends all phases of time.' 100 In other words, God's relationship to time 
is such that His 'instantaneous now' has access to - envelops- all points of time; all 
times are 'now' for God, but we, who are temporally conditioned, must relate this to our 
98 Suggestions for this might include the angels, for example. 
99 ST la.l0.2 ad 4 
100 ST la.l0.2 ad 4 
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experience by employing tenses. It is notable that this is a more purely theological 
point; if it is underpinned by anything in particular, it would presumably be that 
whatever gives existence to everything must, if it is not temporally conditioned, have 
'equal access' to everything in that giving. 
The second textual challenge provides another avenue of exploration for this 
idea The challenge is that scripture cites God as existing before and beyond eternity. 
Aquinas argues that God exists before eternity in the sense that God is eternal before He 
shares this eternity with anything else101 We might want to suggest that Aquinas has an 
idea of God as 'ontologically prior' to everything else (in terms of being subsistent 
existence), including time - an idea that we shall revisit when considering Augustine, 
but this should be marked out as distinct from what he is examining here. The concept 
of ontological priority applies more to the idea of time extending infinitely far back (vis 
a vis the debate over whether the world is 'eternal'), or to the problem of any concept of 
'before time' (Aquinas and Augustine), whereas Aquinas is here attempting to deal with 
a more distinctly Neoplatonic point; eternity was claimed to be the duration of the 
emanation oflntelligence (as immaterial substance)102 from Being (the One). Hence the 
importance of establishing that eternity can be shared; Aquinas needs to emphasise that 
God is prior to eternity so that he cannot be criticised for making God in any way 
secondary, or an emanation, but he also needs to maintain that God is eternal in God's 
self. The notion of God sharing eternity is the method he chooses to resolve this 
tension. 
In order to overcome the problem of God's existence 'beyond eternity', Aquinas 
notes that 'eternity', in Exodus, is synonymous with 'ages': 'So that God is said to reign 
beyond eternity because he outlasts all ages, outlasts, that is to say, any given 
duration.' 103 He goes on to complete the rebuttal by arguing that, if one were to allow 
eternity to mean instead 'everlasting', God 'would still reign beyond it, because his 
reign is instantaneously whole.' 104 This point will recur, both in Boethius and 
Augustine as well as in Aquinas, and is a key to the notion of eternity since it brings us 
to the idea of God's eternity as enveloping time, and being separate from, yet related to, 
time. 
In the third article of the question, Aquinas asks whether eternity belongs to God 
alone. One may glean from the ensuing discussion further elucidation of Aquinas' view 
101 ST la.l0.2 ad 2 
102 Aquinas, Summa Theologice, trans. T. McDermott, p.l41, n.a 
103 ST la.l0.2 ad 2 
104 ST la.l0.2 ad 2 
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of eternity. He makes three challenges; broadly, they are as follows. First, those who 
achieve heaven may become eternal. 105 Secondly, those who are sent to hell 
'depart ... into eternal fire.' 106 These both reduce to essentially the same point: what is 
the case if our souls, or some other realm which is not God Himself, are eternal? 
Finally, Aquinas objects that 'what is necessarily so is eternally so. ' 107 Since various 
things - particularly certain propositions - are necessary, we may deduce that several 
things may be considered to be eternal. 
The reply which Aquinas formulates is very direct: that God alone is eternal in 
the correct usage of that term. This effectively means that he must supply an 
explanation to resolve the three challenges considered above. Before doing so, he 
provides an exceptionally clear statement of his concept of eternity as argued for 
previously. 
Eternity, in the true and proper sense, belongs to God alone, for eternity, we said, 
follows upon unchangeableness, and God alone, as we showed, is altogether 
unchangeable. 108 
With this in mind, he re-emphasises and re-applies two points for which he has 
previously argued, in order to demonstrate that the three problems noted can be 
reconciled with his view of eternity. First, he argues that God 'shares' 
unchangeableness with some elements of creation; to the extent that anything shares in 
God's unchangeableness, it shares in God's eternity. This is a development of the point 
found in ST 1 a.l0.2 ad 1. 109 
Secondly, he again raises the linguistic point that eternity is often used to mean 
merely 'a long time', and this echoes similar points made in ST 1a10.1 ad 4 and ST 
1 a 10.2 ad 2. He links it on this occasion with the previous argument, suggesting that 
things which merely 'endure for a long time' partake to a lesser degree in God's 
unchangeableness, and therefore to a lesser degree in God's eternity. 
Aquinas resolves the problems as follows. He argues that the angels and saints 
share in God's unchangeableness and eternity 'still more fully ... as they contemplate 
God' 110 than do any other creatures, and that consequently 'one tells of many eternities 
105 ST la.l0.3 obj I 
106 ST la.l0.3 obj 2 
107 ST la.l0.3 obj 3 
108 ST la.l0.3 
109 ST la.l0.3 
110 ST la.l0.3 
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because many are the things sharing God's eternity by contemplating him. ,Ill Hell, on 
the other hand, 'is called eternal only because it is unending,' 112 the idea being that one 
suffers for an infinitely long time, and 'the pains of hell include change. ' 113 Finally, 
Aquinas suggests a resolution of the problem of necessary things being eternal. He 
appeals to Aristotle's claim that truth resides in the mind, and argues that necessity is a 
mode of truth. Thus 'necessary truths are eternal only if they exist in the eternal mind, 
which is nothing other than God's mind. ' 114 
It may be seen, therefore, that in dealing with the various problems facing his 
concept of eternity, Aquinas' key strategy is to ensure that we do not lose sight of the 
very specific concept of eternity that he wishes to propound. His other points, 
linguistic, logical or theological, are aligned to this purpose. The result is a keen sense, 
instilled in the reader, that one must differentiate the way we naturally think about time, 
and what we read about it, from the concept of God's relation to time that is derived 
from God's changlessness and simplicity. We must yet ask, however, to what extent 
Aquinas should be seen as a part of a tradition and to what extent an entirely original 
thinker in respect of this view of eternity. 
Concerning Boethius 
We have seen that Aquinas makes Boethius' definition of eternity the starting 
point of his explorations. The next logical step, therefore, if we require a fuller 
understanding of Aquinas' position and the 'timeless God' tradition of Divine eternity, 
is to turn to Boethius, who wrote about seven hundred and fifty years earlier than 
Aquinas. 
In Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius mrun concern ts 
episternic; he begins the sixth chapter with the following statement: 
Since, therefore, as we have just shown, every object of knowledge is known not as a 
result of its own nature, but of the nature of those who comprehend it, let us now 
examine, as far as we may, the nature of the divine substance, so that we may also learn 
what is its mode of knowledge. 115 
111 ST la.l0.3 ad I 
112 ST la.l0.3 ad 2 
113 ST la.l0.3 ad 2 
114 ST la.l0.3 ad 3 
115 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts (London: 
Penguin, revised edition 1999), p.l32- Consolation references provided in dual version for ease of 
referral 
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He then outlines a concept of eternity as the foundation of an argument 
concerning free will and divine foreknowledge, which also forms the final argument of 
the work as a whole. The structure of his argument is as follows. First, he needs to 
establish that God knows and/or sees everything that occurs. His model of eternity is 
designed to accomplish this, but leads to the problem that God sees things seemingly 
'before they happen', which could imply that humans cannot control what happens, or 
are in some way fated to perform certain actions. Boethius solves this by arguing 
essentially that God's foreknowledge makes states of affairs necessary in one sense but 
not in another; the necessity of foreknowledge is not causal, and we therefore have free 
will, but any state of affairs which we bring about becomes necessary in the sense that, 
once done, it cannot be undone. Expansion of this argument will both aid the exposition 
of Aquinas, and raise issues for future consideration, and to such an expansion I now 
tum. 
Boethius begins by saymg, as we have seen, that eternity is 'the complete, 
simultaneous [/instantaneous] and perfect possession of everlasting lifeol 16. He uses the 
contrast of the creature in time, which 'is in the position of not yet possessing tomorrow 
when it has already lost yesterday'; there is no temporal thing 'which can embrace 
simultaneously the whole extent of its life'. 117 
Boethius goes on to make a distinction between eternity 'proper' and the eternity 
which should more properly be considered as simply 'everlasting'. Anything that is 
temporal, even if it is endless and had no beginning (Boethius cites Aristotle's view of 
the world as being eternal in this sense118) 'is still not such that it may properly be 
considered eternal.' This is so because '[ i]ts life may be infinitely long, but it does not 
embrace and comprehend its whole extent simultaneously. It still lacks the future, while 
already having lost the past. '119 
The truly eternal, then, 'will always be present to itself, controlling itself, and 
have present the infinity of fleeting time.' 120 Boethius uses Plato to consolidate his 
view, and in so doing also defends Plato from the accusation that he believed the world 
to be co-eternal with the Creator, 'for it is one thing to progress like the world in Plato's 
theory through everlasting life, and another thing to have embraced the whole of 
everlasting life in one simultaneous present.' 121 Thus, 'God ought not to be considered 
116 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l32 
117 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l32-33 
118 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l33 
119 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l33 
120 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l33 
121 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l33 
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as older than the created world in extent of time, but rather in the property of the 
immediacy of His nature.' 122 The thought here seems to be that if the world is 
everlasting, one cannot say that God is 'more everlasting', or that God existed 'before' 
the world, yet in some sense clearly God as Creator must be 'prior to' the existence of 
the everlasting world (we shall return to this when considering Augustine). Since 
Boethius is concerned primarily with knowledge, he chooses to present this as epistemic 
priority, portraying God as possessing already in an eternal present that which the world 
must traverse a temporal interval in order to possess. Boethius concludes that we 
should distinguish, with Plato, between God as 'eternal' and the world as 'perpetual' 123. 
Having clarified his position, Boethius moves on to consider the particular issue 
of God's knowledge, which, he asserts, 'embraces all the infinite recesses of past and 
future and views them in the immediacy of its knowing as though they are happening in 
the present.' 124 Such a knowledge 'is better called providence or "looking forth" than 
prevision or "seeing beforehand". For it is far removed from matters below and looks 
forth at all things as though from a lofty peak above them.' 125 This is used by Aquinas 
in his analogy of the citadel from which one can see the whole of a parade, compared to 
those on the ground who can only see a part at a time126. 
Boethius then addresses the problem of foreknowledge qua necessitation; m 
other words, does God's knowledge of our future have a causal element? He argues that 
'this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature and property of things; it simply 
sees things present to it exactly as they will happen at some time as future events.' 127 
However, he does not find this sufficient to answer the problem. 
If you say at this point that what God sees as a future event cannot but happen, and what 
cannot but happen, happens of necessity, and if you bind me to this word necessity, I 
shall have to admit that it is a matter of the firmest truth, but one which scarcely anyone 
but a student of divinity has been able to fathom. 128 
Boethius therefore makes a second attempt to solve the problem. In this he 
employs a distinction between two sorts of necessity, which he calls simple and 
conditional. The examples which he employs are slightly confusing, in that they do not 
correspond to what we might choose in light of the progression of logic and modality 
since Boethius' time. He cites as a simple necessity 'that all men are mortal' and as a 
122 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.133 
123 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.134 
124 De Conso1atione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.134 
125 De Conso1atione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.134 
126 See De Veri tate ll. 12; ST Ia.14. 13 ad 3 
127 De Conso1atione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.134 
128 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.135 
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conditional necessity that 'if you know someone is walking, it is necessary that he is 
walking."29 To clarify Boethius' point, we might choose the following examples 
instead. To exemplify simple necessity, one might say that it is necessary that an object 
cannot be both red and green all over, simultaneously. The clarification of conditional 
necessity is less demanding, but we might want to remove the epistemic element present 
in Boethius' example. Thus, an example of conditional necessity might be that, 
necessarily, if someone drops a golf ball off of a skyscraper in normal conditions then it 
will fall to the ground. 
The point of the distinction between types of necessity is the affirmation of free 
will: I can choose whether or not to drop the golf ball, and if I choose to drop it I can 
predict what will happen to it; furthermore, I can choose to paint it red or green. I 
cannot, however, choose to have a golf ball that is both entirely red and entirely green 
all over at the same time. Boethius' argument is that God's knowledge of the future 
places future human actions in the category of the conditionally necessary, not that of 
the simply necessary: 'No necessity forces the man to walk who is making his way of 
his own free will, although it is necessary that he walks when he takes a step.' 130 Thus: 
God sees those future events which happen of free will as present events; so that these 
things when considered with reference to God's sight of them do happen necessarily as 
a result of the condition of divine knowledge; but when considered in themselves they 
do not lose the absolute freedom of their nature. 131 
Boethius goes on to explain that it is impossible for two events which are 
happening not to be happening, and yet perfectly plausible that one came about 
necessarily and the other contingently. He uses the example of the sun rising and a man 
walking, the idea being that the latter involves free will and the former (as we would 
now put it) comes about because the Earth obeys certain laws of nature. The argument, 
then, is that just as we may observe an action without causing it, so by extension God 
may observe a future action without determining the agent in the present. 
Boethius provides a further clarification by considering the question of whether 
one may 'escape' divine foreknowledge. He posits that 'if it lies in my power to change 
a proposed course of action, I will be able to evade Providence, for I will perhaps have 
altered things which Providence foreknows.' 132 His response to this is that it is 
129 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l35 
130 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l35 
131 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.IJS-6 
132 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l36 
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impossible and the reason for its impossibility encapsulates the essence of the 
compatibility of free will and Divine foreknowledge. 
You can alter your plan, but since this is possible, and since whether you do so or in 
what way you change it is visible to Providence the ever present and true, you cannot 
escape divine foreknowledge, just as you cannot escape the sight of an eye that is 
present to watch, though of your own free will you may turn to a variety of actions. 133 
Similarly, it is not the case that changing one's intentions for an event 'changes' 
the divine knowledge, in the way that many people have portrayed changing the past 
with a time machine as altering the future; rather, it is that God 'with one glance 
anticipates and embraces your changes in its constancy.' 134 So, for instance, at two 
separate times, t' and t", before event E, one has two consecutive intentions as to how to 
act atE- I' and I"- but discards all of them in favour of act A at the moment of E. It is 
not the case that at t", say, God's knowledge of A is exchanged for some A". Rather, 
there are three discreet moments represented by t', t" and E, and God eternally knows 
that I', I" and A correspond to those moments. This does not exert any causal force 
upon the agent. 
In conclusion, then, what does Boethius' account of eternity amount to? We 
know that his concern is more epistemic that metaphysical in nature, yet we may still 
extract a coherent view for our purposes. Boethius' view of God is one of a God outside 
of time and yet related to it. Outside of time because God's possession of everlasting 
life is in an instantaneous/simultaneous present, and God's knowledge 'transcends all 
temporal change' 135 ; related to time because this God is not posited in such a way in 
order to be abstracted from the universe of human thought and experience but to be 'a 
spectator from on high of all things', and one who knows all that transpires in the 
universe, in our past, present and future. 
The connection between Aquinas and Boethius, then, can be seen not simply as 
the quotation by the one of the other as a starting point to an original piece of work, but 
as a distinct view of eternity held in common. Although Aquinas does not consider 
Divine foreknowledge or omniscience under the heading of eternity, he does as we have 
seen, say that God's eternity 'comprehends all phases of time. ' 136 This, taken 
133 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l36 
134 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l37. Again, this 
emphasises a distinction between how God would see things and how humans think of them. We have a 
'plan' concept of intention, which means that we see 'outcomes' as changing dependent upon our current 
thoughts 
135 De Consolatione v, prosa 6; The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. Watts, p.l34 
136 ST la.l0.2 ad 4 
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epistemically, appears to be compatible with Boethius' arguments 137. Nevertheless, we 
must also be aware that Aquinas and Boethius are singing from different metaphysical 
hymn-sheets when it comes to underlying philosophical commitments. For this reason, 
perhaps the most important things that we can take with us from Boethius' work are, 
first, the concept of ontological priority (which for him is most likely to result from his 
Neoplatonic commitments) and, second, the idea of a divine perfect life lived 'all at 
once' with nothing lost to the past or yet to be gained from the future. This latter seems 
a more genuinely theological point, as opposed to more directly derivative from 
metaphysical commitments, and is something to which we shall return (particularly in 
the final chapter of the thesis where we examine the possibility of contemporary 
theological arguments which neither require nor assume prior metaphysical 
commitments). 
To complete the vtew of both the 'tradition' of divine timelessness which 
reaches its conclusion in Aquinas, and of the philosophical commonalities and 
differences pertinent thereunto, some attention must be paid to Augustine, writing a 
little over a century before Boethius. We know that Aquinas was well aware of 
Augustine's work- and indeed, quoted him quite extensively in De /Eternitate Mundi 
during his vehement disagreement with those who thought that creatio ex nihilo and the 
proposition that the world has always existed are contradictory, where he suggests that 
if it were contradictory Augustine would certainly have pointed this out. 138 
Augustine and Timelessness 
Augustine opens Book XI of his Confessions with the following statement: 
'Lord, eternity is yours, so you cannot be ignorant of what I tell you. Your vision of 
occurrences in time is not temporally conditioned.' 139 From this, he sets out to explore 
connected issues and problems, but it is important to note that we cannot yet assume 
that Augustine interprets eternity as timelessness. It is easy to read this into the 
quotation, but 'not temporally conditioned' could equally mean that God's perception or 
knowledge is not affected by time, which would be compatible with perfect memory 
and perfect foreknowledge but existence in time. 
137 Although Aquinas' own treatment of God's knowledge gives cause to question this compatibility. 
138 De A:ternitate Mundi 16 
139 Conf 11.1.1; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
p.221- Confessions references provided in dual version for ease of referral 
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Augustine begins with the Creation, briefly describing the idea of creation ex 
nihilo and emphasising the ontological priority of God over the universe. 
The way, God, in which you made heaven and earth was not that you made them either 
in heaven or on earth ... Nor did you make the universe within the framework of the 
universe. There was nowhere for it to be made before it was brought into existence. 140 
This, combined with his primary statement, sketches a concept of God's eternal 
and non-spatial existence: God's knowledge is not time-dependent as ours is, implying 
that he is either outside of time as we have seen Boethius to posit, or within time but 
omniscient in such a way as not to be affected by time. The non-spatial concepts then 
incline us to favour the option of eternity as outside time, and indeed Augustine 
proceeds to set up a problem that will allow him to explore the links between 
atemporality and non-spatial existence, and question more closely the concept of God's 
eternity, and the relation between God and time. 
Augustine first asks, therefore, whether God's speaking the Creation was subject 
to temporal succession 141 . Augustine argues that the Creation was accomplished 
through the Word, which 'is spoken eternally, and by it all things are uttered 
eternally.' 142 Thus, 
It is not the case that what was being said comes to an end, and something else is then 
said, so that everything is uttered in a succession with a conclusion, but everything is 
said in the simultaneity of eternity. Otherwise time and change would already exist, and 
there would not be a true eternity and true immortality. 143 
He goes on to interpret the concept of 'beginning' in Genesis as being the same 
beginning as that 'Beginning' found in the Prologomenon of John, i.e. the Word; 'the 
source whence we have our being.' 144 Augustine wishes, then, to emphasise three 
things. First, the co-eternity of the Word with God; secondly, the inclusion of time 
within the created order, and finally the ontological rather than temporal priority of God 
over the Creation. In other words, the 'means' of creation is, being of one substance 
with God the Father, extant under the same conditions allotted to God - in this case, 
eternity. This entails that the Word was not temporally successive in any way, in 
relation either to God the Father or to Creation; hence, time must be a part of the 
14
° Conf 11.5.7; Augustine: Confessions p.225 
141 Chadwick notes in relation to this that Plotinus, a key figure in Augustine's intellectual development, 
emphasised the temporal succession of human words. (Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, 
p.225, n.ll) 
142 Conf 11.7.9; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.226 
143 Conf 11.7.9; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.226 
144 Conf 11.8.10; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.227 
40 
creation. Since this is the case, it is problematic to think of anything as 'before' the 
creation in temporal terms, although clearly if God creates ex nihilo, then God must in 
some sense be prior to the created universe. These three elements follow logically in 
just the order presented, and are clearly grounded in a particular concept of eternity. 
Augustine proceeds to clarify both the issue arising (just what is the 'before' 
relation that God has to the created universe?) and his conception of eternity by 
addressing the question of what God was doing before the Creation. He lays the 
problem out in the following way. If God is eternal in the sense of being outside time, 
and therefore changeless, then how could the Creation have come about, since if God 
was not creating and then created, then this implies that a change took place such that 
before there was not Creation and afterward there was Creation? So either Creation did 
not come about (which it plainly did), or God is not eternal, or Creation is eternal with 
God. 
Augustine's answer to this challenge is to re-affirm and examine the idea that 
there was no time before Creation, because time was created with the rest of Creation. 
This allows him to emphasise God's relation to time, so conceived. 
You have made time itself. Time could not elapse before you made time. But if time 
did not exist before heaven and earth, why do people ask what you were then doing? 
There was no 'then' when there was no time. It is not in time that you precede times. 145 
He goes on to express his conception of eternity more fully. He makes a point familiar 
to us from Boethius' ideas, that eternity is 'always in the present' and yet embraces all 
of the past and future in a single non-successive eternal moment. 
All your 'years' subsist in simultaneity, because they do not change ... [they] are 'one 
day' and your 'day' is not any and every day but Today, because your Today does not 
yield to a tomorrow, nor did it follow on a yesterday. Your Today is eternity. 146 
He also says, when distinguishing between time and eternity in City of God that 'the 
former does not exist without some movement and change, while in the latter there is no 
change at all' 147 
It is clear, then, that Augustine's conception of God's eternity corresponds 
closely to Boethius' conception of eternity: God is outside time, and creates time - as 
He creates space - with the rest of the Creation. Thus, God is prior to Creation but not 
145 Conf 11.8.15-16; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.229-30 
146 Conf 11.8.16;Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.230 
147 De Civ. Dei 11.6 
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temporally because this would requtre that time existed independent of Creation; 
likewise the Word of God by which God creates is co-eternal, and is therefore not 
successive in itself or in the relation between God and Creation. Augustine even 
touches on the issue of divine foreknowledge which we have seen to be of such 
importance to Boethius, using the contrasting analysis of a person singing a psalm to 
highlight the difference between our 'knowing' the future and God knowing the future. 
When I sing a psalm, Augustine explains, 'I have full knowledge of that psalm I sing. I 
know by heart how much of it has passed since the beginning, and what and how much 
remains until the end.' 148 However, God knows our past and future in a very different 
way. Our thoughts and experiences are extended in time, but God's are complete and 
outside time. Thus: 
A person singing or listening ... suffers a distension or stretching in feeling and in sense 
perception from the expectation of future sounds and the memory of past sound. With 
you [God] it is otherwise ... Just as you knew heaven and earth in the beginning without 
that bringing any variation into your knowing, so you made heaven and earth in the 
beginning without that meaning a tension between past and future in your activity. 149 
This brings Augustine's argument full circle to echo his opening remark: 'Lord, eternity 
is yours, so you cannot be ignorant of what I tell you. Your vision of occurrences in 
time is not temporally conditioned.' 150 We now have a far clearer picture of what 
Augustine means by this opening remark. In conclusion, then, Book XI of the 
Confessions gives us a good idea of Augustine's concept of eternity, both through his 
discussion of the Creation and God's relation to it, and through his own justification of 
divine foreknowledge. Augustine thinks of eternity as a 'simultaneous present', m 
which there is no succession or alteration, which places God and God's Word as 
ontologically, but not temporally, prior to the entirety of a creation which includes the 
temporal as well as the spatial. This means that God's knowledge of His creation is 
radically different to any creature's knowledge of it, a difference which must be 
expected, since the former is not temporally conditioned, whilst the latter is so 
conditioned. 
Augustine's arguments can be helpfully compared with much of what Aquinas 
says. In particular, in view of the foregoing discussion, it is useful at this point to 
consider Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, wherein he addresses arguments 
148 Conf 1!.31.41;Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.245 
149 Conf 11.31.41; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.245 
15
° Conf 11.1.1; Augustine: Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick, p.221 
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which are not found in the Summa Theologiae. The third paragraph of 989, for 
example, reads as follows: 
For when we say that things were eternally produced by God, we do not mean that an 
infinite time has preceded in which God ceased from acting, and that after a determined 
time He began to act. Rather, we mean that God produced time and things together in 
being after they were not. And so we need not consider that the divine will willed to 
make things not then, but afterwards, as if time already existed. Rather, we need only 
consider that He willed that things and the time of their duration should begin to be after 
they were not. 151 
This certainly matches with Augustine's account of eternity as ontological 
priority, and Aquinas brings this together with his core conception of eternity in the last 
two paragraphs of 990. The comparison between Aquinas and both Augustine and 
Boethius (neither of whom he cites here) is striking: 
There is, however, a duration before time, namely, the eternity of God, which 
has no extension of either before or after, as does time, but is a simultaneous whole. 
This does not have the same nature as time, just as divine magnitude is not the same as 
corporeal magnitude. 
Thus, when we say that outside the world nothing exists except God, we do not 
posit any dimension outside the world. In the same way when we say that before the 
world nothing was, we do not posit a successive duration before the world. 152 
However, we must remember that Augustine and Boethius did not have the concept of 
subsistent existence to work with and were operating from more distinctively 
Neoplatonic philosophical structures. Thus, a concept of ontological priority is 
available to all three, but in Augustine and Boethius it springs from a sense of God as 
the source of everything, whereas for Aquinas there is a more specific metaphysical 
structure of God as subsistent existence which actualises individuals. In the latter case 
the phrase 'God produced time and things together in being after they were not' has no 
whiff of emanative metaphysics but connotes pure act in individual creation. 
In bringing together the work of Aquinas in the Summa Theologire and in the 
Commentary to Aristotle 's Physics, with both Augustine and Boethius, we have seen a 
clear strand of thought as it persists through approximately a millennium, even if the 
philosophical underpinnings vary. Although Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas all had 
different points of concern, and wrote with different aims in mind, there are also evident 
overlaps. We see in Augustine a concern with the interaction between Neoplatonic and 
151 Sent. Super Phys. 8.2.989; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, trans. R. J. Blackwell, R. J. 
Spath and W. E. Thirlkel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p.485 
152 Sent. Super Phys. 8.2.990; Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, trans. R. J. Blackwell et al, p.487 
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Christian thought, in Boethius a similar interaction directed toward epistemic and moral 
concerns, and in Aquinas an engagement with Aristotle as well as a background of 
Neoplatonic thought, and an embedding of the issue of eternity within a larger and more 
systematic approach. Despite the differences in both historical period and intentions-
visible most notably in Boethius' concern with epistemic priority, and only secondarily 
with the ontological priority of God more clearly present in Augustine and Aquinas -
the concept of a God outside time can be extracted with remarkable coherence from the 
three authors, and ought to be engaged with in a philosophically and historically 
responsible way as a foundation of a discussion of divine eternity. 
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Chapter II- Methodological Considerations: Science, Metaphysics, and Theology 
Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis, I observed that if we are to say something about 
God and time, it seems prima facie advisable to look at what physics and philosophy 
have to say about time, since both clearly have a considerable amount to say about it. 
Having seen, historically, an engagement on the part of Aquinas (in particular, as a great 
exponent of this sort of enquiry) with a wide range of scholarship in his own time, what 
ought we to do about such an engagement with contemporary resources in philosophy 
and science, given their development and diversification? Before getting into the 
philosophical detail in the next chapter, I need to ask two questions: first, is there some 
structure into which we can place both science and philosophy that facilitates their 
interaction with theology in a rigorous, rather than arbitrary, fashion, allowing us to see 
the complex interrelations of the trio as required? And, second, how should we 
understand these interrelations, given that we cannot easily prise one apart from the 
others for separate consideration (for it seems clear that science and theology carry 
philosophical assumptions, theology and philosophy can presume or drift free of 
empirical data, and science and philosophy may affect or be affected by theological 
presuppositions)? 
By way of clarification, I take the best sort of answers to these two questions to 
be answers which will not be simplistically over-determinative or reductive of these 
relationships, running a risk of rendering a caricatured structure that leaves no space for 
subtlety or flexibility. My concern, rather, is to find a way of minimising arbitrary (and 
therefore potentially misunderstanding-laden) employment of one discipline by another 
in such a way as to optimise the visibility of the flows of arguments and resources 
between them, and to do this in a way that will not only work for the case of 'God and 
time' but could be adapted for other cases as well. In short then, I think that good 
answers should reduce the complexity of the interrelations of science, philosophy and 
theology in the sense of reducing messiness, rather than in the sense of reducing variety 
and sophistication. 
This chapter, therefore, compnses three main tasks. First, I shall ask what 
approach contemporary scholars in the field of 'God and time' have taken to the use of 
science in their philosophical/theological discussions. Finding a paucity of direct 
methodological material despite an increasingly scientifically involved range of 
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arguments, I then consider whether a structure can be developed so as to provide a 
scientifically and philosophically responsible approach. 
The second section finds this structure in the work of Katherine Hawley, who 
outlines a suitable approach with regard to science as a guide to metaphysics. This 
suggests ways in which metaphysical claims might be held to be confirmed by science, 
and ways in which alleged confirmation might be responsibly challenged. I then 
enquire as to whether this can be applied mutatis mutandis to science and philosophy's 
relationship to theology. 
The third section, then, argues that direct application of the same methods is 
inappropriate and that instead science and philosophy should be seen as placing 
boundaries and constraints on theology. This is rather different to providing means of 
confirming, disproving or otherwise straightforwardly determining theology. I conclude 
by observing the importance of holding in balance these interactions (science with 
philosophy, and both with theology), in line with the methods described. This will lead 
naturally in to the third chapter's consideration of the links between philosophies of 
time and theologies of divine eternity, and the sorts of constraints placed by the former 
on the latter. It also prepares the way for the extensive discussion of the impact of 
science on the debate, found in chapter five. 
Structures in the Contemporary Debate 
How have contemporary scholars of divine eternity approached the issue of how 
or whether science can inform the debate? There appear to be three tendencies: not to 
employ science, to make more or less arbitrary (or critically unreflective) use of it, and 
to place it within a philosophical structure to strengthen or weaken certain arguments -
i.e. a more critically reflective use. In briefly exploring this spectrum in various works 
on the area, I aim to show that no-one has actually started from the methodological 
question of how to determine the legitimacy of scientific support/undermining of 
philosophicaVtheological claims. I can then go on to attempt an answer to this question 
in the remainder of the chapter. 
Beginning with important works that come under the category of 'not employing 
science' in the divine eternity debate (noting that this should not necessarily be taken to 
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mean 'deliberately ignoring science') we can note that Nicholas Wolterstorff153 does not 
engage with it and neither does Edward Wierenga154, although interestingly the latter 
has the following to say in his introduction to The Nature of God: 
One fascinating feature of the philosophy of religion is that it usually involves issues 
from other areas of philosophy; advances in the philosophy of religion always seem to 
require solutions to problems in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, or 
h.l hi II . 155 p 1 osop ca ogtc. 
To some extent this is only a methodological step away from noting the addition of 
'philosophy of science' or of science as an influence on other philosophical fields. 
Moving on to the category of 'critically unreflective use' of science, one finds 
some variation. Elenore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, in their seminal article 
'Eternity' 156, make use of special relativity theory in order to provide analogous 
imagery and logic for their attempt to construct the concept of 'eternal-temporal 
simultaneity'. However, they are ready to hedge their work about with disclaimers: 
Also: 
simply in order to set the stage for our characterization of ET -simultaneity, it will be 
helpful to look at a standard philosophical presentation of temporal simultaneity along 
Einsteinian lines ... We want to leave aside the philosophical issues raised by this 
example and simply accept it for our present purposes as a standard example illustrating 
Einstein's notion of the relativity of temporal simultaneity. 157 
[the RT-simultaneity principle] and the Einsteinian conception of time as relative have 
served the only purpose we have for them in this paper, now that they have provided 
and introductory analogue for our characterization of ET-simultaneity, and we can now 
revert to a Newtonian conception of time, which will simplify the discussion without 
involving any relevant loss of precision. 158 
And again: 
And if it must be said that the absolute present is absolute only within a given 
observer's reference frame, that will not affect our use of the concept here ... 
153 Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'God is Everlasting' in Michael Peterson et al, Philosophy of Religion: 
Selected Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.309-320; "Unqualified Divine 
Temporality" in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.) God and Time: Four, p.l87-213 
154 Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God, pp.l-12 & pp.l66-202; 'Timelessness Out of Mind' in 
Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff ( eds.) God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p.I53-164 
155 Wierenga, The Nature of God, p.8 
156 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 'Eternity', Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981 ), p.429-458 
157 Stump & Kretzmann, 'Eternity' p.437 
158 Stump & Kretzmann, 'Eternity' p.440 
47 
distinguishing individual reference frames for our discussion of time in the rest of this 
paper would be as inappropriate as taking an Einsteinian view of time in a discussion of 
hi . I hr I 159 stonca c ono ogy. 
Setting aside how, why and to what extent Stump and Kretzmann have been criticised 
over ET -simultaneity, we can simply note that in some quarters their article has become 
a cautionary tale for the casual employer of science in philosophical and theological 
discussion. For instance, Padgett notes whilst criticising them for misunderstanding 
relativity theory: 
Stump and Kretzmann claim that this discussion of relativity is merely a heuristic 
device (p.440). But even so, surely this idea is necessary to the demonstration of the 
coherence of ET-simultaneity, given the dependence of their explanation of its 
h I . . 160 co erence upon re atiVIty. 
In the process of their own critiques of Stump and Kretzma.nn, related points are made 
by DeWeese161, who in pained terms decides to 'confess that I find Stump's and 
Kretzmann' s explication of ET -simultaneity quite puzzling on several counts,' 162 and by 
Craig163, who wraps up the first part of an eight-page shredding ofET-simultaneity with 
the following non-apology: 
No doubt Stump and Kretzmann would cry foul at such a critique, in that I have pushed 
the analogy to Relativity Theory far beyond their intent. I concede the point, but then I 
simply cannot make sense out of the language of observation found in their definition 
nor of the metaphysical relativity appealed to in its explication. 164 
By contrast, in his extensive work Time and Eternity, Brian Leftow provides a 
balanced and cautious treatment of Stump and Kretzmann but, concluding that ET-
simultaneity raises more problems than it solves, decides to make a clean breast of 
things by looking for an alternative to their development ofBoethian ideas, taking as his 
starting point some Anselmian thoughts on eternity 165 . Nevertheless, the special theory 
of relativity is taken up enthusiastically for the purposes of several arguments. Does 
Leftow provide us with a methodological discussion of this? After a fashion: 
159 Stump & Kretzmann, 'Eternity' p.440 N.B. by 'absolute present' here Stump & Kretzmann seem to 
mean something like 'our experience of now-ness'. 
160 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 70-71 within the wider discussion of pp.69-72; see 
also 'Eternity and the Special Theory of Relativity', International Philosophical Quarterly 33:2 (1993), 
pp.219-223 
161 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l64 within the wider discussion ofpp.l60-l66 
162 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l6l 
163 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.88-96 within the wider discussion of pp. 79-96; see also 'The Special 
Theory of Relativity', Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), p.l9-37 
164 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p. 93 
165 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.216-217 
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One can say ... that the finite speed of light shows us that space and time have a certain 
structure, that this structure accounts for the relativity of simultaneity, and that if space 
and time do have this structure, they have it objectively and so regardless of anyone's 
means of knowledge. . .. that the temporalist is driven to deny the literal truth of STR 
confirms the validity of my argument's inference: if STR is true, as I am assuming, then 
a spaceless God is also timeless. 
Leftow generally demonstrates a good understanding of STR uses it well enough, and 
in this case makes a good episternic argument (at least up to asserting that he assumes 
STR is 'true'). Nevertheless, in thirteen indexed uses of relativity theory, this is the 
closest Leftow gets to a methodological assertion (in this case, that STR is 'true') and 
the view it represents seems to warrant all sorts of employment of relativity theory in 
philosophical and theological arguments. This would perhaps not be terribly 
problematic if things were done in detail on a case-by-case basis - which in some 
instances, one could argue, they are, although in other places things are a little too 
casual (e.g. 'Current physics overwhelmingly confirms the claim that "time" and 
"space" just name abstracted aspects of a single reality, space-time' 166). However, 
Leftow spends fourteen pages at the outset of his work discussing 'working 
assumptions' 167 and it would surely make it easier for both him and his readership if 
some more extensive idea of how he views relativity theory was to be included in this, 
particularly if he is going to talk about people being 'driven to deny the literal truth' of 
relativity theory, as opposed to a more cautious 'challenge some philosophical or 
theoretical implications of relativity theory'. 
Moving on to more critically reflective uses of science, one might begin with 
Alan Padgett. His approach might be summarised by his comment that 'STR teaches us 
a good deal about the world, but not all there is to know, even about time.' 168 In his 
monograph, Padgett gets into fairly detailed discussion of relativity theory, its 
assumptions, its interpretations, and to what extent it can be used to support various 
arguments in philosophy of time and theology of eternity169. He also sets out some 
groundwork for this in his 'establishing the parameters' chapter, where he considers 
time measurement and metrics and how this can impact our thoughts on time 170. 
However, he does not really consider issues of method: how science can be used, and 
166 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.24 
167 Leftow, Time and Eternity, pp.6-20 
168 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.93 
169 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, pp.82-95 
170 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, pp.7-10 & pp.l7-18 
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how science that is used can be challenged. Instead, he simply engages in direct 
argumentation when specific points arise. 
Dean Zimmerman provides an interesting case with his article 'God inside time 
and before creation' 171 . Here, he essentially says that he will be ignoring relativity of 
simultaneity and associated issues because, first, he will be talking about time pre-
creation (and therefore prior to physical reference frames) and, second, because divine 
temporalists - of whose potential views he writes - generally adhere to philosophical 
viewpoints which require 'getting around' relativity theory in various ways. In short, 
then, he provides evidence that he has considered methodological issues, but based on a 
decision regarding suitable methods for his inquiry he is not going to discuss them 
because he doesn't need to. One can hardly complain, but neither can one claim that 
here is a methodological consideration of the sort we would like. 
Returning to monograph-sized considerations of God and time, two scholars 
stand out as providing the closest to a full methodological discussion of how science 
interacts with philosophy/theology. It is notable that they are also two of the authors 
publishing most recently on the topic. 
William Lane Craig has written extensively on arguments involving the nexus of 
contemporary physics, philosophy of time and theology of eternity. His strategy, 
broadly speaking, is as follows: 
1) To invoke a Newtonian VIew of absolute time as being the true 
(metaphysical) time of Divine duration, driving a wedge between this and 
physical time. 
2) To allow relativity theory to correct Newtonian physical time, but to 
defend the possibility of metaphysical time on the grounds that relativity 
theory would excise it on verificationist grounds which are nowadays 
philosophically untenable. 
3) To use the resultant epistemological undermining of proponents of 
relativity theory to discount standard interpretations in favour of a 'Neo-
Lorentzian' interpretation of relativity theory. 
4) Thereby to propose a coherent position in which God is temporal, the 
present is a vital ontological feature of reality, and modem science 
demonstrates a privileged reference frame corresponding to the present, 
which is also God's present. 
171 Dean W. Zimmerman, 'God inside Time and before Creation', in Ganssle and Woodruff(eds.) God 
and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.75-94 
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However, despite all of this, there is not actually any discussion of what is appropriate, 
for example, about his epistemic challenge to certain interpretations of relativity theory 
in comparison with other challenges one might make, or indeed what criteria there are 
for admitting the kind of support that standard interpretations apparently give to certain 
philosophical and theological positions (which might be a good first step to deciding 
what sort of challenge to mount). 
What we have instead is something more picturesque. For instance, opening his 
chapter on 'the classical concept of time': 
Let us recur to the fount of the classical concept of time ... of Sir Isaac Newton, with a 
view toward acquiring some insight into the concept of time in contemporary physics 
and its implications for one's doctrine of divine eternity. 172 
This is followed straightforwardly by expository material. Coming out at the other end, 
he rounds off his chapter conclusion with the claim that 
Even if we do not go so far as Newton in including discourse about God in scientific 
theorizing, still it is clear that if we are prepared to draw metaphysical inferences about 
the nature of space, time, and spacetime on the basis of physical science, then we must 
also be ready to entertain theistic metaphysical hypotheses such as Newton deemed 
relevant. 173 
Similarly, when criticising Leftow's approach he is swift to say that it 'evinces a certain 
naivete concerning the philosophical foundations of the received physical interpretation 
of Relativity Theory and an uncritical acceptance of that interpretation. ,~ 74 However, 
again there is no consideration of criteria or degree of engagement: what would count as 
a critical acceptance, and where do burdens of proof lie when debating the issue? 
Garret DeWeese provides us with by far the most clearly presented 
methodological commitment in this area. We shall return to his wider methodological 
concerns later in the chapter, since a key feature of his introduction is as follows: 
I believe that the search for a solution to God's temporal mode of being and his relation 
to temporal creation should be shaped by certain constraints. I shall not offer arguments 
for the followin~ constraints, but only indicate the role they play in guiding the dialectic 
ofthis project. 17 
172 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l43 
173 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l62 
174 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l07 
175 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.5 
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By the end of this chapter and the next it should be clear that a large portion of this 
thesis is concerned with expanding upon the nature of these constraints, and the present 
chapter must therefore provide an adequate account of how and why such constraints 
should be structured in a particular way. In the meantime, let us ask a more specific 
question of DeWeese: namely, does he have a suitable view of how science should 
interact with philosophy and theology, and how it may be invoked as support, or 
challenged as inappropriate, within that interaction? 
Speaking of philosophy of time and how it is affected by physics, he says that 'a 
metaphysical theory that entails the denial of well-confirmed experimental results 
predicted by contemporary scientific theories would be highly suspect. ' 176 Further, he 
makes the following observation whilst rejecting the idea that metaphysics is defunct or 
solely dependent on empirical science: 
I believe that metaphysics is an independent enterprise. But independent does not mean 
isolated, and the deliverances of the empirical science constitute some of the evidence 
that metaphysical theories must explain. Conversely, since data will always 
underdetermine theory, purely metaphysical considerations should be brought to bear in 
the process of theory adjudication. A successful theory will result from respectful 
interaction between the scientist and the philosopher. 177 
DeWeese's approach could be distilled into some principles: 
1) If a metaphysical claim entails the denial of good empirical data, this constitutes 
a reason to doubt the metaphysical claim. 
2) Metaphysical theories are not straightforwardly entailed and solely determined 
by empirical science. 
3) Metaphysical theories must explain empirical data, among other things. 
4) Within the bounds of (1-3), non-empirical arguments contribute to the 
arbitration of metaphysical claims/theories. 
This set of principles extracted from DeWeese gets us a long way to where we want to 
go, but it leaves some issues unaddressed and questions unanswered. If we have reason 
to doubt a metaphysical claim because it seems to conflict with successful empirical 
science, how should we go about reconciling them? What happens if the conflict is not 
between metaphysical theory and scientific data, but between metaphysical theory and 
scientific theory? Might there ever be non-empirical arguments that supersede scientific 
176 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.4 
177 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.6-7 
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ones? It seems we need a more precise structure if we are to avoid making bad moves 
in the game of interrelating science, philosophy and theology. Fortuitously, just such a 
structure is available. 
In her recent 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', Katherine Hawley explores 
the often sharp differences of opinion that characterise the arguments in this area 178 
This creates a desirable 'nuts and bolts' structure for understanding interactions between 
science and metaphysics, and which also allows interpretation of some of the critical 
moves made by those espousing 'scientific' metaphysics against more 'traditional' or 
'alternate' metaphysics, and vice versa. I take Hawley's approach to be preferable on 
account of being more focussed and detailed when compared to other articles expressing 
interest in the area: for example, Michel Esfeld's article on science and metaphysics in 
which he describes the thesis of his paper to be that: 
there is a mutual dependence between science and philosophy: philosophy in the sense 
of metaphysics needs science to know about what there is in the real world, and science 
needs philosophy in the sense of epistemology when it comes to developing criteria for 
the interpretation of scientific theories -that is, criteria for the assessment of knowledge 
claims contained in scientific theories 179. 
He also says: 
The justification for a revisionary metaphysics stems from science: our best scientific 
theories suggest the conclusion that a number of our common sense beliefs about the 
constituents of the world - as analysed by what Strawson calls descriptive metaphysics 
-are false. 180 
However, beyond outlining examples of the development of 'scientific metaphysics', 
Esfield does not provide further means of structuring or understanding either the way in 
which scientific resources impact metaphysical resources, or the criteria for acceptable 
challenges of metaphysics allegedly derived from science by independent metaphysical 
concerns. For the most part, this is because Esfield is concerned to show how 'scientific 
results>~ 81 give rise to revisionary metaphysics (i.e. revisions of our common-sense 
beliefs about the world and the accounts of reality we provide incorporating them), and 
thereby to show what 'scientific metaphysics' looks like. 
178 Katherine Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.451-470 
179 Michel Esfeld, 'Metaphysics of Science Between Metaphysics and Science', for Grazer 
Philosophische Studien, special issue Alex Burri and Christian Beyer (eds.) Philosophical Knowledge-
Its Possibility and Scope, January 2007, p.l 
180 Michel Esfeld, 'Metaphysics of Science Between Metaphysics and Science', p.2 
181 Michel Esfeld, 'Metaphysics of Science Between Metaphysics and Science', p.2 
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Hawley outlines 'optimist' and 'pessimist' positions and applies them to the 
increasingly fraught debate over whether the philosophy of time known as 'presentism' 
is defeated by considerations arising from the special theory of relativity and connected 
scientific and philosophical arguments. In providing a fairly detailed discussion of her 
work 182, my interest is twofold: first and foremost, Hawley's analysis, if agreeable, may 
prove extremely helpful to both that debate (which we must engage in chapter 5 as part 
of our wider discussion) and to the evaluation of Craig's work more generally, which is 
a complementary concern throughout the thesis. Second, we may usefully ask whether 
the ideas Hawley outlines can be applied in modified form to the question of whether 
and how science and metaphysics may be allowed to guide theology. The third section 
of the chapter will develop an answer to this question by arguing for an understanding 
of science and metaphysics as possible constraints on, or boundaries for, theology - as 
opposed to determiners (proof or disproof; confirmation or denial) of theology. Having 
incorporated the material from Hawley into my considerations, I will be able to build on 
DeWeese's observations to form a more streamlined and effective structure. 
Science and Metaphysics 
It may be prudent, in the first instance, to say something about what I take 
science and metaphysics to be. In part, what I take them to be (and what I think Hawley 
takes them to be) will become apparent through considering the question of whether and 
how science can act as a guide to metaphysics. It should be obvious that there is an 
assumption that the two are not identical, for example, and the sort of cases used to 
illustrate arguments in the following sections will provide more casual indications of 
what the remit of each is taken to be, and how their interaction highlights this 183 . In 
terms of more specific description, these words from Jonathan Lowe seem an apposite 
starting point: 
What is it, then, that metaphysics and physics have in common? Well, physics-and 
here I speak of modem physics-is an empirical science concemed to explain certain 
basic and ubiquitous phenomena in the natural world... Metaphysics is also concemed, 
though not exclusively, with the nature of things existing in space and time... But 
182 Although the material explicitly referring to the special theory of relativity and presentism will have to 
wait its twn, later in the thesis. 
183 It ought also to become clear early on that the two are not unrelatable: even the most rampant 
metaphysical idealist would not deny that one observes certain phenomena, although the account given of 
them may be alien to any scientific explanation. 
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metaphysics is not at heart an empirical science-it does not typically appeal to 
experimental or observational data in support of its claims ... its central concern is with 
the fimdamental structure of reality as a whole.184 
One might ask the question of this section of the thesis in two parts: first, 
whether and how metaphysics should appeal to experimental or observational data: 
second, whether and how metaphysics should appeal to scientific theories which appeal 
to experimental or observational data The way that these are phrased suggests working 
definitions of science as something relating observations of phenomena to explanations 
of phenomena through use of various theoretical structures and experimental 
methodologies, and of metaphysics as something which attempts to give an account of, 
or simply reason about, the nature of reality, using various conceptual structures and 
methodologies. Can definitions be given that unproblematically allow us to identify 
something as either metaphysics or science? I think not, but I think the problems that 
arise will result from the distinction between being and doing: there may be a scientific 
claim in a metaphysical theory where the metaphysician is adamant that they are 'doing 
metaphysics', or a metaphysical claim in a scientific theory where the scientist is 
adamant that they are 'doing science'. But I think that the above working definitions 
and the discussion to come, below, give us reason to think that we can identify such 
scientific and metaphysical claims, and persuade the metaphysician and scientist of their 
presence in the respective theories. 
To begin her exploration of the interaction between science and metaphysics, 
Hawley characterises 'optimism' and 'pessimism' as follows: 
The first view, roughly, is that if a scientific finding seems to bear upon a metaphysical 
matter, then you ignore it at your peril. Call this the 'optimist' view, since it is 
optimistic about the possibility of achieving metaphysical progress on the back of 
scientific progress. The alternative 'pessimistic' view is, roughly, that you can only get 
as much metaphysics out of a scientific theory as was put in by hand in the first place. 185 
The optimist, Hawley implies, would characterise the pessimist as prone to 
philosophical flights of fancy, and inclined to dismiss the empirical yardstick as 
conceptually impoverished. The pessimist would characterise the optimist as prone to 
buying into the conceptual baggage that accompanies scientific data, effectively treating 
the bathwater with the same respect as the baby. 
184 E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.2-3 
185 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.453 
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Hawley encourages us to see both sides of the argument, pointing out that each 
has a core element of something important to say: 
In line with optimism, it should be uncontroversial that our metaphysical beliefs ought 
to be empirically adequate, so long as 'empirically adequate' is understood to mean 
something like 'consistent with our beliefs about what we observe' or even 'consistent 
with the truth about what we observe'. 186 
But in line with pessimism, it should also be uncontroversial that no interesting 
metaphysical view is simply entailed by what we observe, that the content of a 
metaphysical claim outruns its empirical consequences, and a fortiori outruns its 
consequences for what has in fact already been observed. 187 
Hawley defends the 'core element' of optimism in several ways. She points out 
that the empirical adequacy is easily achievable using relevant auxiliary hypotheses; so 
we aren't saying that metaphysical content leads directly and simply to empirical 
content. She also points out that, if we are interested in truth and consistency when we 
seek good metaphysics, then the core element of optimism seems to follow. She further 
argues that there is no bar, in the 'optimistic core', on revising empirical beliefs as a 
result of metaphysical beliefs. Hawley observes that this core makes optimism 
plausible because we incline to linking empirical adequacy with scientific consistency 
on the grounds that science is empirically successful. 
Let's take an illustrative example of the core of optimism: we might say that it is 
consistent with our observations of light, biology, and physical chemistry that we form 
the belief that colouration is reducible to microstructural properties of certain bodies; to 
be coloured x is just to have physical property y. 188 It is also consistent to form the 
belief that colouration is an experience caused in a conscious self by objects with 
specific dispositions, and that objects themselves carmot be said to be 'coloured' 
independent of a human observer189. These (necessarily broad) characterisations of 
metaphysical considerations of 'colour' should not be independent of scientific 
descriptions of colour perception- involving the absorption of wavelengths of light, the 
light-sensitive structure of rods and cones in the eye, the operation of the optic nerve 
and the visual cortex, and other brain processes- and, indeed, should be consistent with 
them; this is the point of the optimistic core. It is not consistent with our observations 
of light, biology, and physical chemistry that we form the belief that colouration is 
186 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.454 
187 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.454 
188 For example, Thomas Reid's view has been associated with this position. 
189 For example, Dwnmett, Evans and McDowell have been associated with this position- generally with 
the addition of the standard proviso 'normal observers, normal conditions'. 
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reliant upon the existence of carrots in sufficient numbers: metaphysically and 
scientifically, if we believe this we have exceeded what is reasonable. 
There are strong defences also of the 'core element' of pessimism, which 
Hawley similarly lays out. Foremost, the empirical adequacy suggested by a 
metaphysical view's 'fit' within a coherent scientific view does not guarantee truth. 
Likewise, there may be incompatible metaphysical views with equal 'fit', so although 
we can use empirical adequacy as a desideratum, observes Hawley, we cannot call it 
truth. 
Let's look at an example of the pessimistic core. Returning to our colouration 
example, we could say that the physical properties of certain substances, together with 
certain biological facts about our colour-perception systems, entail that a normal person 
observing those substances under standard conditions will have an experience of a 
certain colour: it does not straightforwardly follow that colouration just is one or a set of 
physical properties of a substance. Additionally, if colouration just is microstructural 
properties of an object, there are more consequences than 'if you see an object with this 
colour then it has these properties'; for instance, it may affect what sort of account you 
give of hallucination, or of the possibility of perceptual knowledge. 
Having looked at the core elements, Hawley provides three views which 
accommodate what is uncontroversial in optimism and pessimism alike regarding 
involvement of metaphysical claims in an empirically successful scientific theory 
(henceforth 'ESST'). 
(Optimism) There are actual cases in which the involvement of a metaphysical claim in 
an [ESST] provides some reason to think that the claim is true. 
(Radical Pessimism) The involvement of a metaphysical claim in an [ESST] can never 
provide any reason to think that the claim is true. 
(Moderate Pessimism) There is a kind of involvement in theory which, were a 
metaphysical claim to achieve this involvement, would provide some reason to think the 
claim is true; but there are no cases of metaphysical claims being involved in theory in 
this way. 
She then goes on to show how these accommodate the uncontroversial claims. The 
claim that metaphysical beliefs should be empirically adequate is compatible with both 
forms of pessimism because 'to deny that metaphysical claims are confirmed by their 
roles in scientific theories is not to deny that metaphysical claims must be empirically 
57 
adequate.' 190 Incompatibility between a metaphysical claim and an ESST may be down 
to elements of the ESST that go beyond the empirical dat~ the metaphysical claim may 
still be empirically adequate. 
The claim that no interesting metaphysical claim is simply entailed by the 
empirical data is compatible with optimism because 'one can admit that involvement in 
an [ESST] does not entail the truth of a metaphysical claim whilst maintaining that it 
nevertheless provides some defensible reason to think that the claim is true. ' 191(my 
italics). In the same way that we may prefer one scientific theory over another when 
they are empirically equivalent (because one may integrate better with other theories, or 
provide more explanatory power), so we may prefer one metaphysical claim over 
another, where more than one is compatible with the scientific material. 
Hawley summarises: 
Optimists and Moderate Pessimists have a common view about justification which 
differs sharply from that of Radical Pessimists; Optimists and Moderate Pessimists 
differ over whether science can ever satisfy the condition for justifying a metaphysical 
claim. 192 
She moves on to discuss the relation between these three positions and that of scientific 
realism. Scientific realism is taken for the purposes of this thesis (and I am assuming 
for the purposes of Hawley's paper, since she indicates no deviation) to be the position 
that 'the subject matter of scientific research and scientific theories exists independently 
of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of science is the description and explanation of 
both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. ,~ 93 This position entails that 
claims about unobservable entities can sensibly be made and are amenable to scientific 
confirmation or falsification. 
Hawley argues that 'scientific realists should reject Radical Pessimism and those 
who reject scientific realism should reject Optimism. ' 194 The scientific realist who fails 
to reject Radical Pessimism seems committed to 
190 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.455 
191 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.455-6 
192 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.456 
193 J.D. Trout, 'Scientific Realism' in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 1999), p.821. Note that this is entirely compatible with 
'critical realism', which takes an independent physical world to be the primary object of knowledge but 
asserts that physical objects are not directly present to consciousness, being instead mediated through 
mental states (broadly construed). Cf for example C. F. Delaney, 'Critical Realism' in Robert Audi (ed.), 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, znd ed. 1999), p.l94 
194 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.456 
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finding some in-principle difference between claims about unobservable 'scientific' 
entities and 'metaphysical' claims, a difference which could explain why, although the 
former gain confirmation from their integration into successful scientific theories, the 
I d if h . . d 195 atter o not, even t ey are JUSt as mtegrate . 
Candidates for this difference are unpersuasi ve. If metaphysical claims are accused of 
having the wrong semantic status (lacking truth values or assertoric mode) one reaches a 
level of instrumentalism about the metaphysical and realism about the scientific that sit 
ill with one another. If, as is historically the case, content has shifted from the area of 
metaphysics to science as the latter expands, it seems strange to think of such past 
claims as gaining assertoric status or truth-value over time. Hawley's paper also works 
from the standpoint that metaphysics is viable in its semantic status. 196 
Moreover, the scientific realist accepts that there are topics which may be 
analysed using inference to the best explanation, and these overlap with the topics of 
metaphysics. Why then should they accept a pessimist position that empirically-derived 
evidence is simply not available for this process when discussing metaphysical claims 
as opposed to theoretical-scientific ones? It is not as if the pessimist position is 
suggesting that the evidence is available but insufficient for adjudicating the 
metaphysical claim in addition to the scientific claim for which it is sufficient. It just 
seems like an arbitrary decision to open the door to unobservable entities in science and 
close the door to metaphysical content at the same time. 
Hawley goes on to provide two reasons for rejecting scientific realism which, 
she argues, lead respectively to radical and moderate pessimism in a straightforward 
way. The first reason for rejection is that 'one might think that the involvement of a 
claim about the unobservable in generating predictive success is irrelevant to whether 
we should believe it.' 197 This leads to radical pessimism, since taking this view of 
posited 'physical' entities suggests that one's view of metaphysical entities should be 
the same. The radical pessimist who believes in the possibility of metaphysics, then, is 
someone who thinks that we have distinctive methods of enquiry in that field 198. 
The second reason is that 'one might simply think that claims about the 
unobservable never do any work in generating novel success.' 199 In other words, talk of 
electrons was good as a way of talking and explaining but didn't directly contribute to 
any ESST. This feeds into moderate pessimism, because it does not deny outright that a 
195 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.457 
196 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.457; cf p.452 
197 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.457 
198 Cf E. J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
199 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.457 
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claim about the unobservable could be involved in an ESST in such a way as to make 
the claim more plausible; it simply says that there just isn't this sort of involvement at 
the moment. 
Hawley turns her attention to the nature of 'involvement' itself, since this 1s 
what distinguishes the optimistic and pessimistic positions if scientific realism 1s 
accepted. She begins with realist responses to the anti-realist accusation that 
historically there are empirically successful theories which posited entities in which we 
no longer believe. Given this, says the anti-realist, how can we say that empirical 
success is reliable for determining the truth of theoretical claims? 
Hawley identifies two realist response strategies. The first is to argue that 
(especially if empirical success involves successful prediction beyond that originally 
intended by the theory) there are not in fact many historical ESST's on the 'discard' 
pile. This sort of debate between realists and anti-realists might take as its battleground 
something like the phlogiston theory of substances, combustion, and associated 
processes: did the theory have genuine empirical success, or did it really just account for 
experimental results after the fact? 200 If the latter, it was not a genuine ESST when 
discarded. 
The second response is that credit for empirical success need not be dispersed 
throughout a theory; empirical success does not licence equal belief in all elements of a 
theoretical structure, and some elements may be idle. For example, in the use of a 
miasma theory of disease before the development of the germ theory, one might argue 
that some empirical success was generated through more incidental elements of the 
theory - such as the importance of sanitary conditions - despite the actual 
ineffectiveness of the hypothesis of 'bad air' (as demonstrated by failure to deal with 
cholera)?01 !/miasma theory could be taken as an ESST, this may not therefore licence 
belief in the existence of'bad air' as described by the theory. 
The bottom-line argument, then, is that 'there are very few cases in which a 
claim about the unobservable is supported by its involvement in generating empirical 
success, but later rejected. '202 Building on this idea of involvement as empirical success 
leading to empirical confirmation, Hawley tries to lock down the mechanism of this 
involvement. 
20
° For background on the theory, see James Bryan Conant, ed., The Overthrow of Phlogiston Theory: The 
Chemical Revolution of 1775-1789 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,l950) 
201 For discussion of the development and use of miasma theory, see for example M. Susser and E. 
Susser, 'Choosing a Future for Epidemiology: I. Eras and Paradigms', American Journal of Public Health 
86:5 (1996), p.668-673 
202 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.458 
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Using the work of Stathis Psillos, Hawley suggests that a criterion for 
involvement with regard to the sort of entities that scientific realists and anti-realists 
debate about boils down to something like the following: 
If a claim H is to be involved in generating a prediction in a way which entitles it to 
share in the confirmation which successful prediction brings (according to the scientific 
realist, at least), H must satisfY two conditions with respect to the generation of 
prediction. First, it must be the case that the theory-minus-H cannot generate the 
prediction alone. Second, it must also be the case that there is no available, sensible 
alternative to H which could have done the work just as well.203 
By 'sensible alternative', we may understand 'independently motivated, non ad hoc, 
potentially explanatory, etc. ' 204 In short, then, if we cannot come up with something that 
allows the theory to work without the particular theoretical baggage in question 
(including the simple or 'special' case of simply ripping it out}, then we must conclude 
that it is not so much theoretical baggage after all, but rather fully involved theoretical 
content. By way of contrast, although it is a bit of a stretch, one might say that the 
claim of the existence of' bad air' in miasma theory, when simply ripped out, might still 
allow a predicted reduction in instances of a disease in situations where sanitation is 
improved as the theory demands. 
How will this translate to the case of optimism versus pessimism, where there is 
a disagreement over whether metaphysical claims actually are involved in generating 
empirical success? At a basic level, one can simply read the previous paragraph 
replacing 'theoretical' with 'metaphysical'. Moderate pessimists and optimists 
therefore disagree over whether anything has actually succeeded in fulfilling the 
criterion of involvement thus formed. 
When Hawley moves on to consider the situation in which optimistic and 
pessimistic metaphysicians find themselves ('What should a metaphysician do if told 
that her favourite metaphysical theory is undermined by scientific findings?' 205) she 
determines that, at first glance, there are two options for challenging a metaphysical 
claim seemingly embodied in science. First, one might challenge the empirical success 
of the theory. Second one might take disagreement between two theories (e.g. relativity 
and quantum theory) as a justification for caution or scepticism over the metaphysical 
consequences of both. 
203 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.459; cf Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How 
Science Tracks Truth (London: Routledge, 1999), p.llO 
204 Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, p.llO 
205 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.459 
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Even if it accepted that the science is a good guide to empirical adequacy, there 
is a further challenge which is possible: to take one's alternate metaphysics and 'fit' it 
with the empirical content of the relevant scientific theory in such a way that there are 
no clashes which result in implausible empirical consequences. This gets one part of 
the way to challenging the metaphysics seemingly embodied in the science. One then 
requires either Undermining or Counterargument, argues Hawley, and she gives the 
following accounts of those strategies: 
Undermining ... is the attempt to show that the scientific metaphysic is not involved in 
generating novel prediction, and thus that its appearance in a scientific theory does not 
. h" k" 2~ g1ve us reason tot m 1t true. 
This could be done either by finding a sensible replacement which is not ad hoc but also 
does not support the scientific metaphysic, or by re-formulating the scientific theory 
persuasively to show that the scientific metaphysic results from the formulation rather 
that the real content of the scientific theory. One must then provide separate, non-
scientifically arbitrated, grounds for preferring one's alternative metaphysics over the 
scientific metaphysics one is challenging. Note that these grounds cannot be 
scientifically arbitrated because the effect of the first part of the challenge is to set a 
'level playing field' of empirical adequacy: turning around at this point and claiming 
scientific support for one's alternate metaphysic would be roughly equivalent to 
persuading a Big Issue seller that you can't buy a Big Issue because you are as poor as 
they are, and then trying to persuade them to buy you lunch because, come to think of it, 
you would sell the Big Issue too, given half a chance. 
The second strategy is Counterargument, which 
accepts that the scientific metaphysics is genuinely confirmed by the role it plays in 
generating empirical success, but claims that independent reasons to believe the 
[alternative metaphysics] outweigh the scientific support?07 
Hawley writes that, in accord with what we have discussed thus far, the alternative 
metaphysics must still be empirically adequate, but in this case a more ad hoc rival 
theory is sufficient to do the job because we are not attempting to remove the efficacy of 
the scientific metaphysics in the theory. 
Hawley draws these elements together and relates them to the original cores of 
optimism and pessimism. The optimistic core of empirical adequacy for metaphysical 
206 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.460 
207 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.460 
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(as for other) beliefs and the suitability of contemporary science to providing a guide for 
such adequacy, is 'reflected in the requirement that [the alternate metaphysics] must 
provide a system of beliefs which ... is empirically equivalent to scientific theory (or, 
depending where the burden of proof lies, scientific metaphysicians must show that this 
cannot be done). '208 
Meanwhile, the pessimistic core - of empirical data being insufficient for direct 
entailment of interesting metaphysical positions - is reflected in the demand on 
scientific metaphysics to show its genuine involvement in empirical success generation 
(if the burden of proof lies on the alternate metaphysics, it must show no such 
involvement exists). 
These concepts and structures will become vital later in the thesis, where we 
must decide how far we should allow our science to guide our metaphysics in the case 
of time, and whether the challenges presented by those arguing a pessimistic viewpoint 
with regard to the metaphysics of time are strong enough to overcome what appear to be 
good reasons to be optimistic on the subject - indeed, also whether those arguing a 
pessimistic viewpoint are genuinely pessimistic after all. In particular, we shall relate 
an argument by Yuri Balashov and Michael Janssen (against William Craig's view) to 
the ideas laid out by Hawley, making the argument both clearer and more powerful as 
we see the extent of its force. This in turn will provide an important contribution to the 
question of what a defender of divine timelessness should be turning to as a resource for 
their proposal. 
However, in terms of methodology we are only part way through the story. 
Having laid out some resources for thinking about science as a guide to metaphysics, 
how then should we approach the question of how far (or whether) science and 
metaphysics should be a guide to theology? If we cannot make sense of this issue, we 
will be ill-placed to determine how the philosophy and science impacting our view of 
time can be resourced in our theological reflections. 
Science. Metaphysics. and Theology 
The structure in the case of science and metaphysics 'guiding' theology seems 
liable to be different for several reasons. First, theological claims are not present in 
either science or metaphysics as elements for which the success of their host structure 
provides confirmation or support. Second, insofar as theology is bound by concerns of 
208 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.461 
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consistency with philosophy or science, the augmentation by auxiliary hypotheses of a 
theological claim in principle (if not in practice) provides greater room for manoeuvre 
than analogical metaphysical claims in science. Finally, theology frequently treats of 
topics that are bound up with human responses to the world and to themselves, which 
makes theology as (or more) likely to be discussing value as truth-value. 
At the same time, there are obvious logical links to be made. If we hold that 
God created everything (not just as a way of saying something about the value of the 
world, but as a direct ascription of a causal activity to an entity) and an ESST leads to 
the discovery of a certain thing (say a chemical element209), we cannot hold both that 
God created everything and that God did not create the substance in question. The crux 
of the question thus becomes 'did God cause the nature of the universe to be x?' where x 
constitutes (the result of) a metaphysical claim. Thus, to the extent that an ESST 
supports the assertion of x, that ESST can restrict the logical possibilities of God's 
action and nature after the fact (i.e. I am not here denying that God could have acted 
differently, I am simply asserting that given God's action in one respect, logical 
limitations are present). In other words, for our purposes, if the nature of the universe is 
to have a specific temporal character, it may not be consistent with a God who is both 
changeless and responds to His creation, given that God has indeed created. 
It can be argued, then, that if science and metaphysics act as guides to theology, 
it is because they place constraints or boundaries rather than because their success lends 
confirmation to theological claims. In short, one might say that theology too should be 
empirically adequate. However, one key feature is that, if we wish to challenge a 
putative constraint theologically, it is not sufficient to provide an ad hoc theological 
model if this model would have repercussions on the science and metaphysics forming 
the constraint. Under such circumstances, the theologian (much as the alternate 
metaphysician) has to show how any metaphysical or empirical consequences are 
cashed out and made acceptable. 
For example, if an ESST demonstrates clearly that the universe's structure is 
such that it does not have a 'first moment of time', this places a constraint on theology. 
If a theologian wishes to argue that God created a world in temporal series and began by 
creating a first moment of time, it is not enough simply to develop a theological model 
of this. The model will not (prima facie) be empirically adequate, because it is making 
209 Cf the development of the periodic table of elements, where certain discoveries were made on the basis 
of theoretical prediction of what elements should exist and their properties. For extensive material on 
this, see Stephen G. Brush, 'The Reception ofMendeleev's Periodic Law in America and Britain', Isis 
87:4 (1996), p.595-628 
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a claim which, for the sake of argument, is straightforwardly false in the ESST. The 
theologian, then, must be able to show: 
1) That the model is an exercise in counterfactuals, arguing the best option for the 
case where the ESST turns out to be wrong somehow. Or .. 
2) That the claim about time in the ESST is not involved in making the scientific 
theory empirically successful. Or .. 
3) That the claim in the ESST is formulation-dependent; other formulations would 
be compatible with a first moment of time. Or .. 
4) That there is a semantic issue which, when resolved, brings the model and the 
ESST into compatibility (although there may be repercussions elsewhere in 
theology). 
Clearly, some of the above corresponds to strategies or ideas developed in Hawley's 
paper, and may involve serious commitment on the part of the theologian to 
understanding and working with the relevant science. Equally clearly, there may be 
relatively few claims made by a theological model that would be straightforwardly false 
in an ESST, which lends credence to pursuing the options above and does not simply 
equate speculative theology with claims which fail to be empirically adequate. 
Let us tum to consider what sort of constraints science and metaphysics may 
reasonably be said to place on theology. As I noted in passing in the first section of this 
chapter, DeWeese briefly canvasses some constraints that he sees as shaping the 
development of a theory of God and time. We saw only one in detail, when I derived 
some principles regarding scientific constraint on metaphysics from his comments. 
This has now been overtaken by the more detailed treatment given by Hawley, and has 
been extended by some general considerations of how it might apply (or not) to the 
nexus of science, philosophy and theology. Another constraint he suggests is that of 
greater explanatory power as a criterion of judging between different theories. As a 
general point this is self-explanatory, but we shall return to consider it in more detail 
below. 
There are three other constraints which DeWeese states, and these should be 
noted in passing. The first is 'biblical exegesis'. The second is 'pre-philosophical 
intuitions'. The third is 'historical theological tradition'. In this instance, I am taking 
biblical exegesis to be hugely underdeterrnining of a rigorous view of divine eternity. 
There are moves to be made in all directions, and consideration of these can be 
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accessibly followed up in Padgett210 and DeWeese211 in particular. Pre-philosophical 
intuitions will be addressed in chapter six, where issues of epistemology and our 
perception of temporality come to the fore. We have already considered the historical 
tradition(s) in terms ofthe care needed to approach them and the methodological issues 
involved, as well as noting the depth of scholarship available for those wishing to 
pursue their views of divine eternity. 
The final constraint that DeWeese discusses is headed 'philosophical analysis'. 
Here he talks about logical rigour and coherence, and the drawing out of logical 
ramifications resulting from theological positions, as constraints upon the development 
of theology. I wish to build on this in two ways. First, I shall develop the content of 
this chapter to provide a more schematic consideration of constraints that science and 
philosophy can impose on theology. Second, in the next chapter, we shall see more 
detailed and specific consideration of how the philosophy of time constrains theologies 
of divine eternity. I am not generally in disagreement with DeWeese in either of these 
developments, save that I hold them to be just that: developing methodological 
comments into a more detailed structure, and providing further argumentation. It is my 
contention, after all, that this sort of thing ought to be engaged with as a vital part of 
constructing a defence of divine timelessness (and indeed, as far as methodology goes, 
for construction of almost any responsible view of God and time). 
Moving on to lay out my proposed structure of constraints, then, I suggest three 
categories. One variety of constraint is semantic. If there are certain laws of nature 
and, for example, the concept of the 'miraculous' or 'supernatural' is defined by the 
theologian as an event going beyond the laws of nature, then attributing a divine action 
as 'miracle' is dependent upon knowing the laws of nature. Science can therefore 
constrain theology in terms of theology's definitions and content with respect to itself. 
Further, to the extent that terms are shared between theology and philosophy or science, 
their referents as defined by philosophy and science constrain their reference in 
theology. 
Another variety of constraint is factual and counterfactual constraint. An ESST 
could place a factual constraint on theology by explaining or providing an empirically 
predictive account of something upon which theology has been constructed. For 
example, a theological claim about creation and the place of humanity within it, which 
relied upon a Ptolemaic view of the universe with the earth at its centre, would be 
210 Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, pp.23-37 
211 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, pp.93-110 
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challenged by the Copernican revolution. Although this would be unlikely to 'disprove' 
a theology, nevertheless appeal could not be made to empirical fact in order to provide 
an analogy or metaphor for the theology, and since the theological truth-claim's content 
may derive from a way of seeing the world, the challenge to the latter may result in the 
abandonment of the former. 
Similarly, in areas such as the problem of evil, different (or new) issues may 
arise as a result of what an ESST tells us about causation, or the world, or human nature 
(vis a vis genetics). Constraints on theology would then arise in factual or 
counterfactual contexts. The idea of biological inheritance of original sin might be 
another good example of a way in which advances in science provide possibilities and 
constraints for theology. 
Finally, there is a category of logical constraints. We are already used in 
philosophical theology to self-imposed logical constraints (regarding questions such as 
'can God make a stone too heavy for him to lift?') where logical consistency places 
limits on what can be said theologically. These are generally seen as boundaries that 
help define where the real theological issues lie (after all, we are not really worried over 
whether God can make a stone too heavy for Him to lift; we are worried about what 
exactly the issues are in the topic of omnipotence). 
I take the above not to be 'news' in the sense that it simply schematises 
approaches which have been considered fairly obvious by philosophers of religion, who 
naturally enough have had extended discussions on the topics I have used as examples, 
all of which are likely to illustrate the sorts of moves I am referring to far better and 
more exhaustively than I am able to here. Nevertheless, it is important to set the ideas 
out in the relevant structure to show the coherence of my approach. 
The question in which I am primarily interested, however, is 'can there be other 
logical constraints imposed on theology from outside of itself?' Given the foregoing 
material, it seems plausible that there could be. For example, our theology of bodily 
resurrection must be affected by the philosophy of personal identity, which is in tum 
affected by physics and neuroscience. Clearly a theology of bodily resurrection which 
claims that all that is required for a person to be bodily resurrected is for God to 
reassemble their bodily parts would be seriously challenged by a 
scientific/philosophical demonstration that bodily integrity has nothing to do with 
constitutive personal identity over time212. Therefore there is a complex of 
philosophical arguments which are likely to be related to scientific material in the ways 
212 Perhaps the defining criterion being memory instead, for example. 
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described by the structure I have adopted from Hawley. Similarly, it is also the case 
that in addition to the usual constraints we might expect to find in a philosophical 
theology of bodily resurrection (semantic, factual, logical213) there may be specific 
constraints introduced into the process by the results of the philosophicaVscientific 
interaction214. What I am arguing for is that the nature of time is another such topic, 
introducing logical constraints on the theologies of divine eternity. 
To take our exploration further, it could also be argued that there may be a 
parallel in theology to Hawley & Psillos' distinction between ad hoc and independently 
motivated theories. There does seem to be a difference between an auxiliary argument 
which gets around a problem and an alternative theory which has the theological 
equivalent of more explanatory power. For instance, the Bad Theodicy Club decides 
one week to compose a broadly Augustinian theodicy, predicated on the Fall as a 
strictly historical event. The critic responds that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
world was relevantly or significantly different before a certain point in time. The 
clever, but naturally bad, Club response is that being Fallen affects how we see 
everything, so pre-Fall geologicaVarchaeological data would look the same as post-Fall 
data. A good (non-Club) response to the situation would be to give up the idea of a 
strictly historical Fall and construct a theology of the Fall in which it is a way of talking 
about human nature and moral fallibility; evil in the world can then be construed as 
resulting in various ways from the way in which every human being copes with having 
free will and so forth. 
The reason, specific to our current purposes at least, for the awfulness of the first 
response is that the argument carries with it consequences for science and epistemology 
that far outweighs the gain to the theodicy. It essentially means that successful 
empirical systems and our trust in our own perceptual framework are faulty as ways of 
getting closer to 'the truth' about the structure of reality; in short, there is a danger of a 
radical scepticism creeping in. This makes the response ad hoc in a non-sensible way; 
the second response, by contrast, is independently motivated (by the desire to think 
about sin in terms of human nature, as opposed to terms of causal chains) and presents a 
genuinely different angle on the problem. 
This argument is a more rigorous extension of one of DeWeese's constraints, 
which he terms 'greater explanatory power', saying that 'the best explanation will offer 
213 E.g.: what counts as resurrection? (semantic, logical); what is a body? (semantic, factual); 
214 For an example of the sort of starting point I envisage this structure helpfully working on, see Peter 
Geach's brief discussion of'subtle bodies' at the beginning of his article. Peter Geach, 'What must be 
true of me if I survive my death?' in Brian Davies (ed.) Philosophy ofReligionA Guide and Anthology 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.724-725 
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more and/or better answers than its competitors. ,21S I take my position to be offering 
specific links to science and philosophy as part of characterising how we should judge 
the issue of greater explanatory power within the structure we have been discussing. 
We can also endeavour to tie this in with the historical material we have already 
discussed. We have seen in Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas both differences but also 
overarching similarities. All to some extent deal with the dominant philosophies of 
their time in order to inform their theological reflection on God and time. Neoplatonism 
features pervasively, and the work of Aristotle may be considered not only a 
philosophical influence on Aquinas (and indeed Boethius) but also an embryonic 
scientific one - to the extent that the two can be distinguished at that historical distance 
-primarily through the influence of the Arabic interpreters to which Aquinas had access 
and their interests in the mathematics of infinity. 
Reminding ourselves of some specifics, we can recall that for Augustine the 
concept of temporal succession (a preoccupation of Plotinian philosophy) and the 
exploration of the relation between the non-spatial and the non-temporal drove the 
development of his philosophical theology of eternity. For Boethius, the concern was 
episternic, and the theology of eternity developed to solve problems with divine 
knowledge, but this development was constrained by philosophical structures. Boethius 
used Aristotle and Plato to help him distinguish between views which would be 
problematic for his theology and those which would not. Aquinas relies heavily on 
Aristotle to give him a philosophical structure for his theological work, and after using 
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy to think through change, cause and being, the 
logical consequences for time and eternity followed relatively straightforwardly. 
Nevertheless, we see more direct theological work. All three ask questions 
which are motivated by primarily theological assumptions and for which theological 
answers are required. This is clearest where Augustine and Aquinas attempt to integrate 
scriptural elements, and of course Boethius' motivation for discussing divine eternity is 
not a direct enquiry into the relation of God and time, but a response to the topic of 
omniscience and foreknowledge. We should bear in mind, however, that this work still 
operates under the sort of constraints that I have outlined, so that it would be difficult to 
argue that any elements of the authors' theological work are 'purely' theological (in the 
way that one might attribute to, say, Karl Barth on the topic216). These three historical 
figures, then, can fairly be taken as precursors of the more analytic tradition of 
215 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.7 
216 See, for example, Bent Flemming Nielson, 'Karl Barth- A Brief Introduction: Time and Eternity' 
available at http://www.teol.ku.dk/ast/ansatte/Pdf-filer/timeandetemity.pdf (accessed 27/07 /07) 
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philosophical theology which demands at least mtmmum adherence to notions of 
coherence and consistency with which we are familiar from the heading of 'logical 
constraints' above. The overall picture, however, surely includes a deeper commitment, 
to the sort of constraints that I have argued shape our thinking at the present time. 
How might we reconcile this with Mark Jordan's comment that, for Aquinas, 'a 
Christian theology done well ought to speak more and better things about matters of 
concern to philosophy than the philosophers themselves can say' 217? I would argue that 
this is not an exhortation to break free of the constraints I have suggested for theology, 
but a challenge to conceive of a deeper understanding of reality which is nevertheless 
scientifically and philosophically responsible. No-one should (or indeed would) suggest 
that theologians arguing for God's existence should be 'cut a little slack' because, after 
all, they are only theologians. Similarly, a good argument owing its originality to a 
fresh angle of theological imagination should not be philosophically dismissed on that 
account. Presumably both Jordan and Aquinas would be content with both these points, 
and I see them as coherent with the structure of boundary and constraint that I have laid 
out above. 
I hope that I have presented above some reasons to think that there is common 
ground between the discussion of science as a guide to metaphysics, and science and 
metaphysics as a guide to theology - at least, enough to see that although there are 
important differences we can and do think of science and philosophy as imposing 
constraints on our theological ideas. In order to make this even clearer for the case of 
the contemporary debate over divine eternity (for it is my contention that this is a case 
in which such constraints are most appropriate and effective), we shall now move on to 
a discussion of some of the basic ideas involved. The overarching concern here, 
however, is to establish a consensus regarding the way in which our theology of divine 
eternity can be, and often already is, constrained - a consensus which will allow us to 
explore in far greater depth the interplay of the ideas already considered. 
217 Mark D. Jordan, 'Theology & Philosophy', in CCAq, p.248 
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Chapter III- Philosophical Foundations: Constraints on Theories of Divine Eternity 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the previous chapter I canvassed the methodologies, with respect to 
the use of science in arguments of philosophy of time and religion, of several key 
scholars writing on God and time. My contention was that, although there were signs of 
some of them coming close, no-one had really detailed a rigorous groundwork that 
would help to clarify both their own (and others') use of science and under what 
auspices they would accept challenges to that use. Having tried to provide such a 
groundwork myself, and expanded it into a structure that would allow us to comprehend 
interactions of science, philosophy and theology more effectively, the time has come to 
ask what sort of constraints are formed specifically in the question of God's relation to 
time. 
In line with the structure I have outlined, and for further critical reasons that will 
become readily apparent, the most straightforward way of doing this is in a 'nested' 
fashion: first, to ask what the philosophical constraints appear to be on theologies of 
eternity, and then to ask what reliance the philosophy has on scientific resources, so that 
a conclusion will show a flow of argument from the more specific science through the 
relevant philosophy to the effects in theological terms. Note that if we were to look at 
the science/philosophy interaction first, as might seem logical, we could not guarantee 
that all the ways that science affected philosophy would translate into ways that both of 
them affected theology - some issues in philosophy using scientific resources might not 
have any suitable theological application, and it would almost certainly exhaust the 
space available for a thesis. 
Since the vast majority of contributors to the divine eternity debate have 
employed some philosophical principles, arguments or critical resources, it will not be 
helpful to look at 'methodological approaches' as we did at the beginning of the 
previous chapter regarding science- the material is simply too vast. However, we can 
focus in on a specific constraint issue that is of vital importance, insofar as it potentially 
represents a far more thorough constraint on arguments in the divine eternity debate. 
This issue centres on the question of whether the position we adopt in the philosophy of 
time is tied to specific views regarding God and time. What I wish to argue, following 
other works on the subject, is that there are such ties, indeed so much so that it may be 
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difficult or impossible to espouse one vtew of 'God and time' whilst supporting 
anything other than the correlated position in philosophy of time, and vice versa 
This chapter, therefore, will have the following structure: first, some necessary 
introductions to the philosophy of time and the terms of the debate will be provided. 
Second, I shall look at some key works (much as I did in the last chapter) to assess the 
increasing acceptance of correlations between philosophies of time and views of divine 
eternity. Third, I shall present a collection of arguments which claim that a proponent 
of (in general terms) a 'tensed' philosophy of time should also support (in general 
terms) a temporal God - and vice versa - whilst a proponent of divine timelessness 
should also support (in general terms) a 'tenseless' philosophy of time, and vice versa. 
This will leave me with one remaining task for this chapter: to explain what issues arise 
if the debate over divine eternity is reliant upon the debate in the philosophy of time, 
and to select which of these issues are most foundational to address for the defender of 
divine timelessness - in line with the purpose of this thesis. 
The Terms of the Debate 
The philosophy of time has managed to accrue a more than usually large number 
of terms for two sides of a debate, a situation which is saved from condemnation only 
by some subtle differences in tone which fit certain terms for some arguments better 
than others. The essence of the division is the concern over the importance of 'the 
present' in a description of the reality of time218, a concern which is mostly broadened 
to include the concept of 'tense' generally (past, present and future). Consequently, the 
most prominent terms for theories of time are 'tensed' and 'tenseless'. The former 
refers to theories which give ontological priority to concepts of past, present and future; 
the latter refuse priority to these concepts, holding that (whatever the case regarding 
anisotropy in the 'direction' of time) all moments of time taken as such are equally real. 
The caveat with these terms is generally that they can intermingle issues of semantics 
with issues of ontology: whether or not our language can (or should) be purged of tense 
or is essentially tenseless is only one question among many that have application to the 
debate. 
218 We are here restricting discussion by the premise that time is real, since most participants in the 
relevant debates accept this point. Consequently, proponents of the unreality of time (a not insignificant 
grouping spread over the last 300 years, with plenty of classical roots) will be set aside unless specific 
relevance pertains (e.g. McTaggart's paradox). 
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The most neutral terms approximating the same distinction between ontologies 
of time are A- & B-theories - on the genesis of which, more shortly - although these 
have from time to time been considered unhelpful on the grounds that they fail to 
express anything about the views involved?19 Padgett opts for the terminology of 
process & stasis, claiming that they are suitably descriptive and non-pejorative. 
DeWeese, following Michael Tooley220, chooses to employ 'dynamic' and 'static'. 
Both of these pairs emphasise the arguments concerning 'objective becoming' versus 
the equality of reality across temporal extension. 
A brief sketch of McTaggart's argument221 for the unreality of time will set the 
stage for many of the considerations in the wider debate, as well as explaining whence 
the terms' A-theory' and 'B-theory' derive. The material can be summarised thus: 
(i) Temporal positions can be considered in a relation of past, present or future, 
where things are understood to be future, to become present and then to 
become past. This gives rise to a temporal series (A-series). 
(ii) Temporal positions can be considered in a relation of earlier or later, where 
things are understood to be before or after other things in time. This gives 
rise to a temporal series (B-series). 
(iii) We perceive events in time as an A-series. 
(iv) We can give an account of events in time (such as a history) as a B-series. 
(v) Time involves change. 
(vi) An A-series involves change because events change from being future to 
being present and then become past. 
(vii) A B-series does not involve change because it is true at any given moment 
that, e.g., event xis earlier than event y, regardless of our experience of x and 
y. Further it is true at any moment that, e.g., the light is on at t 1 and the light 
is off at r. 
(viii) Ifthe B-series is the fundamental description of time, then there is no change 
involved in the description of time. Therefore there is no time (from v and 
vii). 
(ix) If the A-series is the fundamental description of time then any event must 
successively have futurity, presentness and pastness. An event cannot have 
219 E.g. Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four 
Views, p.95 
220 Michael Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 
221 J. M. E. McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time', in Le Poidevin and MacBeath (eds.) The Philosophy of 
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp.23-34 
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more than one such determination (e.g. nothing can be both past and future), 
so one must appeal to the determinations being held in the past, present or 
future (e.g. in the future x will be present). These give rise to another set of 
inconsistencies (e.g. x being present and x being past are both in the future) 
which will require another order of tense determinations and so on to a 
vicious infinity. Therefore the fundamental description of time is 
contradictory, and so cannot describe time. 
(x) Time is not real, since on one description it ts not time and the other 
description is not logically consistent. Our temporal descriptions of reality 
may be persistent, but they are not correct. 
As a generalisation, A-theorists are those who would agree with McTaggart that an 
A-series (or the conception thereof) is the fundamental description of time, but 
disagree that it is contradictory. B-theorists would either agree that an A-series is 
contradictory and/or disagree that it is the fundamental description of time, and 
argue that a B-series (or the conception thereof) can provide a fundamental 
description oftime. 
Step (ix) in the above account is a brief version of McTaggart's Paradox. 
Although its nature and effectiveness is an area of discussion that continues to 
attract extensive attention,222 the characterisation presented here is sufficient to 
show some points of importance. It is well worth noting is that the Paradox is often 
held to rely on a view of time in which past and future events have equal reality to 
present events (in short, on a view of time as a B-series in which all times have 
equal reality but in which the 'absolute window of the present' slides over them in 
sequence). Consequently the philosophical position of presentism is, in some form, 
held to provide a solution to McTaggart's Paradox by claiming that only the present 
exists: future events do not exist to come into being, and past events do not exist 
because they have ceased to be. 
As one consequence of this evasion of the paradox, an event in reality only ever 
has one determination (presentness) because it does not exist as an event to have 
pastness or futurity - i.e. to say that something is past or future is to say that it was 
the case that x or that it will be the case that x, not to attribute any real possession of 
a determination or property. Presentism in philosophy of time might be considered 
222 For some recent work on this, see the special issue of the journal Philosophical Writings, 32 (2006) 
dedicated to this topic. 
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an 'import' from the debate over how things persist and the problem of temporary 
intrinsics. The question would be something like 'how can the same thing have 
incompatible properties (e.g. be a cube at t1 and a sphere at t2)?' The B-theoretician 
will frequently (but by no means always) tend to concentrate on the 'at r' element 
of this and espouse a view of temporal parts or stages. The presentist on the other 
hand can claim that such a thing does not have incompatible properties; there is just 
one thing with its relevant property existing at any given moment223 , and we should 
no more be worried about it having an incompatible property in the past than we 
should about it having an incompatible property in another possible world. Note 
that when these debates overlap one can find the term 'presentism' opposed by 
'eternalisrn' as the B-theoretic view. That it does not automatically equate to that 
view in terms of use may be illustrated by arguments purporting to show that one 
should be a B-theorist if one is an eternalist224 . 
Trends in Contemporary Scholarship 
What is the importance of concepts in philosophy of time for the theology of 
divine eternity? The task of this section and the next is to demonstrate that there should 
be mutual commitment between A-theories of time and divine temporality, and also 
between B-theories of time and divine atemporality. What have contemporary writers 
on time and eternity made of these links? There is a spectrum from those who have 
held that the theory of time we adhere to should not make much difference to our view 
of God and time, through scholars who have not made arguments in these terms but 
have come to accept the links when apprised of them, through to those who advocate 
them strongly. 
An excellent example of someone who is aware of the argument that there 
should be strong links between philosophy of time and divine eternity, but who rejects 
the constraint of concomitance, is Brian Leftow. As part of his 'working assumptions', 
he provides the following explicit statement ofhis position: 
This book does not assume that either a tensed or a tenseless view of time is correct. 
Some philosophers have argued that the claim that God is timeless is incompatible with 
223 For more on this see, for example, Nathan Oaklander, Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming: A 
Defence of a Russel/ian Theory of Time (Lantham MD. University Press of America, 1984) 
224 E.g. Hales and Johnson, 'Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity' in Philosophical 
Quarterly, 53:213 (2003), pp. 527-539 
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a tensed view of time. I contend that they are wrong, but in asserting this I do not 
implicitly or explicitly endorse a tensed theory. 225 
Unfortunately, Leftow does not provide any references for the philosophers he 
mentions, so we do not know whom he has in mind here. 
A good example of the middle-spectrum scholar is Paul Helm. Writing Eternal 
God in the mid-1980's, he makes plenty of references to the contemporary literature and 
arguments in philosophy of time: with the benefit of hindsight, one could read a 
commitment to a tenseless theory of time into many of his arguments. The first and 
perhaps strongest instance of this is when he says: 
Even if an understanding of what is involved in individuals in time applying temporal 
indexicals to themselves is denied to God this may not matter very much because it has 
been plausibly argued that the use of such indexicals depends on there being a non-
indexical concept oftime for their proper employment. 226 
This point, early on in the work, is accompanied by a reference to Mellor's Real 
Time227. Nevertheless, an explicit (never mind methodological) linkage to tenseless 
theories of time being important as such to a defence of divine timelessness is absent. 
However by 2001, Helm's commitments seem clear: after using the concepts of A- and 
B-series time to explicate his idea of 'two standpoints' 228 - a human standpoint in time 
and a divine standpoint outside time- he is pressed by his interlocutors to clarify his 
position, to which he replies: 
Bill [Craig] is bothered ... because he thinks that it may be inconsistent for a B-theorist 
such as myself to introduce such standpoints. But it is evident that it is perfectly 
consistent with the B-theory of time that agents employ temporal indexicals in their 
action on and reaction to their world. This represents and expresses their temporal 
standpoint. B-theorists proceed to affirm that this is not, ontologically speaking, the 
most basic standpoint, but nonetheless they recognize that the use of temporal indexical 
language is vital for the agency of someone who is in time. 229 
Again, in response to Craig's own contribution, Helm says that he would agree that 
efforts to combine divine timelessness and a temporal (tensed) creation are doomed, yet 
For a consistent B-theorist this project need not be undertaken in the first place; indeed 
it ought to be studiously avoided. For such a person, God is really related to the 
225 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.l8 
226 Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.25 
227 D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
228 Helm, 'Divine Timeless Eternity', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, p.58-9 
229 Helm, 'Divine Timeless Eternity', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, p.83-4 
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universe by virtue of freely creating and sustaining it. But God is not thereby rendered 
temporal. 230 
Thus, we can presume a strong commitment but must look elsewhere for more fully 
worked-out material on methods of relating philosophical theories of time to models of 
divine eternity. 
Wolterstorff provides another example of contemporary scholarship along these 
lines. He is happy to assert that he is a tensed theorist and to present arguments making 
use of the relevant resources, but provides us with few claims or arguments about the 
reliance or otherwise of theologies of divine eternity upon tensed/tenseless theories of 
time, although he does follow a method of determining which view of time to support 
and then building arguments in the divine eternity debate using this231 . In this sense, 
methodologically (but without explicit discussion thereof) he is perhaps closer to the 
'fully worked out' end of the methodological spectrum. 
Padgett, Craig and DeWeese have all presented arguments of varying detail and 
extent for the importance of tensed and tenseless theories of time for the respective 
views of temporal and atemporal divinity. We shall see these contributing to the 
discussion in the next section, so they will not be rehearsed here and I shall restrict 
myself to some brief summary references. 
Padgett expresses his position quite concisely in his article for God and Time: 
Four Views: 
The main objection I have to the timeless model [of divine eternity) is simply stated: it 
is true only if the stasis theory of time is true. Since the stasis theory of time is false, we 
should reject the timeless view because we should, wherever possible, bring coherence 
to theology. 232 
Most of Padgetts efforts, therefore, tend to be concentrated on showing that a 
tensed/process theory of time and a timeless theology of eternity are incompatible, and 
secondarily on showing that a tensed/process view and a temporal theology of eternity 
are mutually supportive. 
DeWeese's programme m his God and the Nature of Time is to arbitrate 
between philosophies of time, then to see if contemporary physics challenges the 
230 Helm, 'Divine Timeless Eternity', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, p.l61-2 
231 Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'God Everlasting' in Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz (eds.) Contemporary 
Philosophy of Religion (New York: OUP, 1982) 
232 Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, 
p.95; cfChapter 4 of Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, especially pp.62-81 
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philosophical view he approves, and then to use the results to work out what sort of 
theology of eternity to build. One key conclusion, however, is worth noting: 
All atemporal conceptions of God's being must at least tacitly assume static time .... 
My argument differs [from others] in that it does not rely on any conclusion drawn from 
God's knowledge. If my argument succeeds then I have shown that all atemporalist 
construals of God's being entail a B-theory of time. 233 
So, in short, not only are dynamic theories of time incompatible with divine 
timelessness, but the latter also ties one logically to tenseless theories. 
Craig has produced by far the most on this topic, and has re-iterated the general 
importance of links between philosophical theories of time and theologies of divine 
eternity in several publications. 234 His clearest pronouncements on this can be found in 
God, Time and Eternity, where he concludes the first part of the book by saying: 
An adjudication of the doctrine of divine timelessness is therefore made feasible by -
and probably necessitates -an adjudication of the tensed vs. tenseless theory of time. 
Few philosophers of religion have been willing to undertake seriously this task. But 
apart from such an assessment ... the most important arguments for and against divine 
timelessness remain inconclusive. The adjudication of this debate within the 
philosophy of ... time is therefore of critical importance and cannot be avoided. 235 
His conclusion to the more limited argument in his article for Questions of Time and 
Tense is equally appropriate: 'theologians and philosophers of religion can advance the 
discussion of the nature of divine eternity only by tackling the ... problem of the tensed 
versus tense less theory of time. ' 236 
However, Craig's theological concerns introduce a potentially problematic 
element into his structural approach. As a part of his avowedly 'philosophy of time 
centred' critique of the B-theory he has a short chapter presenting a 'theological 
objection' (from creatio ex nihilo) to the B-theory, and has the following to say about it 
Secular philosophers may find it odd or at least rather quaint to lodge theological 
objections against a particular theory of time. But Christian philosophers, such as the 
author, take such objections with utmost seriousness. A view which is philosophically 
coherent but theologically untenable cannot be true. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, 
233 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l84 
234 Craig, God, Time and Eternity; Craig, 'Timelessness and Omnitemporality', in Gregory E. Ganssle 
(ed.), God and Time: Four Views, pp. 129-160; Craig 'The Tensed vs. Tenseless Theory of Time: A 
Watershed for the Concept of Divine Eternity' in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.221-250 
235 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l37 
236 Craig, 'The Tensed vs. Tense less Theory of Time', in Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense, 
p.248 
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to reflect on the theological implications of one's theory of time with a view to 
. . d 237 
assessmg 1ts a equacy. 
From the viewpoint of my own methodological commitments I can hardly take issue 
with some of this if I expect to be consistent. Certainly, I should be equally committed 
to the fairness of lodging theological objections against philosophical positions, as a 
result of early comments in the thesis about theology speaking 'of more and better 
things', to use Jordan's phrase, than philosophy. But the primary thrust of my position 
is in favour of allowing theological premises as equal premises (to be challenged or 
supported) to secular philosophical premises. To say, then, as Craig does, that a 
philosophically coherent but theologically untenable position 'cannot be true' seems to 
be rather rash, since it smacks of unchallengeable premises rather than of defensible 
commitments. Certainly a philosophically coherent position might not be true (and 
theological resources might aid an argument for this)- but then a theologically coherent 
position might not be true either. 
The real problem here, though, is a more specific one. As we have already seen, 
Craig makes a strong claim for the resolution of the divine eternity debate to be reliant 
on arbitration of the philosophy of time debate. One should be careful in such 
circumstances to avoid potential circularities, and the argument here appears to be 
something like this: A B-theory of time will, if correct, place constraints and demand 
certain interpretations of divine timelessness; one such demand that a B-theory of time 
makes is a certain interpretation of creatio ex nihilo. Therefore, that it makes such a 
demand, if true, is a good reason to think that it is incorrect. Yet purportedly the whole 
point of resolving the philosophy of time debate first is that it gives us an inkling of the 
way the world is: it is this way that the world is which constrains God's relation to it 
(after the fact, modally speaking, that God chose it to be the way it is). So my objection 
to Craig's tactic here is simply that, if he adhered to his methodology properly, he 
should not have placed the critical material where he has. Either the B-theory stands, 
and so one must find a way of reconciling it with one's creation theology- at which 
point such concerns come to the fore - or it does not stand and so one does not have to 
worry about reconciling it. We shall see in chapter five that Craig risks an even more 
blatant manoeuvre of this sort with regard to contemporary physics' input on the 
philosophical debate. 
Tensed & tenseless views of time, temporal and atemporal views of eternity 
237 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.218 
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Having seen, in general terms, a concerted move in the contemporary debate 
towards recognising the importance of arbitrating philosophical theories of time as a 
precursor to developing theologies of eternity, we can move on to look at some detailed 
arguments. The overall approach fits with the methodological concerns of the thesis, in 
that science and philosophy are not determining theology as such but are placing 
boundaries and constraints. In particular, I am not trying to suggest in this section that 
no-one would find themselves preferring one view of divine eternity for strong 
theological reasons and a discordant philosophy of time for strong philosophical 
reasons; rather, I wish to show that in such a situation something will probably have to 
give - and to suggest that there may be reasons for preferring a particular philosophy of 
time that are strong enough to allow it to place powerful constraints on a theology of 
eternity, as opposed to 'shopping' for a philosophy of time that will agree with our 
theology without too much violence to our other philosophical commitments. I would 
see this in a similar light to comparable cases in which we allow views of causation, 
perception and logical limitation to constrain theology of divine action, omnipotence, 
omniscience and so forth (although in the case of eternity the potential constraint is 
much greater). 
The strongest view we could arrive at would be: 
Commit to A-theories - commit to divine temporality 
Commit to B-theories - commit to divine atemporality 
To avoid needless complexity and replication of arguments, I wish to concentrate on 
showing that we cannot really be B-theorists and divine temporalists, and neither can 
we really be A-theorists and divine atemporalists. As a part of this, arguments will 
become apparent in favour of being A-theorists and divine temporalists, or B-theorists 
and divine atemporalists, since in many cases the arguments do work in both directions. 
Looked at methodologically, what I am doing primarily is showing two inconsistencies, 
thereby providing two separate constraints on our philosophy of religion. 
I shall begin with the more well-documented challenge: the inconsistency of 
holding a tensed view of time with an atemporal view of God. There are several 
arguments ranging from the more general to the more specific (the latter often in the 
form of criticisms of those who have attempted to combine the two positions). 
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DeWeese provides a general argument which he claims is free from one of the 
entanglements common to arguments in this area: involvement with divine omniscience. 
It runs as follows: 
I) The ordered sequence of temporal events T exists in eternity in an atemporal 
analogue A of the temporal order. 
2) There is a function F(f,A) which maps points (moments, events) in the temporal 
order Tonto points in the atemporal analogue A of the temporal order. 
3) The future does not exist. 
4) No function can map non-existent values onto real values. 
5) F(T,A) cannot map future points onto the atemporal analogue A. 
6) Hence, A cannot contain atemporal analogues of future points ofT. 
7) Either A grows as the temporal order grows, or A is incomplete. 
8) A cannot grow, since there can be no change in an atemporal entity. 
9) A cannot be incomplete, for then the actual time sequence T would, at any time 
after the first event, be larger than A. 
10) Therefore, if God is timeless then time is tenseless. 238 
This can also be considered a more specific argument angled at Leftow's model of 
eternity, since the first premise is intended to be a general distillation of Leftow's 
conception of eternity (and indeed Stump's and Kretzmann's, if A ts taken as 
representation rather than genuine presence). 239 By way of clarification: Leftow's 
conception of A is characterised by, for example, 'temporal events occur all at once in 
eternity, in addition to occurring at various points in time' 240 understood as 'if all events 
really occur at once, they occur at once in an atemporal reference frame. ' 241 
Consequently, given Leftow's understanding of reference frames, A is not a shadow, 
replication or representation forming a separate reality, nor is it an atemporal 
representation of a single real sequence conceived (as we might, analogously) as a 
'virtual reality overlay'; it is the same singular real sequence apprehended and actually 
arranged/related in a different way. At any rate, the first premise does most of the 
work, and the third premise helpfully includes most A-theories by placing emphasis on 
denying reality to the future. 
238 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l81 
239 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l81 
240 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.219 
241 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.219 
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It might be thought that one could escape the force of the argument by mapping 
all possible points instead of just actual points. This would deny that ( 4) defines what it 
would be to map temporal points to an atemporal analogue, and (5) would only be true 
if we read 'actual future points' for 'future points'. Consequently one might claim that, 
by containing all possible points, A and T by hypothesis timelessly contains the actual 
points which can be picked out as and when the temporal terms come about in T. The 
function F(T,A) therefore maps a real temporal point to an atemporal analogue at any 
given moment, but this does not involve real change in A However, this simply will 
not do: it replaces the problem of sequentially creating values in an atemporal analogue 
(essentially rendering it temporal) with the problem of sequentially picking out a value 
to be matched to another value. The fact remains that while (3) holds it demands that 
new relations come into being in real (not just logical) sequence; altering our conception 
of the atemporal analogue or of the mapping function, or of what is mapped, seems 
unlikely to provide any escape from this. DeWeese considers another way of getting 
around it - by using placeholders for each ordered pair where one term does not exist 
yet- but concludes that set theory would hold that the 'before' and 'after' sets would be 
non-identical because the reference would alter - from placeholder or concept to actual 
moment or event. 
Padgett provides a less rigorous but more illustrative sketch of the same sort of 
point, using Nelson Pike's definition oftimelessness242 : 
The definition of something's being timeless is (a) that it exists, (b) that it does not exist 
at any time and (c) that its existence has no extension in time. God can be all these 
things and still have to wait for a temporal world to pass by. What follows from God's 
timelessness is that God never changes, but it does not mean that all times can be 
"present" to God. All times' being present to God, while a traditional idea, is 
incoherent... What we might say is that God coexists with every moment in time. 243 
Such coexistence, it is argued, can only be reliant upon a B-theoretic ontology, since 
God cannot coexist with t1 and then, t1 having gone out of existence to be replaced by ?, 
coexist with ? and remain atemporal. Only a philosophical commitment to ontological 
equality for all moments of time at all moments of time will secure the basis for such 
coexistence. 
There are three further interconnected arguments based on the premise that the 
changing present is an irreducible feature of reality. These may be summarised for ease 
242 Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 7 
243 Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, 
p.98 
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of reference as arguments from (i) divine knowledge (ii) divine belief and (iii) divine 
action244. 
In the first case, the argument is that an atemporal being cannot know the 
contents of an irreducibly tensed world's temporal span because parts of that span do 
not exist at any given moment: to know that x exists and then that y exists, on this 
reading, involves the judgement that x exists now and a subsequent judgement that y 
exists now. The succession of judgments is enough to constitute temporality: 
consequently either God is temporal, or God can only judge that one of x & y exist, or 
God cannot judge that either ofx andy exist. 
DeWeese summarises this type of argument as follows: 
l) Time is dynamic (that is, temporal becoming is real). 
2) Hence what is real is constantly changing. 
3) A timeless being cannot experience change in its knowledge. 
4) Therefore, if God is timeless, he cannot know what is real. 245 
The swift response is that if we credit God with perfect foreknowledge, there is 
no material difference to be had and tensed time is still compatible with divine 
timelessness. However, this will not do: God might have full propositional knowledge 
but the issue at stake from the viewpoint of a tensed theory of time is 'knowing what 
there is now', where 'now' is vitally irreducible to anything else. This is not a sort of 
knowledge that the timeless God has access to with respect to a tensed world. 
The second argument develops from a similar starting point of the features of 
tensed reality. The argument from divine belief, or intention, notes the necessity of 
tensed beliefs in such a reality; the above judgments of the existence of x andy are two 
such beliefs. An atemporal God would be unable to have such beliefs, since they must 
change as the contents of reality change, and it is incoherent for God simultaneously to 
believe all of (1) x is future (2) xis present and (3) xis past. Consequently, a timeless 
God cannot know when to act in a tensed reality, since God must intend to act now, or 
at least when the event of which God has propositional knowledge becomes present. 
DeWeese provides a neat version of this: 
244 For extensive discussion of arguments relating to divine action and knowledge in the context of tensed 
and tenseless theories of time, see respectively chapters 3 and 4 in Craig, God, Time and Eternity, pp.56-
lll &pp.ll2-133 
245 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l80 
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1) There are essentially tensed truths ... 
2) A timeless being cannot know essentially tensed propositions. 
3) Therefore, if God is timeless, there are truths he cannot know?46 
Ganssle247, as noted by DeWeese248, has attempted to circumvent this by using 
Alston's 'direct intuition' model of God's knowledge, which makes it non-propositional 
or non-discursive249. Although it may be effective against arguments employing the 
concept of tensed propositions, such as the one DeWeese suggests, the idea that direct 
intuitive knowledge is not a 'time-spanning relation' is probably not enough to secure 
the defender of divine atemporality against the problem of knowing what there is now 
as opposed to at some prior or subsequent moment, since at any given moment on a 
tensed theory at least the future (and possibly also the past) fail to exist at all. 
We can continue this point into an argument about divine action, since on the 
same basis God must act on whatever is present. If what is present changes, then in 
order to act at two separate moments of time God must 'wait' between them: again, 
action followed by inaction followed by separate action is sufficient to constitute 
temporality. So again either God is temporal, or God can only perform one action, or 
God cannot perform either action. 
The type of response employed against arguments from divine knowledge and 
belief- perfect foreknowledge and non-propositionality - is even less successful here: 
God cannot encompass all temporal actions in a single (non-propositionally known and 
planned) action because there is only ever one momentary reality extant to act upon. In 
order to make such an incorporation, God would have to 'encode' intended action 
within the first moment of temporal reality such that an action would occur after a 
certain amount of time had passed, or in response to certain states of affairs. This 
begins to look somewhat deistic, and therefore highly undesirable for a Judaeo-
Christian model of divinity. As Padgett puts the point, with reference to the Boethian 
and Thomist analogy: 
A picture of God ... seeing all of time at once, in the way an observer on a high hill can 
see the whole road at once. The problem here is that only one step of the road exists, 
even for the observer. 250 
246 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l80 
247 Gregory E. Ganssle, 'Atemporality and the Mode of Divine Knowledge', International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion 34 (1993), pp.l7l-80 
248 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l80 
249 William Alston, 'Does God Have Beliefs?' in Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 
250 Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in G&T:4V, p.99 
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There are further arguments which are not so generic as these, but often rely on 
the same points, and revolve around criticisms of scholars who attempt to reconcile 
dynamic time with divine atemporality. The most notable set are critiques of Stump and 
Kretzmann's articles on eternity251 I collate below a representative selection from 
Craig, DeWeese and Padgett. 
DeWeese provides the most conctse comments. Picking up on the third 
condition of their definition of ET-simultaneity ('an eternal entity or event observed as 
eternally present (or simply as eternal) by some temporal observer B is ET-
simultaneous with every temporal entity or event' 252), he argues that 'only a static 
theory of time could render this condition coherent. ' 253 Looking to clarify this criticism, 
he quotes Stump and Kretmann's example of future events - as opposed to 
representations of them - being present to an eternal entity, as summarised by the claim 
that 'from the standpoint of eternity, every time is present, co-occurrent with the whole 
of infinite atemporal duration. ' 254 He compares this with their contention that 'it is not 
that the future pre-exists somehow, so that it can be inspected by an entity that is outside 
time' 255 and concludes that confusion reigns. DeWeese objects that on a view of time 
as dynamic, future events do not exist to be simultaneous with anything, and one cannot 
simply define such a relationship into coherence. Stump and Kretzmann want to have it 
both ways, says DeWeese, and if they 'had simply bit [sic] the bullet and adopted a B-
theory of time, then their definition would be more plausible. ' 256 
Craig, in his own discussion of S turnp and Kretzmann' s earlier work, makes a 
similar argument, citing their definition: 
For every x and for every y, x andy are ET -simultaneous iff 
(i) either xis eternal andy is temporal, or vice versa; and 
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x andy are both present 
- i.e., either x is eternally present andy is observed as temporally present, or vice 
versa; and 
251 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity' Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981) pp.429-458; Eleonore Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann, 'Eternity, Awareness, and Action', Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), pp.463-482; 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 'Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity', Philosophical 
Perspectives, 5: Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp.395-424 
252 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity', p.439 
253 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l64 
254 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity', p.441 
255 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity', p.442 
256 De Weese, God and the Nature of Time, p.l65 
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(iii)for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, x and 
yare both present- i.e. either xis observed as eternally present andy is temporally 
• 257 present, or VICe versa. 
and concluding that, on the premise of dynamic time, 
[g]iven that the eternal "present" is successively simultaneous with one temporal 
present at a time, eternity is not atemporal at all but has been temporalized in virtue of 
its real relation to time. 258 
Craig also argues that a later formulation ofET-simultaneity259 does no better. Here the 
definition eliminates the language of observation in favour of direct assertion of 
presentness in conditions (ii) and (iii): 
(ii) with respect to some A in the unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both 
present - i.e., (a) x is in the eternal present with respect to A, (b) y is in the 
temporal present, and (c) both x andy are situated with respect to A in such a way 
that A can enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of them ... 
(iii) with respect to some B in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, x 
andy are both present- i.e., (a) xis in the eternal present, (b) y is at the same time 
as B, and (c) both x andy are situated with respect to B in such a way that B can 
enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each ofthem. 260 
In an echo of his previOus point, Craig explains that the situation this gives rise to 
simply sharpens the problem: 
God's being ET -simultaneous with only present events might appear ... to be acceptable 
to the partisan of a tensed theory of time... One cannot, after all, be simultaneous with 
non-existent entities, so perhaps God's being ET-simultaneous with present events 
alone is not so bad... But since which events are present is constantly changing, God 
acquires continually new relations ofET-simultaneity. 261 
Engaging the same material from a slightly different angle, Padgett suggests that 
their misunderstanding of relativity theory has contributed to Stump and Kretzmann's 
failure to see the crucial point. By taking relativity theory to claim that there is 'no 
absolute state of being temporally simultaneous with' 262, they omit the key qualification 
257 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity', p. 441 
258 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p. 90; Craig, 'The Tensed vs. Tenseless Theory of Time', in Le 
Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense, p.234 
259 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity, Awareness, and Action', p.477-8 
260 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity, Awareness, and Action', p.477-8 
261 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.95; Craig, 'The Tensed vs. Tenseless Theory of Time', in Le 
Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense, p.238 
262 Stump and Kretzmann, 'Eternity', p.438 
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of absolute causal temporal orders within single frames of reference. Padgett's thought 
is, implicitly, that if they had not lost sight of this then they would have been less likely 
to attempt the reconciliation of dynamic time with divine timelessness, since absolute 
causal sequences more clearly raise the relevant question in line with a dynamic view of 
time: how can anything be simultaneous with something that is not yet real? Thus 
Padgett diagnoses Stump and Kretzmann's critical error in a similar fashion to 
DeWeese and Craig: 
God cannot timelessly "will" that a certain effect take place at some future time, since 
the effects of his "will" do not yet exist. ... [G]iven their assumptions about time, God 
cannot both be timeless and sustain a changing temporal world. 263 
As part of an extensive critique of Leftow's view of eternity, Craig shows the 
severe strain Leftow's position is put under by his insistence on its being compatible 
with both tensed and tenseless views of time. He begins with what he regards as a core 
claim: 
Relative to God, the whole span of temporal events is always actually there, all at once. 
Thus in God's frame of reference, the correct judgment of local simultaneity is that all 
events are simultaneous.264 
Craig begins by clarifying that 'always' here must be taken as 'tenselessly' because 
God's frame is specifically timeless rather than sempiternal. On the same basis, 
'simultaneous' must be taken to mean 'co-existent'. Craig then moves on to make sense 
of the language of local simultaneity judgments. He canvasses the option of the 
meaning 'all events exist in God's timeless frame of reference, but are tenselessly 
ordered by a "later than" relation such that no event occurs (tenselessly) later than any 
other'265 (i.e. ordered but ordered as simultaneous by way of being tenselessly co-
existent). Craig is concerned that this equates to positing a single moment of time at 
which all events occur. What Leftow needs, however, is an ordering which is not a 
temporal ordering but an analogue of one. 
In order to get a clearer picture, Craig turns to Leftow's criteria for 
distinguishing a temporal being from an eternal one in the eternal reference frame: 
a. its fourth-dimensional extension or duration would have parts. 
263 Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p.73 
264 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.228 
265 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l 02 
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b. not all parts of its duration would occur at the same temporal present 
c. its duration's parts would be ordered as earlier and later. 
d. In most cases, its duration would have a beginning and an end 
e. If it had no duration, still it would stand in a sequence representing the earlier-later 
relations obtaining between it and other events. 266 
Craig argues267 that this gives a clear impression of the temporal being in the eternal 
reference frame as a tenselessly existing four-dimensional world line (one might say 
that in the eternal reference frame, a temporal being appears to perdure). It means that 
the whole B-series of events is tenselessly present in the eternal reference frame - or, 
rather, that the set of B-series corresponding to the set of physical reference frames are 
teneslessly present. 268 Appearances suggest, then, that Leftow should be committing to 
a B-theory view of time. Is there any way around this? 
Returning to Leftow's use of relativity theory, in which B-relations of causally 
unconnected events vary with frame of reference, Craig posits that for Leftow the divine 
reference frame cannot have any of these relations (since they relate times), so that 
timeless co-existence is devoid of ordering relations. This includes not just temporal 
ordering relations but spatial ones as well. The latter can be seen by referring to 
Leftow's Zero Thesis ('The distance between God and every spatial creature is 
zero'
269): Craig argues that, based on Leftow's belief that something located in one 
dimension of geometry is located in all, temporal things are spatial too; if something 
lacks temporal co-ordinates, it also lacks spatial ones. Although it might supply a way 
of maintaining all temporal content in an atemporal analogue, this worries Craig even 
more than the prospect of the 'ordered but simultaneous' interpretation, since he thinks 
it implies a God who is 'confronted with ... a chaotic collection of points' 270 with no 
ordering at all, although he admits that an omniscient God would know all the lines of 
simultaneity corresponding to all the physical frames of reference, and so even if events 
are intrinsically unordered in the eternal reference frame there is, as it were, an heuristic 
that God can apply to them. 
The key difficulty, however, is that it still seems that Leftow' s account demands 
a B-theory of time. All of the points in the atemporal analogue still seem to require the 
tenseless coexistence of the complete temporal series, and on an A-theory this is not 
266 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.237 
267 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l 04 
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possible (save perhaps at the end of time, if we manipulate arguments about the status 
of the past to provide the Tooley-esque view that reality increases with time). Indeed, 
Craig suggests that it would be much simpler to identify God's reference frame with the 
four-dimensional spacetime manifold271 , but cites Leftow's attempt to avoid this: 
A defender of God's eternity can assert that (in a strictly limited sense) one and the 
same event is present and actual in eternity though it is not yet or no longer present or 
actual in time... That is, it can be true at a time t that an event dated at t+ l has not yet 
occurred in time, and yet also correct at t to say that that very event exists in eternity. 272 
Craig sees in this something suspiciously like a B-theory of time, and asks how Leftow 
can reconcile it with the reality of tense. The answer appears to be to relativise actuality 
to reference frames so that 'a temporal event's being present and actual in eternity does 
not entail that it is present and actual at any particular time in any temporal reference 
frame' 273 . The overall picture, then, is that in any temporal frame of reference it is 
correct to say that a given event is past, present or future, that it may have a different 
status in another temporal reference frame, and that it is present in the eternal reference 
frame. But, as Craig points out274, this really stretches the conceptual structure of 
reference frames, has a questionable grasp of the absolute sequencing of causally 
interconnected events that relativity theory contains, and still suggests the eternal 
reference frame to be best understood as the four-dimensional spacetime manifold 
(which is not itself a reference frame and which demands a B-theory of time). 
All together, therefore, there are still plenty of problems which lead to the 
conclusion that Leftow would be better off as a dedicated B-theorist. Craig drives this 
point home in discussion of Leftow's view of omniscience, where he observes that 
Leftow's account of 'factual omniscience' seems to suggest that there are no tensed 
facts: 
According to Leftow, a fact is either the eXIstmg of a subject or a subject's 
exemplifying of an attribute ... the same fact that renders It is then (i.e., at 3 P.M) 3 
P.M true also renders true what is expressed by the sentence token "It is now 3 P.M."275 
Consequently God can be relevantly factually omniscient but these facts are not tensed, 
even if they make tensed beliefs true. It makes more sense to engage a tense less theory 
271 Craig, God, Time and Eternity, p.l05 
272 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.232 
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of time to expound this view than, as Leftow does, to attempt to secure knowledge of 
tensed facts for God. 
DeWeese provides some less convoluted discussion ofLeftow with a view to the 
same conclusion. He makes several criticisms: first, that Leftow takes 'now' as 
primitive and not entailing a position in a B-series (so that an eternal now is not 
temporal), whereas on an A-theory - especially, I would add, presentism - 'now' is 
either definitively temporal such that to be temporal is to be able to say of something 
that it is 'now', or considerable in terms of a separation of two other points, which could 
thereby place it within a B-series relation of earlier or later than. On a B-theory, things 
are in some ways worse because 'now' can be understood as picking out a time in a B-
series or of referring to a simultaneity relation (e.g. 'simultaneous with my tokening this 
proposition'). 
Craig: 
DeWeese's second criticism extends the 'conceptual stretch' complaint from 
How can very many- perhaps infinitely many- relativistic reference frames, each with 
its own clock, be represented in a single [eternal reference frame] in which there is no 
clock but merely an atemporal analogue of the ordering determined in each individual 
reference frame by B-determinationsf76 
DeWeese also objects that the atemporal analogue is not sufficiently clear, and the 
description of reference frames require extension along axes, so that the atemporal 
analogue of a B-series, without further elucidation, seems 'to do nothing more than to 
specify that within that reference frame some axis represents a B-series. ' 277 One 
implication we can draw, which DeWeese chooses to overlook in favour of a stronger 
criticism, is that it is hard to see a difference between this and a tenseless view- and we 
have already seen that there are problems in explicating this difference. 
DeWeese's final objection moves from the sketchy conception of the atemporal 
analogue to concentrate on the extensional quality noted already. DeWeese argues that 
if there is an extension, there is something which has proper parts: Leftow's conception 
of divine eternity is vitally linked with his conception of divine simplicity (i.e. God's 
being must be equal to God's eternity), so Leftow is threatened with having to give up 
divine simplicity, since what is eternal - the atemporal analogue of B-series - will have 
proper parts. I am not convinced that this last line of attack will succeed against 
Leftow, since he has already quite happily said that everything is present in eternity, but 
276 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l74 
277 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.l75 
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what is temporal is extended in time as well. If the atemporal analogue is the mode of 
things' presence in eternity, it does not seem straightforward that the atemporal 
analogue is what eternity is, or more cautiously what it is for God, so it does not 
necessarily follow that what God is has parts. By analogy one might argue that 
omniscience of diverse entities is necessarily knowledge of distinct things but that does 
not mean that omniscience itself has parts so that God has parts if God is God's 
omniscience. Nevertheless, this counter-argument gets Leftow no nearer to avoiding 
allegations of requiring a B-theory for his model of eternity. 
We may also recall that DeWeese's general argument, which we saw earlier, 
was aimed primarily at Leftow's characterisation of eternity insofar as it employed the 
idea of an atemporal analogue. Having completed this loop of argument it should be 
clear that combining dynamic time and atemporal divinity is fraught with difficulty. 
What can be said about the prospect of B-theoretic time and a temporal God? There are 
three arguments, which will be considered in turn. 
The first argument is related to the arguments from divine knowledge and belief 
that we have seen already. In his article 'History without the Flow of Time' Mellor says 
that 'on the tenseless view, there are no ... changing facts: God can be in time without 
His knowledge ever needing to change. ' 278 Thus God knows all the (tenseless) facts 
and has no tensed beliefs. However, this is actually rather problematic. If God is in 
time, then God experiences temporal sequence in the form of the earlier, later and 
simultaneous relations that tenseless time requires. If God has no tensed beliefs, how 
can God know when to act? The most sensible suggestion is that God knows what is 
simultaneous with God's existence, and can therefore act at the appropriate moment. 
But this is no good at all: on a tenseless theory, and where God only knows the tenseless 
facts, it is the case that God exists at every moment of time (presumably this is one of 
the things God will know, pace Craig who thinks that such a God 'never knows at what 
moment He exists' 279). So the idea of God in time on a tenseless view must mean 
something like 'God experiences moments sequentially, but knows both that He exists 
at every moment and the facts about every moment'. Unfortunately it is very difficult 
to see how this experience of temporality would be coherent, given that it differs from 
normal human experience in that (i) it contains knowledge of all tenseless facts and (ii) 
it contains no tensed beliefs about what it is experiencing. It seems that there is a risk of 
278 D. H. Mellor, 'History without the Flow of Time', Neue Zeitschriftfur systematische Theologie und 
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the position collapsing either into the 'tensed plus temporal' view or the 'tenseless plus 
atemporal' view, and it is unclear what could motivate one to fight either of these off. 
If we were to countenance God having tensed beliefs, it might be easier to make 
sense of a temporal God in a tenseless time. This option is pursued by MacBeath280 but 
heavily criticised by Craig281 , who argues that a God who has tensed beliefs in a 
tenseless universe certainly facilitates knowledge in the ways one might expect, but 
does not actually experience the truth about reality, since tensed beliefs under such 
conditions do not correspond to tensed facts but tenseless ones. How is this compatible 
with God's perfection as knower? By contrast, a temporal God in tensed time requires 
tensed beliefs to make sense of tensed facts; God's knowledge is perfected by such 
beliefs. 
The second argument is an analogue from the first to the area of divine action. 
On a tenseless theory of time where God is temporal, either God's actions must be 
multiple and successive, or singular and stretched out through time. The latter is 
possible because God knows all the facts of the complete time series on a tenseless view 
of time; consequently, even if God is located at one moment of that time series (or 
simultaneous with it in God's own time), it is possible to act, or to intend to act, on any 
given moment. However, once again this raises questions of how God is relevantly in 
time, and if we are obliged to retreat to talk of God's sequential experiences it again 
raises the question of whether God must wait to act and react. This would feed into the 
case where God's actions are multiple and successive, but then it is unclear what 
advantage has been gained over the tensed theory in which God must wait to act. A 
collapse into either a temporal God in a tensed time or an atemporal God outside a 
tenseless time seems still to be a risk. 
The final argument against a temporal God in a tenseless time is that it threatens 
divine simplicity insofar as it invites a view of temporal parts. More carefully: if all 
moments of time are equally real and God exists at all moments of time, then it seems 
plausible that God acts in different ways at different times and has different relations to 
things at different times. On a presentist view of a temporal God this would be 
explicable as a simple entity changing over time, but at any one moment- that being all 
that exists - God is as God is. However, on a tenseless view, God is x-at-t1 and y-at-r 
and, given that both times are equally real, how can we avoid the conclusion that God 
280 Murray MacBeath, 'Omniscience and Eternity I', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 
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has parts? Of course, giving up divine simplicity may not worry someone who has 
already given up divine atemporality, and probably immutability. 
As a means of rounding this section of the chapter off, Padgett provides a nice 
summary of the basic contentions that we have been discussing: 
1. On the timeless view, God cannot have any real change. This follows from the very 
idea of a timeless being. 
2. Since God sustains all things, God is responsibly directly for the being of all things, 
at all times. 
3. On the process theory of time, things come into and pass out of existence with the 
passage of time. 
4. On the stasis theory of time, nothing that ever has existed or will exist passes out of 
existence from a timeless perspective. 
"tenselessly" or timelessly. 
God creates/sustains the universe 
5. On the process theory, bringing something into existence, or ceasing to sustain 
something, is a real change in the Creator, not the creature. 
A On the process theory of time, God undergoes real change (from [2], [3) and [5]). 
B. Only the stasis theory of time is compatible with (1) (from [2] and [4]). 282 
The two dual commitments that have taken shape in this section indicate the 
importance of identifying important issues in the arbitration of philosophies of time as a 
means of securing constraints on the theology of divine eternity and I shall return to 
some of the considerations here in the final chapter of the thesis, where I hope to 
emphasise both how much work they can do in theological argument about divine 
eternity, and some important exceptions. Before moving on to select areas of 
philosophical debate, however, a note is required on why we should, or should not, tum 
to historical material to find a more extensive account of how philosophies of time and 
theologies of eternity relate. 
In his historical reflections on divine timelessness, Padgett briskly comments 
that 'It was not until the 131h century that the traditional doctrine of eternity was 
questioned' 283 by way of introducing his discussion of Duns Scotus, and although 
extended discussion of his work is not possible here, the angle Padgett takes on it 
provides a chance to recollect certain elements of the first chapter of this thesis in order 
282 Padgett, 'Eternity as Relative Timelessness', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, 
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to feed them into our discussion of the links between philosophical and theological 
positions in this chapter. Padgett attends to two arguments by Scotus. The first 
responds to the Thomistic analogy of God as the centre of a circle, the circumference of 
which represents time. Whereas for Thomas the circle is ready-drawn, Scotus takes a 
different line, arguing that time is really like a point moving about the circumference 
(i.e. the relationship between God and time is like a radial line). Thus 'time is not a 
standing circumference, but a flowing one, of which circumference there is nothing 
except the actual instant' 284. 
The second argument moves from the premise that what is present is actual, and 
that under the Thomistic view the future is likewise actual in eternity. This means that 
what is future now is already actual, so that God cannot act so as to create new things 
when the future becomes present. But at least some future things will be entirely new, 
so we must change our view of eternity. 
Padgett makes the following move from this evidence: 
In both of these arguments Scotus assumed the process theory of time. Given this view 
of time, he argued that since the distinction between past, present and future is a real 
one, then it is real for God. 285 
Although this is clearly not an example of someone adhering to 'a philosophy of time' 
as such, it is clear that Scotus has a strong opinion on the nature of time and is using it 
to challenge the philosophical foundations of what would have been a theological 
commonplace, and Padgett is right to identify it as such. One can therefore suggest, 
much as I did in chapter one, that there are noticeable historical roots to the practice of 
matching one's philosophical intuitions about time with one's views on divine eternity 
(whether explicitly or not), and that this encompasses more than simply the tradition 
represented by Aquinas eta!. 
There are various extended discussions of which philosophies of time are 
adhered to by which historical figures286, but I do not propose to engage in this sort of 
exposition for three reasons: first, because they are sometimes maltreated as 
springboards for developing a theology of eternity, which opens modem authors to a 
certain amount of partiality or wishful thinking in interpretation which would take a 
thesis in itself to disentangle through careful historical scholarship (the resources for 
284 Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 39, q.5, sec. 35, cited Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p.51 
285 Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p.51 
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which are already provided fo~8\ Second, I have already set out what I take to be the 
most important methodological issues involved so that further detailed historical study 
would be otiose. Finally, I suggest that the historical theology already explored is 
sufficient for the defender of divine timelessness to see much of the philosophical 
material relevant to that defence in its historical context, and adequate to illustrate the 
care which should be employed in investigating philosophical milieus that are relatively 
alien to our contemporary structures of thought. Historical study, then, may be fruitful 
for the proponent of divine timelessness, but is not essential to the core concerns as 
addressed by this thesis. This leads naturally to the question of what should be 
addressed. 
Selection of Key Issues 
In the final part of this chapter the task is to determine which issues are most 
important for the defender of divine timelessness to address. To prevent arbitrary 
selections, there are criteria formed by the methodological concerns of the thesis. We 
should be interested in: 
l) Arguments which make explicit reference to science - it is likely that 
analysis of these in terms of the methodology laid out already would be 
fruitfully pursued. 
2) Arguments which would be held to constitute overwhelming philosophical 
evidence in favour of a position regardless of what scientific material has to 
say on the topic- it is likely that these will provide critical resources for the 
strategies of Undermining and Counterargument, complementing any 
scientific material. 
3) Arguments which centre on candidates for 'philosophical foundations' of 
either A- or B-theories, and which would potentially be commuted through 
the structure of constraints to philosophical foundations of divine 
timelessness or temporality. 
I would argue that the status of the present as metaphysically/ontologically 
favoured is the best starting point for selection of relevant issues. What can be 
appended to the above criteria to support this contention? It seems clear from the 
287 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2"d ed 2006) 
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foregoing material in this chapter that the more powerfully the present is emphasised the 
more likely it is that one will be constrained to exploration of a broadly temporalist 
view of God. One could imagine a philosophy of time in which all moments were 
considered of equal reality (as a B-theory might propose) but where the importance of 
the present and temporal becoming were urged through (i) the importance of tensed 
beliefs (ii) the need for a robust account of change and (iii) the idea that humans have a 
sense of being 'in time'. Now it seems to me (albeit primarily in virtue ofthe way that I 
have expressed the points) that this might provide fewer constraints on the defender of 
divine timelessness; indeed, with a bit of effort one might accommodate these points 
within a B-theory of time. 
However, if we replace these with points ontologically emphasising the present, 
we might obtain: (i) the truth of tensed beliefs, as relating events to the present, (ii) the 
need for an account of a changing present, and (iii) the fact that all that we experience, 
we experience as present. These are a lot tougher to deal with. Based on the arguments 
in the previous section of this chapter, they may even rule out divine timelessness if 
developed strongly enough. If constraints favouring divine temporality come from the 
emphasis of the present in A-theories of time, then the philosophical foundations of a 
defence of divine timelessness are liable to come from the denial of the ontological 
importance of the present; such a move will strengthen B-theories and weaken A-
theories. 
As we saw towards the beginning of the chapter, McTaggart's arguments 
purported to show the unreality of time and have been employed by A-theorists to 
affirm dynamic time (by using McTaggart's claim that the B-series relies on the A-
series) and by B-theorists to deny dynamic time through McTaggart's paradox. Do we 
need to look more closely at this issue? I think not: we also saw that presentism 
allegedly provides a way of escaping the paradox, by arguing that the present is all that 
exists and denying that an event can therefore have incompatible properties of pastness, 
presentness and futurity, since there exists no event or entity to which pastness or 
futurity can be simply applied. Presentism seems likely to represent the end of the A-
theoretical spectrum which most threatens divine timelessness, so concentrating on 
defeating A-theories through an argument which, if it works against anything, works 
against non-presentist metaphysics, will not cut the mustard. 
Whether or not it is possible to avoid McTaggart's paradox in other cases, it is 
generally accepted that presentism is an effective way out, the problem then being one 
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of whether presentism is a good idea per se288 . Moreover, Craig himself argues that all 
A-theoretic approaches fall prey to some version of McTaggart's paradox except for 
presentism- even, for example, Michael Tooley's causal theory which Craig describes 
as a 'reality accretion' model289. If this is so, the use of a version of McTaggart's 
paradox must be logically subsequent to the defeat of presentism even if it is a vital 
move in affirming the strength of B-theories of time. 
Things are moving into focus: denial of the ontological importance of the 
present and a critique of presentism go hand in hand, so that the next step must be to 
identify arguments in support of presentism which also conform to our criteria of 
selection. Fortunately there is a clutch of arguments which provide exactly what is 
required, and which fit very neatly into the structure provided by Hawley's work. 
A closely connected area of debate concerns the relation between language and 
ontology. Craig's summary of the (pro-A-theory) case, as he sees it, is as follows: 
Tensed sentences, which can neither be translated into synonymous tenseless sentences 
nor be given tenseless, token-reflexive truth conditions, correspond, if true, to tensed 
facts.Z90 
Various scholarship has attempted to argue that tensed sentences can either be translated 
into synonymous tenseless sentences or be given tenseless, token-reflexive truth 
conditions. More recently, D. H. Mellor has provided an account which accepts the 
importance of tensed beliefs but argues that all that is required are tenseless facts - i.e. 
tenseless truth-makers for those beliefs. If successful, these attempts go a long way to 
showing that tense is not an irreducible element of reality, even if it is practically a 
ubiquitous element in our communication about that reality. 
There are also characteristics of presentism that give rise to critiques that can fit 
together with the concerns in this debate. Le Poidevin summarises them thus291 : 
1. The extension of the existential quantifier is restricted to presently existing objects. 
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2. Relations obtain only between contemporaries, that is, objects existing at the same 
time. 
3. Past and future tenses are to be interpreted as sentential operators on core present-
tense sentences, the present tense not requiring representation by an operator. 
4. Instants are logical constructions out of propositions. 
5. Past- and future-tense statements have only present facts as their truth conditions, 
that is, what makes a certain statement about the past or future true is the evidence 
h . 292 t at at present eXIsts. 
Although the literature is extensive, it seems likely that considering recent versions of 
arguments concerning truth-makers and truth-conditions, and any necessary associated 
issues, might be useful. In particular, the presentist sides of these debates may 
constitute the sort of independent arguments that can outweigh scientific involvement in 
arbitrating the metaphysical dispute (i.e. are candidates for Counterargument 
employment), and if they do not it may transpire that they can provide independent 
arguments in the event that a scientifically level playing field can be obtained (i.e. are 
candidates for Undermining employment). Success by the critic of presentism in this 
area will uncover likely philosophical foundations for a defence of divine timelessness. 
Turning to scientific issues, it is clear that the debate over whether relativity 
theory can act as a guide to the metaphysics of time is a key one. The main argument is 
that the relativity of simultaneity across frames of reference described by the special 
theory of relativity indicates that there is no such thing as an absolute present; several 
moments of time may be considered equally real. An A-theorist who is willing to 
accept the reality of the future and the past but argues that the present is an ontologically 
favoured determination shifting through events may cope with this by relativising 
presentness to reference frames293 . The presentist, however, seemingly cannot maintain 
presentism except by claiming that existence is relative to reference frames. 
Consequently those who support a B-theory of time claim support for their own 
position, which they suggest is eminently compatible with the science, and presentists 
generally attempt some form of scientific revision to fmd a version of relativity theory 
that is compatible with their position. 
292 Le Poidevin, Change, Cause, and Contradiction, p.36 
293 See Storrs McCall and E. J. Lowe '3D/4D Equivalence, the Twins Paradox, and Absolute Time', 
Analysis 63:278 (2003), pp.II4-123 
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All these considerations are highly pertinent and play directly into the 
methodological concerns of the thesis294. I suggest that pursuing a revision of science 
amounts to a strategy of Undermining; if this is not viable, then powerful philosophical 
arguments will be needed to pursue Counterargument in the face of a potential claim for 
scientific support from the B-theorist. Success by the critic of presentist metaphysics in 
this area is likely to provide further philosophical foundations for the defender of divine 
timelessness. 
Craig offers an argument that attempts to extend the more usual epistemic notion 
that objective tensed reality is the best explanation of our experiences of the world 
(which places the burden on the B-theorist to show some way in which we are 
mistaken). His idea is that belief in tense is properly basic and not able to be rebutted or 
undercut by other considerations. Indeed, he claims that belief in the reality of tense 
enjoys so much warrant in our noetic structure that it trumps any potential argument that 
is put forward to defeat it: 'tensed beliefs are so strongly held that no one can 
successfully divest himself of them and... their abandonment would generate 
repercussions throughout one's entire noetic structure. ' 295 Craig goes as far as to argue 
that if belief in tensed reality is properly basic for everyone then B-theorists, to the 
extent that they reject the belief, are irrational. The strength of this claim is reminiscent 
of Hawley's identification of the Counterargument strategy that accepts scientific 
support for a metaphysic but claims that independent philosophical considerations 
directly outweigh it. Thus, much as for the linguistic and truth-maker arguments, it is 
apparent that this epistemic discussion should be followed up and placed within the 
methodical structure of this thesis. Failure by the critic of presentism to avert the force 
of such an argument may have serious repercussions, for if we are irrational to reject the 
present as a favoured ontological category as well (in just the way the presentist 
suggests it to be), the importance thereby allocated to the present may end up ruling out 
divine atemporality as a possibility. 
There is a further complex of arguments concerned with how to give an account 
of objective temporal becoming, if one is an A-theorist, or of how becoming could be 
mind-dependent or otherwise reliant upon consciousness in its interaction with reality, if 
one is a B-theorist. Some of these issues relate to the logical notion of the present and 
294 To the extent that, as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, there is some overlap with the issue of 
persistence and temporary intrinsics, that debate is also pertinent. However, many of the arguments 
fielded against presentism and in favour of some sort of perdurance are similar or identical to the science-
based material in the philosophy of time, and there is sufficient separation of interests not to oblige us to 
go too deeply into that debate itself. 
295 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.J65 
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can be incorporated under considerations of truth-makers and whether reality is tensed. 
Others are more phenomenological: for instance, what does it mean to say that we 
experience time passing?296 Others still dip into related issues in the philosophy of 
mind: what does it mean to assert that temporal becoming is mind-dependent; how 
should we understand mental events?297 These points I would argue to be mostly 
derivative from more fundamental issues, at least for the purpose of this thesis. Direct 
arguments about the nature of time and how we can know it, one might say, give us a 
picture of what time is. It is a secondary process to make sense of this in terms of our 
status as conscious entities (and it is not as if epistemology, science and language are 
devoid ·of considerations of our experience of time - we shall see a limited argument 
concerning the mind-dependence of presentness in the epistemological discussion of 
chapter six). We must maintain our focus on the status of the present, in the 
anticipation that it will pay dividends. 
In summary, the next few chapters must address the question of the metaphysics 
of the present, as incorporated into the methodological structure of the thesis, in order to 
derive suitable principles, points, or premises, which can contribute to the philosophical 
foundations of a defence of divine timeslessness that this thesis seeks to elucidate. 
We remind ourselves that the levelling of the scientific playing field is the main 
step of Undermining in Hawley's schema; this forms the centrepiece of the discussion 
(chapter five). The independent arguments concerning language and ontology may 
provide resources for Counterargument, but if not may well form a natural match with 
the scientific material to complete the Undermining strategy; their flexibility makes 
them worth laying out as soon as possible; I do so in chapter four. The epistemological 
arguments, regarding the overwhelming impingement of the present into our noetic 
structure, are more directly suited to Counterargument, and form a strong 'final line of 
defence' should other arguments fail; they are therefore placed in chapter six. The next 
three chapters, then, provide an in-depth analysis of the strategic possibilities for 
Undermining and Counterargument which the presentist might employ to promote their 
'alternate metaphysics'. We should, by the end of this process, be able to see more 
clearly the issues of science and metaphysics' interaction nested within a wider 
metaphysical debate, which is in tum set in the widest context of constraints on the 
theology of eternity. 
296 See Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, pp.218-258 for discussion and select bibliography 
297 See Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, pp.l67-177 & pp.l27-145 for discussion and select 
bibliography 
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Chapter IV- The Status o{the Present: Language, Facts and Ontology 
Introduction 
Craig provides extensive discussion of the recent history of attempts to resolve 
the debate in the philosophy of time by recourse to considerations of language. 
However, his position is that 
Tensed sentences ostensibly ascribe ontological tenses [and] unless tensed sentences are 
shown to be reducible without loss of meaning to tenseless sentences or ontological 
tense is shown to be superfluous to human though and action, the ostensible ascription 
of ontological tenses by tensed sentences ought to be accepted as veridical. 298 
That this potentially plays things a little fast and loose is clear when it is compared with 
DeWeese's careful preparation for his own more limited discussion of language. He 
considers a 'syntactic priority thesis' and a 'semantic priority thesis' and finds them 
both lacking. Regarding the former, he cites Russell's exhortation to be able to 'infer 
properties of the world from properties of language' 299 and argues, with Andrew 
Newman, that 'ordinary language admits of different, mutually exclusive 
interpretations, and the decision among interpretations will have nothing to do with 
language and everything to do with metaphysics. ' 300 Likewise, he argues, the idea that 
the meaning of words outside of their context will allow us to draw conclusions about 
the structure of reality without broader metaphysical considerations coming into the 
picture, seems doomed to failure. For DeWeese, the best we can do is a 'weak' 
argument from common linguistic practice, which he summarises as follows: 'One role 
oflanguage is to make it possible to refer to objective reality' 301 allowing the argument 
1. Common linguistic practice provides prima facie evidence of the nature of 
objective reality. 
2. Common linguistic practice is irreducibly tensed. 
a. Attempts to translate tensed into tenseless language are unsuccessful. 
b. Attempts to give tenseless truth conditions for tensed statements fail to 
convey significant information contained in the tensed statement. 
298 Craig, Tensed Theory, p.22 
299 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, p.22 citing Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1940), chapter 25 
300 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.23 cf Andrew Newman, The Physical Basis of Predication 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.36 
301 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.23 
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3. Therefore, irreducibly tensed common linguistic practice provides prima facie 
evidence that objective reality itself is tensed (i.e. that time is dynamic). 302 
Although the form of the argument is almost identical to Craig's own approach, 
DeWeese's conclusion is expressed in terms of prima facie evidence303 , whereas Craig's 
conclusion is more stark: 'Therefore, tensed sentences' ostensible ascription of 
ontological tenses to events/things is veridical. Reality is tensed. ' 304 
Tenseless Facts as Truth Makers 
In line with the overarching concern of this thesis to provide focal points for the 
defender of divine timelessness rather than an exhaustive treatment of the philosophy of 
time that could have a bearing on divine eternity, I choose not to become embroiled in 
either the old B-theory of language which argues for tenseless translation of tensed 
propositions, or the new B-theory of language which argues for tenseless truth 
conditions of tensed propositions. Rather, taking on Le Poidevin's concern305 that the 
debate over truth-conditions may have eclipsed some crucial ontological issues, I 
propose to restrict discussion to some arguments which have most relevance to the 
ontology of time and to the thesis as a whole. I shall begin with Mellor's position as 
regards tensed and tenseless language's truthmakers, and Craig's response to it. This 
will provide a way in to the exploration of some arguments against presentism which 
centre around truthmakers, and the analysis of Craig's model of presentism, which, he 
suggests, evades the criticisms levelled at presentism. The greater part of the chapter, 
then, is about the 'language and ontology' of time in the sense that it is about its logical 
coherence and not about its epistemology or relation to empirical science, which we 
shall consider in later chapters. 
Moving straight to (and through) Mellor's Real Time II analysis allows the 
tenseless theorist potentially to concede two points without becoming bogged down in 
detailed debate or conceding the ontologically vital elements of their position (viz. that 
all times are equally real). The two points conceded are, first, that it is no good trying to 
provide tenseless translations for tensed propositions as a way of 'forcing' tense out of 
reality, and, second, that tensed beliefs/propositions are an ineliminable part of our 
302 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.21 
303 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.29 
304 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l30 
305 Robin Le Poidevin, 'The Past, Present, and Future of the Debate About Tense', in Robin Le Poidevin 
(ed.), Questions ofTime and Tense, p.37 
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interaction with the world, perhaps to the extent that we cannot provide tenseless truth 
conditions for every tensed proposition. The core of the remaining option that Mellor 
espouses is this: that there are facts that make propositions true (regardless of whether 
those propositions are tensed or tenseless) and these facts are not tensed facts but 
tenseless ones. In short, they are facts about things, people, beliefs, events and tokens, 
at times. 
The construction of Mellor's argument begins with concepts of' A-facts' and 'B-
facts'; the former employ A-terminology, whilst the latter 'are contingent facts about 
how much earlier or later events are then each other, and hence about what their B-times 
are; none of which ... entail any A-facts. '306 Mellor then sets out to show that tenseless 
surrogates can be found for tensed facts, and that, further, B-facts are all that are needed 
ontologically. A-facts, then, if Mellor is successful, will be relegated to the status of 
things that we have built onto a B-reality to help us to understand it. 
Mellor's second step is to accept that there can be true tensed beliefs and that 
their truth-values vary depending upon when they are held. He uses the following 
example: 'suppose that today is 1 June, the day before my friend Jim's big race. My 
present future-belief that Jim will race tomorrow differs in type from the future now-
belief, that he races today, which I expect to have tomorrow, even if both beliefs are 
made true by the same fact. ' 307 
Mellor observes that there are two contenders for the truth-making fact: a 
'presently existing A-fact' (Jim races tomorrow) and a B-fact (Jim races on 2 June). 
Before prosecuting his case, he interjects a discussion of truth-bearers. Mellor argues 
that it does not really matter what the truth bearers are, because his argument turns on 
'what makes them true when they are true. '308 As Craig points out (with some chagrin, 
having spent circa seventy pages discussing the matter in one form or another) 'the 
question of truth-bearers is critical. For statements and sentences cannot solve the 
problems which brought down the New B-Theory of Language, since they do not exist 
at all times, nor can linguistic meaning do the job, since meanings are neither true nor 
false. ' 309 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to Craig (and to me) that Mellor is 
employing sentence types (as opposed to tokens) as truth bearers in his final analysis. 
However, in charting the development of Mellor's position, it will appear from time to 
time over the next four pages that he takes tokens to be truth bearers; there will be 
306 Mellor, Real Time II, p. 19 
307 Mellor, Real Time II, p.23 
308 Mellor, Real Time II, p.24 
309 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.93 
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plenty of more complex issues to resolve without regularly bringing this up, and so (to 
enable the reader to concentrate on those issues) we can note in advance that the final 
form of Mellor's argument will address this point by making the sentence types truth-
bearers.310 
Mellor also differentiates a weak and strong sense of 'fact', the strong sense 
which he desires to use being a 'truthmaker' sense of fact such that '"Jim races 
tomorrow" is made true by a fact P. ' 311 This is over and against the weak sense, where-
following Tarski - 'x' if and only if x (so the weak sense would be 'Jim races 
tomorrow' is true if and only if Jim races tomorrow). 
Mellor begins his argument by setting out the ways in which A- and B-facts 
would go about being truthmakers; he notes that the concept of truthmakers is still 
problematic, but implies that he feels confident enough of their acceptability to proceed 
(pace Craig, who states 'Mellor just assumes a truthmaker ontology, which is a 
controversial assumption' 312, implying that Mellor does not acknowledge this). Thus: 
If today is l June, the A-truthmaker for 'Jim races tomorrow' is Jim's racing a day later 
than today, while its B-truthmaker is his racing a day later than 1 June. 313 
Mellor argues that, in order to make B-truthmakers a reasonable idea, he has to show 
how B-facts - which are always facts; they all exist - cope with making various 
propositions true at some times and false at other times. The A-truthmaker above exists 
only on the 1 June; if Jim races again a month later, there will be a different A-
truthmaker existing, although this will be another, separate, fact of Jim racing 
tomorrow.314 
Thus, Mellor argues that 'because B-facts, unlike A-facts, do not come and go 
... no single B-fact can make "Jim races tomorrow" true at some times and not at 
others. '315 Consequently, 'it takes as many B-facts as there are times at which an A-
310 The reason for going through the development of the position is that some of the earlier material is 
necessary for understanding later manoeuvres; the development takes place as it does because Mellor is 
building, in Real Time II, on material he expounded in D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
311 Mellor, Real Time II, p.25 
312 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.92 
313 Mellor, Real Time II, p.26 
314 How we tell the difference between each truthmaker is another matter, and a problem for the A-
theorist that the presentist may attempt to solve by arguing that only one truthmaker of that type will ever 
exist at any one time, and only the present exists, so no distinction is required. 
315 Mellor, Real Time II, p.27-8 
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proposition can have independent truth values. ' 316 In other words, 'it takes a new B-fact 
to make "Jim races tomorrow" true or false each day. ' 317 
Mellor decides to build his account of B-facts by starting with the type/token 
distinction for the class of truth bearers. He notes that a belief-type (e.g. 'Jim races 
tomorrow') will have as its tokens individual belief-occasions of this (mine, yours, 
Jim's brother's). Further, he argues, we should introduce a time component, since you 
or I (or Jim's brother) will have the belief-type at various times. 
This makes the belief-tokens we need facts: my believing a proposition 'P' at a given A-
or B-moment, t. And if t is a B-moment, then even if 'P' is an A-proposition, my 
believing it at t is a B-fact, entailing nothing about how much earlier or later it is than 
the present. 318 
Thus, there are presumably truth bearer types, of which there are various tokens, and 
because the tokens take the form of' x believes P at t', they take the form of facts. 'That 
B-facts can be tokens of A-propositions is crucial to the B-theory. ' 319 What Mellor 
plans to do is to make the truthmakers for truth bearer types rely upon- or partially be -
the tokens of those types. 
Mellor goes on to say the following, for which a great deal of clarification will 
be required: 
I must stress therefore that [B-facts being tokens of A-propositions] is not a peculiarity 
of token beliefs, arising from the fallibility which, for most P, stops my believing "P" 
entailing P. For even if I know on 1 June that Jim races tomorrow, which does entail 
that he races then, my token knowledge is still not an A-fact. For first, all it entails is 
that my belief that Jim races tomorrow is true, not that what makes it true is an A-fact, 
which is the point at issue. And second, my knowing on 1 June that Jim races tomorrow 
entails only the B-fact that he races on 2 June. It does not entail the A-fact that he races 
tomorrow, for it does not entail that I June is today .... Whatever my attitude to the A-
proposition that Jim races tomorrow, my having that attitude at any B-moment is a B-
fact, not an A-fact. 320 
Craig claims that Mellor makes a mistake, in that 'double indexing requires that 
no matter where in the present or past l June is, the race will be tomorrow. If we know 
that ''tomorrow" refers to 2 June, then my knowing on l June that Jim races tomorrow 
entails that today is l June. '321 So what is known on l June is an A-fact. Craig's point 
is grounded in his treatment of temporal indexicals. He wishes to claim that 'it is clear 
316 Mellor, Real Time II, p.27-8 
317 Mellor, Real Time II, p.27-8 
318 Mellor, Real Time II, p.29 
319 Mellor, Real Time II, p.29 
320 Mellor, Real Time II, p.30 
321 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.94-S 
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what the ostensible function of temporal indexicals is: they ascribe A-determinations 
and/or A-positions. ' 322 However, it is not clear to the reader how he gets to this claim 
from his earlier assertion that temporal indexicals have 'linguistic rules determined by 
the meaning of the words which stipulate that the time referred to is a moment or 
interval earlier than, simultaneous with or later than the time of any tokening of the 
sentence. '323 Nevertheless, Craig's account would appear to be this: 
1) I know on 1 June that 'Jim races tomorrow'. 
2) This entails that Jim races on 2 June. 
3) Knowing that Jim races on 2 June entails knowing that today is 1 June. 
4) So what I know is not that Jim races 'the next day', but that Jim races 
tomorrow. 
Some careful attention is required to disentangle this with respect to what Mellor 
really wants to say. What can start with what everyone agrees on: 
(i) x believing 'Jim races tomorrow' on/at 1 June is a B-fact. 
(ii) 'Jim races tomorrow' is a tensed belief. 
(iii) That Jim races on 2 June is a B-fact. 
What we need is a way to differentiate the perspectives that the example employs. 
a) x knows (at 1 June, 'Jim races tomorrow') entails x knows (Jim races at 2 
June, today is 1 June) and entails that Jim races on 2 June. 
b) At I June x knows ('Jim races tomorrow') entails x knows (Jim races one 
day later than x's tokening of the belief), and entails that Jim races on 2 
June. 
However, from our perspective both (a) and (b) entail that Jim races on 2 June, because 
we are provided with the date of x's tokening in each case. But in the first case, x 
knows what the dates are, and in the second case x does not. So, in the first case x 
actually knows all the B-facts that contribute to making 'Jim races tomorrow' true. In 
the second case, x knows that x's tensed belief is true, but does not know the B-facts. 
As Mellor suggests, this does not mean that the fact making x's belief true is tensed 
rather than tenseless. What is common to both cases is that there is a B-fact (at t, x 
322 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.14 
323 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.ll 
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knows P) and that this entails a B-fact (Jim races at f) and that the latter B-fact being 
relevantly B-related to the occurrence of P is what makes P true. 
One might object that it is unclear in (b) what x knows if x does not know the B-
fact that Jim races on 2 June, and that part of the entailment in (a) is that 'today is 1 
June', which rather looks like a tensed fact. In the former case (if one wishes to avoid 
being bloody-minded and simply asserting that x knows x's tensed belief is true) one 
can suggest something like this: imagine a situation in which you do not know any B-
series dates or times (i.e. do not know the date of tokening, nor the date of racing, nor 
the time of racing). What then do you know, and how would you go about seeing Jim 
race? Let us assume that Jim never races in the dark. You know that at some time from 
the sunrise-to-sunset subsequent to your tokening 'Jim races tomorrow', Jim races. So 
presumably the sort of behaviour motivated will involve hanging around the racetrack, 
trying to find more specific information about times, etc. The tensed belief is vital to 
motivate timely action, but what makes it true is not thereby an A-fact- and the lack of 
B-data means that the action motivated is different. Nevertheless, it cannot fail to be the 
case that if x knows P then at some B-position x knows P. This is a B-fact, and in our 
example it entails a B-fact about when Jim races. The relation between the latter and P 
is what makes P true. 
Against the second objection we can argue something very specific (which, as 
we shall see shortly, gets to the heart of the matter): in (a) 'today is l June' is 
incorporated in the scope of what x knows. This is because the example is couched in 
terms which index the tensed elements to x's reference point (l June). Sox does indeed 
know that 'today is l June', but all that tells us is that when it is the 1 June it is true to 
say that 'today is l June'. This is not the same as saying that today absolutely is l June. 
I think this is what Mellor is getting at when he says 'It does not entail the A-fact that he 
races tomorrow, for it does not entail that l June is today. ' 324(Mellor's italics). 
However, in the way that Mellor puts it, a chink is provided for Craig to exert leverage 
in favour of tensed facts; hopefully the treatment just provided closes down that chink. 
It will also provide the key to resolving Craig's criticism of Mellor's account in its final 
form. 
Mellor concludes overall that 'In short, all tokens, however diverse, of any A-
proposition "P" for which we need B-truthmakers, have B-times which (given "P") fix 
their truth or falsity in any given world. ' 325 Thus, he moves towards a concept of B-
324 Mellor, Real Time II, p. 30 
325 Mellor, Real Time II, p. 31 
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truthmakers which employs the tokens themselves in their role of forming facts when 
part of the schematic 'x believes (etc.) Pat t'. 'So the B-fact that makes a token of"Jim 
races tomorrow" true seems to be this: the fact that the token is located a day earlier 
than the day on which Jim races. ' 326 Mellor generalises this (for A-propositions 'P' and 
events 'e') to: 
Any token of 'P' is true iff it is as much earlier or later than e as 'P' says the 
. h 327 present 1s t an e. 
Where A-propositions employing present terms (now, today, etc.) are concerned, the 
truthmaker's relation is simultaneity. For example, 'It's my birthday today' is made 
true by, and only by, its being uttered on the same day(s) as my birthday occurs. 
The above represent the core ideas of Mellor's B-theory, but, as Mellor himself 
admits, it is 'not good enough, because a token-reflexive theory gives some A-
propositions the wrong truth-values. ' 328 He moves on to address the issue of untokened 
propositions. The example Mellor works with is the pairing 'There are tokens now' and 
'There are no tokens now'329, and he helpfully recasts the problem as follows: 
Whatever makes ['there are no tokens now'] true at any A- or B-time t, it cannot be 
what makes [its] tokens true then, since these tokens are never true. What then does 
make ['there are no tokens now'] true at a timet when, as it says, there are no tokens? 
Mellor's answer is that it is a fact about the time of consideration that makes true 
A-propositions, including untokenable ones, true. It is the fact ofthere being no tokens 
at a certain moment that makes the A-proposition 'there are no tokens now' true at that 
moment in particular, and the fact that there are tokens at a moment that makes 'there 
are no tokens now' false at that moment. Mellor generalises this to: 
Any A-proposition 'P' about any event e is made true at any t by t's being as much 
earlier or later thane as 'P' says the present is than e. 330 
Again, propositions employing e.g. now, today, etc., are catered for by the simultaneity 
relation. So 'it's my birthday today', as a P-type rather than a token, is made true at any 
326 Mellor, Real Time II, p. 31 
327 Mellor, Real Time II, p. 31 
328 Mellor, Real Time II, p.32 
329 Mellor, Real Time II, p.32 
330 Mellor, Real Time II, p.34 
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time by that time being simultaneous with my birthday event(s). This is more useful 
than the token-reflexive formulation, because it does not demand the existence of tokens 
to provide the relevant facts, and therefore the truthrnakers, for a proposition/sentence 
type. Consequently, one can, as it were, see the whole set of solutions for the equation 
instead of taking one instance at a time. For example, the sentence type 'Jim races 
tomorrow' will be made true at any time of consideration, when it is true, by Jim's 
racing being a day later than the time of consideration, and will be made false, when it 
is false, by Jim's racing not being a day later than the time of consideration. This also 
lets us know that any tokens will be truly uttered on the relevant days (taking into 
account Craig's previous protestation that tokens cannot be true or false, but only truly 
or falsely uttered331). 
Craig reacts to Mellor's proposals with great dismay. He argues that they 
provide neither truth conditions nor truthmakers for P, because the situation has been 
altered to provide conditions or truthmakers for 'P at t'. 'But we want to know what 
makes (present tense) P true. We want to know, not what makes Jim races tomorrow 
true on June 1, but what makes it true that Jim races tomorrow or that Jim is racing. ' 332 
What Craig wants, we remind ourselves, is 'The fact of 1980's being present makes "It 
is now 1980" (presently) true.' For 'if there are no tensed truthrnakers, then it is 
inexplicable why P is true- not true at t, mind you, but simply true. '333 
If my treatment of the 'Jim races tomorrow' case above is not faulty, then the 
problem here can be diagnosed and resolved to some extent. For it suggests that any 
instance ofP will be indexed to a B-time t. Just as we saw that x's knowledge of 'today 
is 1 June' on 1 June did not amount to a tensed fact that today is 1 June, so we can see 
that Craig's demand for what makes 'Jim races tomorrow' true is a demand for a tensed 
fact that is malformed given Mellor's structure of B-facts and tensed beliefs. The 
tenseless theorist might say the following: What if we opt for fully tensed facts? Jim 
races tomorrow is true because Jim's racing is one day future, or one day after the day 
which has the property of being present. But the former encounters the problem of 
being one day future of what, whilst the latter encounters a problem of absolute and 
relative present: in 1998 Mellor said 'Jim races tomorrow', and I know this statement to 
be true because Jim raced one day later than the present. But whose present? Mellor's 
present, because Jim does not race at all in 2007, so Mellor's statement cannot be true in 
331 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, pp.77-83 
332 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.95 
333 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.96 
109 
virtue of Jim racing one day after 'absolute today', i.e. the present. Is Craig smuggling 
the 'at t' element in through the back door? 
The measured response should, I think, be that Mellor is not failing by making 
'P at t', rather than P simpliciter, what is made true. But neither is Craig smuggling 
anything in or being unreasonable in wanting the truth of P simpliciter. Instead, Mellor 
is providing a coherent account that fits with a B-theoretic view of the world, and Craig 
is asking for an account that fits with a presentist view of the world. If presentism is 
false, then surely it is not sensible to ask what makes 'Jim races tomorrow' simply true, 
and more than it is sensible to demand 'the' answer to an equation that has more than 
one possible solution. If presentism is true, however, then the treatment of the 
entailment 'today is l June' (in (a) above) that I have given will be faulty because there 
is no possibility of x's 'today' being anything other than the absolute and only present, 
and it will consequently make perfect sense to ask what makes 'Jim races tomorrow' 
true simpliciter, and argue for the answer that it is just the tensed fact that Jim races 
tomorrow. This will be brought out more powerfully in the criticism of Craig's position 
from special relativity (note that this means that Mellor's account cannot therefore be 
considered in the category of arguments independent of science). In light of that 
discussion, it should be visible, if the criticism is accurate, Craig's physics is awry, and 
thus a B-theory can claim support from science, that special relativity will bear out 
Mellor's position that truth must be 'truth at t', since for a proposition to be 'simply 
true' is for us to assume that there is a single, common value fort for everyone. 
In conclusion, then, I suggest that Mellor's account does not fall to Craig's 
criticism of it, but neither does it present a knock-down independent argument for a B-
theory approach. The success of Mellor's tenseless theory, as an argument centred on 
language and truthmakers, remains dependent (as he himself I think would allow) on the 
failure of A-theoretic positions. 
Objections to Presentism 
Having discussed the mechanics of truthmakers and tensed or tenseless 
discourse from the perspective of presentism criticising B-theory, we ought to see how 
presentism's own position holds up under critical analysis. Towards the end of the 
previous chapter, we noted that the view that the present is all that exists is generally 
held to be the easiest (and perhaps only) A-theoretical way to avoid the force of 
McTaggart's paradox, and we saw five points that Le Poidevin makes about Prior's 
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presentism (which Le Poidevin terms 'temporal solipsism' to avoid confusion with 
Quentin Smith's theory), which Craig claims to evade in his own theory. We can recall 
them as follows: 
I. The extension of the existential quantifier is restricted to presently existing objects. 
2. Relations obtain only between contemporaries, that is, objects existing at the same 
time.... Apparent relations between non-contemporaries . . . must be analysed in terms 
of some present fact. 
3. Past and future tenses are to be interpreted as sentential operators on core present-tense 
sentences, the present tense not requiring to be represented by an operator.... The 
import of this is that present truth is truth simpliciter. 
4. Instants are logical constructions out of propositions.... An instant, that is, is equated 
with all the propositions which would ordinarily be described as being (contingently) 
true at that instant. 
5. Past- and future-tense statements have only present facts as their truth conditions, that 
is, what makes a certain statement about the past or future true is the evidence that at 
• 334 present eXIsts. 
I shall be concentrating on arguments arising from two of these in particular: in line 
with the subject matter of the chapter so far, the fifth point is evidently of special 
interest, and the second point can be considered in terms of the question 'how should 
we construe cross-time relationships if the present is all that exists?' Consequently it is 
of common concern with the question of truth-makers; indeed Le Poidevin observes that 
the fifth guarantees the second335 . I shall begin by using Le Poidevin's discussion of 
presentism in Travels in Four Dimensions336 as an introduction to the subsequent, more 
detailed, material centred on the work of Ted Sider337, which will also include some 
analysis of the issue of tense operators and consequently of the elements of point (3) 
which have a bearing on points (2) and (5). 
Le Poidevin begins from the position that presentism (understood as the 
assertion that the past and future are unreal) may be thought of as quite an intuitive 
position, but we must ask first what it means for the past and future to be unreal and 
then, if the past is unreal, what makes our statements/beliefs/memories of it true. 
334 Le Poidevin, Change, Cause, and Contradiction (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991 ), p. 37; cf Craig, 
The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.208 
335 Le Poidevin, Change, Cause, and Contradiction, p. 38 
336 Le Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.l35-140 
337 Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 200 I ) 
111 
To answer the first question, he compares colour and fictitious characters. 
Arguing that we would be unlikely to accept that the past is unreal in the sense of 
fictitious, he suggests that this leaves us with an account that is more like Democritus' 
atomism (an account similar again to how we might think of colour)- i.e. that there is a 
reality that makes some beliefs and statements true, but this reality does not contain e.g. 
colour because it is more fundamental (in Democritus' case, it is all about atoms). 
Turning to the second question, he criticises the view thus formed - that it is 
present reality that makes true beliefs about the past - on the grounds that many 
different pasts are compatible with the way the world is now (i.e. the present 
underdeterrnines the past), so that the presentist is forced to assume that only one past is 
compatible with the present. Le Poidevin pushes the criticism further. How, he asks, 
can the presentist talk about this presumably causal mechanism? What makes "the past 
leaves causal traces on the present" true? The presentist must assert that present fact 
makes such a statement true. 
But what purely present fact could make true a statement about the causal relations 
between different times? We can make sense of a past event leaving its causal traces on 
the present. .. but can we make sense of the causal relation between that event and the 
present traces itselfleaving its traces on the present?338 
Thus, the presentist is placed in the position of having to relate events at different times, 
which apparently requires each event and (/or) each time to be part of reality. The 
presentist cannot allow this, and so cannot assume the best apparent mechanism for 
explaining the truth of past-related statements by present reality. Corning, in a sense, 
full circle, Le Poidevin points out that the view that causal relations link events at 
different times may also be thought of as an intuitive view. The presentist appears to be 
in some difficulty, for even if the mechanism can be formed to avoid the causal 
problem, the presentist will still have to deny an intuitive view of causal relations as 
well. 
Le Poidevin makes a further point that could be made to weigh against a reliance 
on tensed operators. He asks, on behalf of the presentist, why one could not just say 
'that such-and-such was the case' 339? He argues that this makes it unclear what is 
meant by denying the reality of the past, since without something to account for this 
338 Le Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions, p.l39 
339 Cf e.g. Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.!90 for a very concise expression of this from his 
viewpoint. 
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unreality one is left with 'the trivial truth that the past is not part of present reality' 340 . 
This is something that even a B-theorist could accept if they were careful enough to 
phrase it properly (e.g. if we are at t2, although t1 and t2 are equally extant nevertheless 
t 1 is not simultaneously extant with t2, because they are two different times; the part of 
reality that t 1 represents is not part of t2's part of reality). Thus we could extend the 
point to argue that tense operators alone will not secure very much for the presentist, 
since a justification for the unreality of the past and future is also needed. 
Let us now take a look at the first detailed objection, which in Sider's work 
combines some critical appraisal of tense operators with an extensive analysis of cross-
time relations. Having observed that the presentist requires operators 1 WAS <p 1 and 
1 WILL <p 1, and their metrical equivalents 1 WAS, n units of time ago, <p 1 and 1 WILL, n 
units of time hence, <p 1, he argues that an objection thereby arises 'that the presentist 
must deny the truth of everyday claims that concern multiple times taken together. ' 341 
He takes as an example that some Greek philosophers are admired by some American 
philosophers. Sider argues that the scope of the WAS operator becomes problematic: 
one does not wish to assert that the Greeks currently exist, nor that the Americans' 
existence is in the past, nor that the admiration took place when the Greeks existed, nor 
that the admiration is co-temporal with both the Americans and the Greeks existing at 
some present or past point: 'It is rather a fact about two times at once. ,342 Sider asserts 
that the simplest way out appears to be to make the operators 'span' rather than 'slice'. 
Yet, he argues, this falls foul of the presentist' s own conceptualisation: 
For example, the sentence 'WAS 3x3y(x=Socrates and y=Kant)' is true of many spans 
of time in the past. And yet since there is no one instant at which Socrates and Kant 
exist, this component sentence '3x3y(x=Socrates and y=Kant)' constitutes a violation of 
the presentist doctrine that there cannot exist non-present things - if two things never 
exist at the same instant then one or both must fail to exist at the present time?43 
Sider goes on to analyse the presentist options for 'slice' tense operators. He 
gives three possibilities: to paraphrase problematic sentences into true tensed sentences, 
or to admit that the sentences are not true but provide grounding reasons ('underlying 
truths'), or to admit that they are not true and explain why they appear to be true to us. 
All of these options have certain similarities with the tense reduction projects of B-
theorists of language. 
340 Le Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions, p.l40 
341 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.25 
342 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.26 
343 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.27 
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Sider re-states the problem of relating entites/events at different times ('I have in 
mind spatial comparisons between objects at different times' 344): 
The problem, roughly, is that these comparisons seem not to be captured by sentences 
formed from the presentist's tense operators since they involve comparing what happens 
at one time with what happens at a different time. 345 
The presentist can, he argues, resolve the matter by accepting a concept of 
'substantival space' with 'enduring places'; in other words a concept of space whereby 
there is a constant set of places which always stand in the same spatial relations, and 
where these are occupied by material objects at particular times. Thus, he argues, the 
presentist could cash out the claim that there used to be something with property F, in 
the place now occupied by a, by stating: 
(*) There is a place p occupied by object a, and WAS (there is something occupying p 
with property F).346 
However, this clearly requires a defence of absolute comparisons of position, 
which goes 'far beyond the relative comparisons of position that are required for 
science' and for which 'there is no empirical basis. '347 Sider devotes significant effort to 
an explanation of this position. He describes it as arising from the Newtonian 
requirement for any acceleration to be occurring with respect to something. For 
example, in the famous thought experiment of the rotating bucket, a world containing 
nothing but a bucket of water presents empirical data as to whether the bucket is 
stationary or rotating (in the latter, the surface of the water forms a meniscus). Rotation 
is a form of acceleration, but if the world contains nothing but the bucket and 
acceleration is always with respect to something, then absolute positions must be 
postulated in order to have a 'something' with respect to which the bucket rotates. 
Sider goes on to describe the way in which modem physics has changed its 
thoughts on this point, 'as the subsequent development of spacetime geometry has 
shown ... absolute position is not required to make sense of absolute acceleration. ' 348 He 
observes that in both neo-Newtonian and Minkowski spacetime, the geometry of the 
structure is such that the straight lines of the spacetime manifold characterise paths of 
344 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.28 
345 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.28 
346 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.28 
347 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.28 
348 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.29 
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unaccelerated particles, so that absolute positions are not required. The difference, then, 
between the original space/time and the new space-time is as follows: in the former, the 
geometry functions through four dimensional variables (x, y, z, t) which makes sense of 
cross-time comparison by employing (potentially) the same {x, y, z} number-values for 
different t-values. However, in the space-time geometry, the affine (preserving parallel 
relations) structure allows only for the specification of a straight line: 'One way of 
doing this is to introduce a three-place relation on the points of the space, R(x, y, z), 
interpreted as meaning that point y is linearly between points x and z. ' 349 R, having 
been given proper mathematical characterisation, allows various classes of points within 
the structure to be related under the concept of a straight line, but 'there will be no 
binary [i.e. two-place; R(x,y)] relation on points definable from R that would represent 
two place-times as being at the same position. '350 
What the modem geometry does allow for is the straight lines to represent the 
paths of unaccelerated bodies, so that the need to distinguish between accelerated and 
unaccelerated bodies can be fulfilled without positing a relation of 'same position as'. 
The rotating bucket experiment can therefore be accounted for without needing to resort 
to absolute positions. Sider concludes that the presentist cannot therefore presuppose 
the absolute comparisons of position used for cross-time spatial comparisons in 
propositions such as (*). The presentist's options are therefore either to fmd a way of 
paraphrasing 'spacetime talk' by use of tense operators (now very difficult, since forms 
like (*) are disallowed because they presuppose an outdated geometry), or to argue a 
version of presentism which is scientifically revisionary. Pursuing this line of argument 
therefore requires a prior settlement on the issue of whether and how science can 
confirm, or be discounted from, metaphysical claims. 
Sider's own view is that the line of argument is doomed, and he turns instead to 
consider 'claims of object relative spatial positions over time'351 , giving the example: 
It WAS/WILL BE the case n units of time ago/hence that: (fed Sider is 5 feet from Bill 
Clinton). 352 
He argues that this approach is also faulty because it omits essential information about 
variation in spatial location over time. One cannot, of course, employ absolute-position 
349 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.30 N.B. 'points' here are understood as 'place-times- places at an 
instant'. (Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.29) 
350 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.30 
351 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.31 
352 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.31 
115 
concepts to track Clinton's movements, and so there are three seemingly inarbitrable 
possibilities to describe Sider's movements with respect to Clinton: 
(PI) I have moved along a continuous unaccelerated path. 
(P2) I have moved along a continuous but accelerated path. 
(P3) I have moved along a discontinuous path. 353 
Sider argues that the presentist cannot resolve this three-way tie. Arguing again from 
modem space-time geometry (and thus once again avoiding any counter-arguments 
from scientifically revisionist versions of presentism), Sider points out that the 
presentist position forms 'a series of "snapshots" of the world at successive moments of 
time' 354 each snapshot corresponding to the sentence form: 
It WAS/WILL BE the case n units of time ago/hence that: <p 355 
Whereas the B-theoretical/perdurance theorist supporter of spacetime geometry has no 
difficulty in picking out Sider's path relative to Clinton, the presentist cannot specify 
from the snapshot sentences alone how the snapshots should line up, and so which of 
(Pl-3) are true, 'since such facts [Pl-3] are not facts about what things are like at any 
one time. ' 356 
Thus, it appears that the presentist cannot accommodate the R(x,y,z) straight-
line facts and the curved-line (acceleration) facts in a tensed translation. Sider explores 
two options - one of 'bridge principles' and one of incorporating state-of-motion data 
within snapshots - potentially open to the presentist for solving the problem of 
differentiating dynamic facts. Beginning with 'bridge principles', he states that the 
most obvious form taken by such principles would be something like 'if the series of 
snapshots take a certain form, then the snapshots "automatically" line up in such and 
such a way,' 357 with the principles constructed to favour certain models of motion (e.g. 
continuous rather than discontinuous). 
Consider constructing an etemalist model of the world, an abstract neo-Newtonian 
spacetime with a selected time to serve as the present moment, based on the set P of the 
totality of the presentist's tensed truths. P constrains what goes on at the various times 
353 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32 
354 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32 
355 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32 
356 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32 
357 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32 
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of the model, including single-time spatial relations between objects, but does not 
constrain cross-time spatial relations.358 
This process will function as a selector of snapshot alignments, since P will 
provide data for the spatial relations at each time and then alignments can be selected 
according to, for example, a principle of maximisation of continuous and unaccelerated 
motion, such that the spatial relation between a pair of objects varies linearly over a 
sequence of snapshots. 
Consider, now, the class E of eternalist models that are consistent with P and maximise 
continuous and unaccelerated motions. In any such model one can evaluate the truth 
value of a sentence (like (P l)-(P3)) that makes a cross-time spatial comparison. The 
presentist, then, can say that one of these sentences is true iff it is true in every member 
ofE.359 
In other words, given three cross-time spatial relation possibilities between Sider and 
Clinton, we can evaluate which is true by plugging the tensed truths snapshots into a set 
of spacetime models, using a bridge principle maximising continuous and unaccelerated 
motion, and then checking each proposition against the relevant alignments which 
result. 
On this view, possibilities (PI) through (P3) can be distinguished in cases where the 
world is sufficiently rich. If the world is like the actual world, containing a vast number 
of things in motion, most of which are moving inertially (or nearly inertially), there will 
be only one way oflining up the 'snapshots' that maximises continuity and unacclerated 
paths. Relative to this way of lining up the snapshots, some particles may undergo non-
inertial or discontinuous motion. But in simple cases, possibilities (P2) and (P3) will 
di 360 sappear. 
However, there is a sting in the tail of Sider's account. He observes that in simpler 
worlds, most clearly in worlds featuring a single particle, the above solution produces 
the result that the particle moves inertially at all times, and the presentist must deny the 
possibility that it will move through accelerated or discontinuous paths. Given that such 
paths are entirely feasible, the presentist must commit to an unpersuasive reduction of 
views of cross-time spatial relations, which the eternalist viewpoint can retain in all 
their variety. Consequently, Sider argues, cross-time spatial relations favour the 
eternalist 'solution' over the presentist solution. 
358 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.32-3 
359 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.33 
360 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.33 
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Before moving on to his so-called 'truth-maker objection', Sider considers the 
possibility that the presentist could evade the problem of state-of-motion data by 
including the information within the 'snapshot', thereby rendering unnecessary any 
principles of alignment. 
Which of (P 1) through (P3) holds would then depend on which of the following groups 
of tensed claims is true: 
(G1) I am not accelerating AND 
W AS-1-minute-ago (I am not accelerating) AND 
W AS-2-minutes-ago (I am not accelerating) AND 
etc. 
(G2) I am accelerating AND 
W AS-1-minute-ago (I am accelerating) AND 
W AS-2-minutes-ago (I am accelerating) AND 
etc. 
(G3) I am moving discontinuously OR 
WAS-1-minute-ago (I am moving discontinuously) OR 
W AS-2-minutes-ago (I am moving discontinuously) OR 
etc. 361 
Sider criticises this solution to the problem of cross-time spatial relations by arguing 
that G(1-3} are 'not ultimate, but must be grounded in facts of location over time ... 
these facts are precisely what I have been arguing the presentist cannot capture. '362 He 
argues this point through two theories of motion, one from Russell and one from 
Tooley. In the Russellian theory, neither acceleration nor velocity can be 'an intrinsic 
property of an object at a time' 363, since both are dependent upon the positions of the 
object immediately before and immediately after that time364. Given this, G(1-3} 
require grounding facts of position over time, which puts the presentist back with 'It 
WAS/WILL BE the case n units of time ago/hence that: q>' and the problem ofP(1-3}. 
Tooley's theory ascribes velocity to objects as a fact about what an object is like 
at a time (so that velocity seems to be an intrinsic property). Sider points out that 
361 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.33-4 
362 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.34 
363 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.34 
364 To have velocity is to have a non-zero first derivative of the position function; to have acceleration is 
to have a non-zero second derivative of the position function. 
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velocity is still connected to spatial relation: 'velocities are irreducible "first-order" 
properties that are picked out as those properties that are, in fact, nornically correlated 
with the first derivative of the position function.' 365 Thus, 'according to Tooley, we are 
to pick out velocity by its role in the laws of nature. This role concerns the relation 
between velocity and spatial position over time. ' 366 This leaves Sider able to conclude 
that, although velocity is not dependent upon spatial location in the way that it is in the 
Russellian theory, nevertheless (since velocity cannot be entirely unrelated to position, 
and indeed is not for Tooley) Tooley's theory does not provide the presentist with 
enough room to manoeuvre so as to vindicate G(1-3) as ultimate, and the argument from 
cross-time spatial relations is still effective against the presentist position. 
Let us now take a look at the second detailed objection: Sider's 'truth-maker 
objection'. He begins: 'the presentist claims that "WAS (there exist some dinosaurs)" is 
true. But if there do not exist any past dinosaurs, what grounds the truth of this 
sentence?' 367 From this point, he assesses two 'grounding principles'; one a fairly 
standard concept of truth-makers, and one the principle that 'truth is supervenient on 
being', a view designed to circumvent problems with the standard truth-maker view. 
Sider intends to analyse the presentist position with respect to these two principles, 
arguing that whichever route is taken will result in the presentist 'cheating' in order to 
make the account fit with their views. 
However, before discussing Sider's approach, something must be said about the 
two grounding principles. The truth-maker principle; 'for every truth, T, there exists an 
entity- a 'truth-maker' - whose existence suffices for the truth of T' 368, arises from the 
work of Russell and Wittgenstein in conceiving of 'facts' or 'states of affairs' as the 
objects composing the world, and has been developed by, for example, David 
Armstrong369. The sorts of problems that arise for this view come from negative 
existentials: positive states of affairs (that I am typing on my computer keyboard) are 
easy to find truth makers for (me; my keyboard; the relation between the two). 
However, 'even very large positive states of affairs are not truth-makers for "there are 
no unicorns", for given any such state of affairs, S, it would be possible for there to exist 
a unicorn in addition to S. ' 37° Clearly there are approaches which could be used to 
365 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.35 
366 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.35 
367 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.35-6 
368 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.36 
369 David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
370 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.36 
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resolve such problems371 , but Sider is concerned to set up a different view so as to 
provide an alternate model of critical analysis for his treatment of presentism. 
The alternate model is that found in the work of, for example, John Bigelow372. 
Sider expresses the grounding principle thus: 'what is true supervenes on what objects 
exist, what properties those objects have, and what relations they stand in. ,373 In this 
way, the lack of unicorns in the world is not demanded as a concrete fact; rather, the 
objects, properties and relations in the world are such that the proposition is true, and 
would be true in any world with the same combination of objects, properties and 
relations. 
Sider notes that, at first glance, presentist tensed truths seem to 'float free of the 
world' in an unacceptable way, neither having truth-makers nor supervening on being, 
since 'all states of affairs are currently existing states of affairs, and the properties and 
relations of objects are confined to those of currently existing objects.' Where does this 
leave propositions about dinosaurs, some of which we would like to say are true or false 
and for which we need either truth-makers or objects with properties and in relations? 
Bigelow is a presentist, which gives Sider the opportunity to explore more fully the 
tension between presentist tensed truths and grounding principles. Sider canvasses two 
options: 'What [Bigelow] claims is that the world - the sum total of everything -
instantiates properties like previously containing dinosaurs. Tensed truths then 
supervene on the instantiation of these properties (Bigelow 1996). '374 The alternative, 
truth-maker, option follows a similar line, employing 'tensed states of affairs such as 
there once existing dinosaurs as truth-makers. ' 375 Sider's critical approach, then, will 
be to accuse both of these options of 'cheating' (which poses a problem for the 
presentist by demanding as a correlate of presentism that both grounding principles be 
rejected), but before engaging in this, he first puts forward an argument to show that 
these two options are the only ones open to the presentist as regards truth-makers or 
supervenient truths. 
371 Both McGinn's work on existence as a property [Colin McGinn, 'Existence', in Logical Properties 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.l5-51] and Skorupski's work on the 'broader, or nominal, 
notion' of a fact [John Skorupski, 'Irrealist Cognitivism', Ratio XII:4 (1999), p.436-459] would allow 
truth-makers to operate in a mental-linguistic context, which would complement the more empirically-
flavoured context of the Russell-Wittgenstein-Armstrong tradition. The presentist would be unlikely to 
favour such approaches, however, because they suit a distinction between treatments of fiction or 
treatments of ethics and treatments of ontology or science. The presentist would be wary of committing 
their view to a system that is ill-suited to ontological evaluation. 
372 John Bigelow, 'Presentism and Properties', in James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 
Volume X: Metaphysics (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), p.35-52 
373 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.36 
374 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.37 
375 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.37 
120 
The alternative identified by Sider is to use laws of nature to provide the 
requisite 'backwards-looking tool' to ground tensed truths when only present objects 
can be taken into account. The idea, then, is to take currently existing states of affairs 
and employ laws of nature to provide grounding truths for (for example) the existence 
of dinosaurs in the past. We could take some fossils, use scientific laws about decay, 
biochemistry, and anatomy and demonstrate that, x million years ago, creatures would 
have existed which conform to our concept of 'dinosaurs', all of which together would 
entail and guarantee the truth of 'there once existed dinosaurs'. 
However, as Sider explains, we would have to be careful about our account of 
laws of nature if this approach were to work within a presentist structure. He begins by 
considering a 'regularity theory' of laws, arguing that the presentist would be unable to 
employ such a theory. Regularity theories are based on the idea that laws of nature take 
the form of statements of regularity; for example, that all renate creatures are chordate 
(if something has kidneys, it has a heart). The problem for the presentist is that 'if 
tensed facts are to be grounded in the laws, the laws could not themselves be grounded 
in the tensed facts. ' 376 Worse, 'the only regularities available for securing the laws 
would . . . be current regularities, and regularity theories are only plausible if the 
regularities are drawn from all of time. ' 377 In other words, this sort of law of nature is 
useless for the presentist to rely on as a grounding of tensed truths, because it relies 
upon the accrual of data over time combined with the capacity to compare those data. 
The presentist cannot allow submission of non-present data except in the form of a 
tensed truth-claim, but this cannot be accepted as a component forming a law which is 
supposed to be the grounding of such claims. 
The need for a stronger account of laws of nature, preferably an account which 
does not include what it is supposed to be grounding, leads Sider to suggest the view: 378 
that laws are relations between universals ... [wherein] ... nomic facts are facts over 
and above the totality of non-nomic facts. A law that all Fs are Gs involves the holding 
of a higher-order relation, the nomic necessitation relation, N, between the universals F-
ness and G-ness. ' 379 
In other words, there are all the usual facts of objects that we can kick about in the 
world, and then there is a class of extra facts that are about how they interact. This 
376 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.37 
377 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.37 
378 Comparing David Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Fred I. Dretske, 
'Laws of Nature', Philosophy of Science 44 (1977) 
379 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.37-8 
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means, among other things, that there could be regularities which are not law-like as 
well as ones which are. For example, as far as we know there is no law of nature 
governing the tendency of men always to squeeze the middle of a toothpaste tube, 
whereas there is (for the sake of argument) a law of nature governing the occurrence of 
fog under certain atmospheric conditions. This would be explained by a higher-order 
nomic necessitation relation holding in the case of the latter, but not of the former. 
However, in a possible world Win which the same regularities were observed, it could 
be the case that an N relation held in toothpaste-squeezing incidents but not in fog-
formation incidents. Nevertheless, in principle the presentist would have something to 
rely upon (present facts plus the class of N-type relations representing laws of nature) to 
ground truth claims about the past. 
Sider criticises this approach in three ways. First, noting that in any case this 
solution would mean constraining presentists to a theory of laws of nature to which they 
may not wish to commit, he cites argumentation from Lewis and van Fraassen 'that 
Armstrong, Tooley, and Dretske cannot explain how N's holding between F-ness and 
G-ness could possibly entail the regularity that all Fs are Gs. ' 380 In other words, how 
does a relation N holding between the universals 'having a heart' and 'having kidneys' 
actually entail that every creature we examine that has kidneys will have a heart too? 
Second, Sider argues that this new presentist solution may give rise to a problem 
of the open past381 . Thus: 
If the laws of nature are present-to-past indeterministic, current facts plus the laws of 
nature do not imply all the facts about the past; given presentism and either the truth-
maker ~rinciple or the princi~le that truth supervenes on being, for many statements, c:p, 
neither it was the case that c:p nor r it was the case that not- c:p 1 will be true. 382 
As Sider observes, most (but not all) philosophers would want to say that there was a 
fact of the matter as to how the dinosaurs became extinct, even if it is impossible to 
know the fact. 
Sider goes on to argue that even deterministic laws of nature could give rise to a 
problem of the open past. He returns to the Russell ian theory of motion (in which, we 
remember, velocity of an object at a time is determined by the position of the object in 
the immediate past and immediate future of that moment), arguing that 'fixing the 
properties and relations of present objects will not fix their velocities ... [so that] there 
380 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.38 
381 CfLe Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions, p.l38-139 
382 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.38 
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is no hope whatsoever that the laws of nature plus non-dynamical properties of present 
objects will entail anything interesting at all about the past. '383 So, given simply the 
location of an object now and deterministic laws of motion, we cannot find out about 
the past locations of the object; we need the velocity, which can only be obtained by 
cross-time spatial comparison (since it is not an intrinsic property) - but this is not 
available to the presentist, so the past is effectively open to some extent. 
The third objection is on a related point. We remember that 'according to 
Tooley, we are to pick out velocity by its role in the laws of nature. This role concerns 
the relation between velocity and spatial position over time. ' 384 Sider assesses the 
potential for this to get the presentist out of trouble, but argues that it fails- just as it did 
as a solution to cross-temporal spatial comparisons. The reason for this failure lies in 
the presentist's need to involve tensed properties of location, since the law relates 
velocity and location over time and the only way of specifying non-present position (for 
the presentist) is to use tensed ascriptions of location. So, just as the cross-temporal 
spatial comparison problem could not be solved using Tooley's work, because location 
over time was still a requisite component in some foilll, similarly the problem of 
grounding past truths in laws of nature plus present truths cannot be solved using 
Tooley's work because (in the presentist's version) the past-tensed properties of 
location needed for the law to function are just the sort of truths that are supposed to be 
grounded by it. In Siders words, the grounding principles under consideration 
require truths to supervene on, or be made true by, facts about which non-tensed 
properties and relations are instantiated by which objects. A law of dynamics, for 
example [the law in which velocity has a role, enabling us to pick it out], must then hold 
in virtue of these facts. But it can't, for once the tensed facts oflocation are left out, the 
law . . . can only involve the necessitation relation . . . and the primitive velocity 
properties, and thus cannot relate velocity to location. 385 
The result can only be a choice between leaving in the tensed facts of location, which 
leads to circularity and collapse, and taking them out - which effectively leaves the 
'shell' of a law of nature without any way of relating it properly to objects. 
Sider's conclusion is that the only reasonable path open to the presentist wishing 
to uphold the supervenience or truth-maker grounding principles is to incorporate tense 
into the relations/properties or states of affairs found in the present, as exemplified 
respectively in the property previously containing dinosaurs, and the state of affairs 
383 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.39 
384 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.35 
385 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.39 my italics. 
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there once existing dinosaurs. Sider therefore sets out on the final phase of his 
criticism, attempting to demonstrate that this path is 'cheating' and should not be 
allowed. 
The method of choice in Sider's demonstration is to take several examples of 
'cheating', compare them to the presentist's option, and offer reasons for the presentist's 
option to be included in the list. Before turning to Sider's list, we note for clarity that, 
in his opinion, 'in each case the cheater is unwilling to accept an ontology robust 
enough to bear the weight of the truths he feels free to invoke. ' 386 
Sider begins by stating 'The point of the truth-maker principle and the principle 
that truth supervenes on being is to rule out dubious ontologies. ' 387 The first example of 
such dubious ontologies is 'brute dispositions'. A wine glass is likely to shatter if 
dropped; this represents a disposition. 'It would be illegitimate to claim that the glass's 
disposition to shatter is completely brute or ungrounded.' Rather, we would want to say 
that, possibly in accordance with some laws of nature, this disposition is grounded in 
some non-dispositional property (or properties) of the glass - for instance, the property 
of having a crystalline structure. 
The second example is 'brute counterfactuals'. 'Most would say that when a 
counterfactual conditional is true, for example "this match would light if struck", its 
truth must be grounded in the actual, occurrent properties of the match and its 
surroundings. ' 388 However, if we posit a new 'P-frog', specifying that 'this sort of frog 
would tum into a prince if kissed', then this counterfactual is entirely ungrounded in any 
existing objects (we have no support either from the properties of frogs, or from the 
properties of princes, or from the contextual elements of frog-kissing). This is why it 
makes sense to relegate this sort of situation to the realms of fiction, rather than to 
consider the metaphysical possibilities, presented by the existence of P-frogs, on the 
same footing as those presented by boxes of matches. 389 Thus, the counterfactual 'this 
sort of frog would tum into a prince if kissed' is 'brute', and represents a dubious 
ontology. 
386 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.41 
387 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
388 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
389 Sider uses an example from Plantinga; however it is far from clear that this works, since it turns on the 
sort of existence possessed by uncreated essences. Sider's argument is that there are counterfactuals 
about what a creature would do in certain situations if created, and these will be true whether or not 
creation takes place; this he sees as a dubious ontology. However, he specifies with Plantinga that 
creation is the decision to cause an individual essence (which 'exists whether or not instantiated') to be 
instantiated. Consequently it is unclear that, from Plantinga's (or God's) viewpoint, the cmmterfactual is 
indeed ungrounded. 
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The third example is put concisely by Sider: 'the theory that there is a law of 
nature that Fs are Gs iff each object in the world has a certain 'brute' property being 
such that all Fs lawfUlly must beGs. ' 39° Compare this with the regularity theory, or with 
the view that the law obtains when a 'nomic necessitation relation' holds between 
relevant objects. The former adds nothing ontologically, the latter adds only a relation 
between the universals cited by the law (which could, at a simple level, be viewed as 
something which could be discovered through empirical research). 
The fourth example is reminiscent of the 'spatial tense' argument against A-
theories391. Sider asks us to 'imagine someone who believes only in one point in space, 
but introduces irreducible "spatial tense operators", for example NORTH ( <p ). ' 392 Sider 
adds nothing to this, but presumably the idea is that such a person wants to talk about 
'not-here' propositions as true or false, and instead of invoking the existence of more 
than one spatial location they opt to make spatial tense operators into primitive 'facts' 
about the world. 
The final example uses the idea (assessed by Prior) of personal tense operators, 
such that 'instead of writing "everyone taller than me is sitting", one would replace the 
quantifier over persons with an operator ALL-TALL, resulting in the sentence "ALL-
TALL (Sitting)". ' 393 Sider asks us to imagine a solipsist claiming that such operators 
were primitive: 'the solipsist claims to reject the existence of all other people but 
reconstructs what the rest of us regard as talk of other persons using these personal tense 
operators. '394 This is somewhat clearer than the previous example: the solipsist wishes 
to engage in speaking about many persons, but instead of grounding the truth of such 
language in posited extant persons, the solipsist chooses to take as primitive operators 
which would normally function by referring to such persons. 
Sider argues that primitive properties such as previously containing dinosaurs, 
and states of affairs such as there once existing dinosaurs, and indeed 'invoking the 
tenses themselves as primitive'395, all count as dubious ontologies and versions of 
'cheating' that fit with the set of examples. He develops this by drawing out the 
common factor: that in all cases 'irreducibly hypothetical properties are postulated, 
whereas a proper ontology should invoke only categorical, or occurrent, properties and 
390 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
391 For example, see Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.97ff; Mellor, Real Time II, pp.47-53 
392 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
393 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
394 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.40 
395 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.41 
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relations. ' 396 This distinction can be clarified as follows: 'Categorical properties 
involve what objects are actually like, whereas hypothetical properties "point beyond" 
their instances.' 397 So Sider's argument is that the presentist's properties and states of 
affairs are attempts to circumvent the demands of those grounding principles for a 
fuller, better ontology than the presentist can supply. The property of previously 
containing dinosaurs purports to be a part of the world, and invoking it seems to be 
saying something about the contents of the world - but in fact (since on the presentist 
view the present is all of the world that exists) it 'is not a matter of what the world itself 
is like, but points beyond itself, to the past'398 and therefore to something which ex 
hypothesi does not exist. Sider suggests that, even if one were not to accept the 
categorical/hypothetical distinction, the presentist position could be characterised as 
sharing sufficient features of the other 'dubious ontologies' to cast doubt over its 
position. 
Analysis of Craig's Version of Presentism 
Craig attempts to construct a version of presentism that uses modal concepts to 
avoid making ontological commitments to moments other than the present, but which 
nevertheless avoids the criticisms of presentism/temporal solipsism that I have explored 
above. This proceeds in three stages: first, he tries to expand standard possible world 
structures to account for tensed possible worlds; second, he gives his understanding of 
ontological commitments for standard possible world structures; finally, he translates 
the previous material into his commitments for tensed possible worlds. In what follows 
I am not providing a properly formalised argument; rather I have chosen to display the 
account in three sets of numbered propositions to give the clearest possible analysis and 
facilitate easy reference. 
1) A possible world is defined as a maximal possible state of affairs, where a state 
of affairs S is maximal if, for any S', S includes or precludes S'. 
2) Possible worlds and the states of affairs comprising them are normally 
characterised as tenseless. 
3) Presentism requires tensed facts. 
4) Tensed facts require tensed states of affairs to be constituents of possible worlds. 
396 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.41 
397 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.41 
398 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.41 
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5) A tensed possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs at t (a time interval 
of variable but specified duration). 
6) Tensed possible worlds which did, do, or will obtain are tensed actual worlds. 
7) A tensed actual world at t is the tensed actual world which obtains when t is 
present. 
8) The world which presently obtains is the tensed actual world. 
9) Tensed actual worlds constitute the tensed history of the actual world a.. They 
are respectively comprised of all states of affairs entailed by a. and each 
successive t's being present. 
10)The schema for tensed history/ies may be generalised to any possible world W. 
11) Each tenseless possible world exists in each world. 
12)The actual world a. is the maximal state of affairs that obtains (tenselessly). 
13) If some other possible world fJ were actual a. would not obtain but would still 
exist as a possible state of affairs. 
14) Every tenseless possible world W is actual in/at W. 
15)The actual world a. is not only actual in a. but also actual simpliciter. 
16)Each tensed possible world exists in each such world. 
17) The tensed actual world v is the maximal state of affairs that obtains (present-
tense). 
18) If some other tensed possible world u were actual, then v would not obtain, but it 
would still exist as a tensed possible state of affairs. 
19) If u obtains (present-tense), then either v does not yet or no longer obtains, but v 
nonetheless exists as a tensed actual state of affairs. 
20) If v alone is (present-tense) actual, no other tensed actual world is (present-
tense) actual. They were or will be actual. 
21)Every tensed world Wt is actual in[/at] Wt. 
22) The tensed actual world v is not only actual in v but also actual simpliciter. 399 
What account does Craig give of his model of presentism in relation to the five 
points made by Le Poidevin? Comprehension of Craig's position here is hindered by 
the fact that, although he starts out by correctly identifying Le Poidevin's points as 
399 Close paraphrasing of Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, pp.208-l0 
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claiming to specify 'objectionable doctrines characteristic of temporal solipsism' 400, by 
the end of the discussion they have become simply 'objections'401 . In line with previous 
discussion, I shall here concentrate on cross-time relations and truth-makers, but I also 
provide a preliminary observation on the existential quantifier. 
Concerning the range of the existential quantifier, Craig provides two options. 
In the first place, the presentist could 'understand the tenseless existential quantifier to 
take as its range all individuals in a., the tenseless actual world.' However, 'the 
presentist has no reason to deny [a] tenseless truth about x. On the basis of the A-theory 
of time, he just does not invest tenseless existential quantification with the sort of 
metaphysical significance [of ineliminable quantification over F's leading to realism 
over F's].' 402 This apparently cavalier attitude to the links between language and 
ontology is presumably a result of Craig believing that he has demonstrated the 
ineliminability of tensed facts from language during his earlier critique ofB-accounts of 
language. Nevertheless, it is somewhat questionable to bandy about talk of the 
'tense less actual world' in what one can only suppose to be an intended fa ryan de parler 
context, rather than an ontological commitment. Does Craig's second option fare any 
better? 
Craig allows that a presentist who wanted to maintain that ineliminable 
quantification over F's leads to realism over F's would have to commit to a reformation 
of classical logic, and suggests Smith's move of making the existential quantifier 
disjunctively tensed ('there is, was, or will be some x such that' 403) or moving the 
existential quantifier to fall within the scope of tense operators. We have already seen 
trouble brewing for this latter tactic in Sider's consideration of cross-time relations404, 
and it is worth observing in passing- although the debate cannot be taken up in full-
that Le Poidevin takes Smith's view as different from temporal solipsism exactly 
because 'he treats all events as equally real in the sense that they are within the domain 
of quantification' 405 . 
Craig's response to the issue of cross-time relations is deeply problematic. He 
begins with a sort of tu quoque argument to the effect that if we want cross-time 
relations in the way the B-theorist demands then we should want modal realism too: 
40
° Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.208; cfLe Poidevin, Change, Cause, and Contradiction, p.36 
401 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.213 
402 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.210 
403 Smith, Language and Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.92. For a more recent attempt 
at solving the problem of cross-time relations within a non-Priorian presentism, see Craig Bourne, A 
Future for Presentism, p. 95ff 
404 See above p. I 08f 
405 Le Poidevin, 'Introduction', in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions ofTime and Tense, p.7 
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ruling out cross-time relations on account of the non-reality of one or more relata should 
also rule out transworld relations unless all the relata are equally real. Meanwhile, any 
moves that can be made to avoid this in the case of transworld relata will have 
analogues for presentism: 'for example, my being shorter than my grandfather could be 
construed as the claim that were my grandfather to exist today, I should be shorter than 
him. ,406 
This strikes me as odd, since presumably what is doing the work in this example 
is 'were my grandfather to exist', which is a possible world step and not a tensed one. 
To put it another way, Craig is not providing a presentist way of succeeding in making 
cross-temporal relations, he is reducing temporal relata to possible world relata. He can 
attempt this because, on actualism, all that exists is what exists in this world and, on 
presentisrn, all that exists is what exists now: given presentist premises, presentism is 
tensed actual ism. But when I say 'were my grandfather alive today, I should be shorter 
than him' I don't mean that some possible entity would have a certain relation to me 
were it actual, I mean to express something about the height of two actual people. This 
small intuitive point shows that we can drive a wedge between the desires of actualists 
and presentists. 
More carefully developed, the core of our discomfort over Craig's response may 
well be that possible world theory works by stipulation, whilst reality does not. Even a 
'modal realist' such as Lewis would presumably agree that a difference between 
possible worlds and the actual world is that the actual world has presented itself to our 
consideration independently of our stipulation of it, whereas we can only consider the 
contents of possible worlds by stipulating the non-actual states of affairs which we will 
consider (even if all ofthe possible worlds are actual at themselves). Thus, to claim that 
any way out of modal realism for the actualist is a way out of chronal realism for the 
presentist is precisely to miss the intuitive point on which the argument from cross-time 
relations is built: that the past is simply not like another possible world. It actually 
happened. 
As Craig develops his response (perhaps to take account of this, although he 
does not say as much), it becomes more worrying. It is, he reckons, 'rather 
misleading ... to speak of non-contemporaries as simply unreal. For unlike merely 
possible objects, both of them do exist in the actual world. They are just not real at the 
same time. ' 407 This begins to sound like the B-theorist, who asserts that all moments 
406 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.211 
407 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.211 
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are equally real but saves the position from incoherence by reminding the critic that this 
does not mean that they are simultaneously extant: each moment exists at that moment, 
but all moments exist equally. 
It strikes me that Craig is here using the intuition cited above to have his cake 
and eat it: the present is all that exists, but the (tensed) history of the actual world must 
itself be actual, even if not present. This is what Craig's theory, as expressed in (1-22) 
above, boils down to: the past and future are modally real and temporally non-extant, 
and the present is modally real and temporally extant. However, this attempt is not 
adequate to the task. To show this we must return to (1-22), concentrating on (6, 7, 19 
& 20): 
\ 
6) Tensed possible worlds which did, do, or will obtain are tensed actual 
worlds. 
7) A tensed actual world at tis the tensed actual world which obtains when tis 
present. 
19) If u obtains (present-tense), then either v does not yet or no longer obtains, 
but v nonetheless exists as a tensed actual state of affairs. 
20) If v alone is (present-tense) actual, no other tensed actual world is (present-
tense) actual. They were or will be actual. 
(6) gives us the answer to the question 'What is actual?' from which to begin our 
analysis of the position that past and future are modally real but temporally non-extant 
whilst the present is modally real and temporally extant. (7) is consistent with the 
position, because it is consistent with the importance allocated to the present and does 
not deny that the future and past are modally real. Vitally, it does not say anything 
about what the case is when t is not present. ( 19 & 20) is where problems begin to 
occur with respect to this omission. In (19) either v is both temporally extant and actual 
(modally real) or simply actual but non-present. It is specified that it is either past or 
future, so by the principle that only what is present exists, it does not exist. 
Nevertheless it is supposedly actual. By (20), a tensed actual world that is non-present 
is not present-tense actual but either will be or was actual. So the existing tensed actual 
state of affairs in (19) neither presently exists, nor therefore exists at all (for the B-
option of stating that it does not exist at the moment of consideration but is at that 
moment real at its own moment cannot be taken up), nor is presently actual. Instead, as 
(7) tells us, it is actual when the t corresponding to it is present. But how does this 
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make the tensed state of affairs either extant or actual at any time other than that t 
specified as corresponding to its present? How does it solve the problems of cross-time 
relations for the presentist without collapsing into the view that all times are temporally 
real? I submit that it does not. Increasingly, it appears that Craig will have to rely upon 
assertions of brute distinction between temporal reality and modal reality with respect to 
non-present times. 
Joseph Diekemper follows a related but distinct line of criticism to that which 
we have considered here when he raises the question of 'the asymmetry of fixity'; he 
suggests that Craig will have difficulty (on 1-22 above) explaining the difference 
between past and future. For Craig the actual past and future are more 'ontologically 
robust' than possible worlds, but it is unclear how Craig can give an account of our 
intuition that the past is fixed and the future contingent. 408 
The nail in the coffin for Craig's presentism comes from (5), which we recall is: 
5) A tensed possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs at t (a time 
interval of variable but specified duration). 
On top of all the difficulties thus far, Craig has to include his escape route from the 
problem of the instantaneous present, which he considers at a different point in The 
Tensed Theor/09 . This is expressed in the parentheses at the end. In an attempt to 
avoid problems arising from the question of the duration of the present41° Craig suggests 
that the present be understood non-metrically. This means that 'there need be 
no ... minimum length or temporal duration because space and time are potentially 
infinitely divisible.' 411 Nevertheless, once one metricates time it is clear that there are 
objective differences in duration (it does not cease to be the case that the Olympics is 
longer than the German Formula One Grand Prix). 
This is fairly unproblematic. Unfortunately for Craig, however, it has the effect 
that 'the duration of the present will be as long or as short as the event or thing under 
discussion' 412; there is no present simpliciter, only present objects, events, states of 
408 Joseph Diekemper, 'Presentism and Ontological Symmetry', The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
83:2 (2005), pp.223-40. Diekemper provides extensive discussion of this issue in the wider context of 
presentist theory. 
409 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, pp. 228-248 
410 See Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, pp.228-245 In short, he finds that 'instantaneous presentism' 
succumbs to Zeno's paradoxes of motion and plurality, and that 'atomic presentism' would commit one to 
an undesirable scientism (this is, however, related to his other commitments in that area). 
411 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.246 
412 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.245 
131 
affairs and so on. Whenever we metricate, we simply get such statements as 'The 
present minute is a duration of one minute.' This might be considered a perfectly 
reasonable way of understanding the concept of the present in terms of duration, and 
undoubtedly provides a common-sense way of getting around bothersome paradoxes: I 
do not think it is self-evidently wrong. When combined with the metaphysical doctrine 
of presentisrn, however, it is disastrous: if only the present exists and we can call 
anything we like the present (e.g. 'the present stage of the evolution of the sun' 413) then 
how do we go about determining what exists? 
Craig says that the 'present instant' can be used as a conceptual limit 'so that 
there is no minimum temporal interval which is now' 414, but does not address the 
existential import of his view. He states 'presentness should be construed as a mode of 
existence, a temporal as opposed to timeless mode of being. ' 415 If we combine this with 
his concept of the 'elastic present' we have two options: either presentness just is 
temporality, in which case the question of the reality of past and future go unanswered 
and we are almost back to square one; or, all that exists is what exists now. The latter is 
what we expect of presentism, but in this case there seems to be no reason why we 
should not refer to 'the present universe'. This seems difficult to distinguish from a B-
theory of time, for if the present universe exists and can be analysed into 
past/present/future with the present instant as conceptual limit then our ontology looks 
decidedly B-theoretical. Craig's tensed possible world in (5) starts to look like a 
tenseless possible world, and the model presented in (1-22) is in danger of collapse416 . 
Craig has a final stab at resolving cross-time relations for presentists. He 
provides two options for such relations: first, that relations are ontologically not mind-
independent and therefore depend upon the mind of the person making the comparison; 
secondly that relations are 'abstract objects that plausibly do not exist in time at all' 417 
and are then able to reach across times. The first might be considered questionable as a 
tactic to be pursued simply to rescue presentism from a problem over cross-time 
relations: presumably 'being simultaneous with' is a relation, and one which (as we 
shall see in the next chapter) the presentist relies upon to be absolute in order to avoid 
problems with standard interpretations of relativity theory. What would it mean to 
413 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.245 
414 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.247 
415 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.246 
416 Paul Helm criticises Craig's use of an 'elastic present' in his review of Craig's work, and likewise 
concludes that it endangers Craig's presentism with collapse into a B-theory. See Paul Helm, 'Time and 
Time Again: Two Volumes by William Lane Craig', Religious Studies 38 (2002), pp.489-498 
417 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.212 
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claim both that simultaneity is absolute and that it is mind-dependent? Mind-dependent 
relations would, I suggest, be the more natural ontological bedfellow of the standard 
relativity interpretation, in which what things are simultaneous depends upon the frame 
of reference involved. 
What of the second option? On the face of it, it runs into precisely the problems 
that an atemporal view of God combined with a tensed view of time ran into in the 
previous chapter. A relation will have to 'wait' between its relata, so it will be temporal 
(metaphysically, if not physically). But far more damagingly, the first relatum will go 
out of existence before the second relatum comes into existence: how then could an 
abstractly existing relation relate them? To adapt from Padgett and use a spatial 
analogy, the problem with the observer on the hill saying that xis one mile further along 
the road from y is that only either x or y exist, never both together. 
Craig matches his abstract relations option with relational properties for 
individuals: when Socrates existed, he had a property of 'going to be referred to by 
Craig' or 'being referred to by William Craig at tn' 418 and now Craig has the property of 
'referring to Socrates'. The problem with the latter is that on the presentist view there is 
no Socrates to refer to. Of the two former options, the second is tenseless and implies 
that tn exists, but more problematically on an open view of the future (which the 
presentist is more likely to have than anyone else) Craig does not exist and might not 
refer to Socrates when he does exist, and so we can only attribute the relational property 
to Socrates when Craig both exists and refers to Socrates. By then, however, there is 
(on a presentist account) no Socrates in existence to whom to attribute the relational 
property. 
On the topic of truth-makers for past and future tensed statements, Craig again 
attempts to exploit his distinction of modal reality and temporal reality. He says: 
On the presentist semantics given here, a future-tense statement is true iff there exists 
some tensed actual world at tin which the present-tense version of the statement is true, 
where t has not elapsed by the present moment. A past-tense statement is true iff there 
exists some tensed actual world at t in which the present-tense version of the statement 
is true, where t has elapsed by the present moment.419 
However, these represent truth conditions and not truth-makers. The truth-makers are 
simply 'that reality was or will be as the statements describe' 420 . Indeed, 'there are 
tensed facts corresponding to what tensed statements assert, but past- and future-tense 
418 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.212 
419 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.213 
42
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facts exist because of the present-tense facts which did or will exist. ' 421 It appears that 
Craig's strategy for getting around such challenges as Sider's (what does it mean to say 
that there is a present fact of 'once containing dinosaurs'?) is to say that tensed facts just 
refer to other times where the truth-makers will be found. Even putting aside the 
criticism of Craig's version of presentism already covered, it is hard to make sense of 
this as anything other than the assertion that past and future are not part of present 
reality - which, as Le Poidevin points out422, is really just a trivial truth unless backed 
up by some more detailed argument. Instead of this, Craig has the following to say in 
conclusion: 
Certainly the grounds of the truth of tensed statements is not present evidence causally 
connected to the events in question, and there is no reason the presentist should adopt 
such a verificationist viewpoint. 423 
It is mystifying why Craig sees fit to invoke the shade of verificationism at this point. 
No-one is saying that a tensed statement is meaningless unless we can trace a path to its 
verifier. Craig already accepts that there must be some state of affairs acting as truth-
maker for a tensed statement; the quibble is over whether his presentist account can 
provide such truth-makers without rendering itself trivial or incoherent, or collapsing 
into some other theory of time. By accepting also that present states of affairs cannot 
provide a truth-maker for past-tense statements, he shows that he must rely upon his 
'modally real but temporally non-extant' understanding of the past and future. 
Consequently, I suggest that the view Craig espouses is in deep philosophical trouble in 
respect of issues of language and ontology, and cannot, from the standpoint of those 
issues, marshal independent metaphysical arguments to counter any scientifically 
supported claims made by the B-theorist or capitalise on a scientifically level playing 
field should it occur. 
If the view that only the present exists is the best solution to McTaggart's 
paradox and the faults found with that view in this chapter are fair then it seems 
increasingly likely that the issue of the use of science must come to the fore- especially 
given that Sider chose not to pursue the debate with presentism into the area of 
revisionary science. The next chapter addresses just this issue. 
421 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.214 
422 Le Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions, p.l40 
423 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.214 
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Chapter V- The Status o(the Present: Science, Philosophy, and Interpretation 
Introduction 
In the last chapter we saw the difficulty inherent in presentist attempts to provide strong 
independent metaphysical arguments (centring on language and ontology) for their 
position. The time has come to remind ourselves of why such independent arguments 
might be a good idea, and of the structure within which such arguments are considered 
independent. 
The core of Hawley's account in chapter two was essentially that metaphysical 
beliefs must be empirically adequate but are not directly entailed by empirical data. A 
'scientific metaphysics' must be able to show some genuine involvement in scientific 
theory (or its detractor show that there is no such involvement); an 'alternate 
metaphysics' must provide empirical and explanatory equivalence (or its detractor show 
that it cannot do so). More than this, however, the alternate metaphysician will need to 
provide some independent philosophical arguments: if following an Undermining 
strategy, they may be able to claim a level scientific playing field first; a 
Counterargument strategy, on the other hand, admits the support given to scientific 
metaphysics by scientific theory, but attempts to bring overwhelming philosophical 
argument in favour of an alternate metaphysic. 
What is the situation in the debate over philosophies of time? We need to 
identify what is to be labelled 'scientific metaphysics' here. Essentially the sort of 
metaphysical claim we are looking at is 'there is no absolute present' or 'there is no 
onto logically distinguished past, present and future'. This is found in the negative claim 
in special relativity theory that there is no preferred frame of reference, which we shall 
see means that there is no absolute present moment in the universe. The alternate 
metaphysic here is presentist, and claims that what is present is all that exists and that 
temporal becoming is real and absolute. 
In order to make sense of these two claims within our structure of relating 
science and metaphysics, we require a sound understanding of the special theory of 
relativity. Then it will be possible to assess Craig's response to the situation with a 
view to finding out whether or not he succeeds in avoiding damage to his metaphysics. 
If he succeeds outright, then it is likely that the defender of divine timelessness will 
need to address a structure of constraints operating from a level scientific playing field-
i.e. a structure of constraints where philosophical arguments independent of science are 
the most vital to the debate, and where the methodology of relating science and 
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philosophy espoused in this thesis reveals a foundation of empirical equivalence which 
can be safely left untouched by the defender of divine timelessness, rather than 
revealing a possible constraint running through science and philosophy to theology in 
virtue of restrictions placed on A-theoretical concepts of time. 
Special Relativity- Early Development 
In classical physics, two strands of development have been mechanics (Galileo 
and Newton) and then electromagnetism and optics (Maxwell). A thorough 
understanding of relativity theory depends in part upon seeing how these two have 
interacted. In the following discussion I rely for referencing primarily on texts by Steve 
Adams424 and David Bohm425 , providing references sparingly to avoid making the text 
unnecessarily busy. Other sources which may be referred to are readily available. 426 
Mechanics can be understood as 'frame relative' because the same laws apply 
within a frame of reference (e.g. if you are travelling at a constant speed in a straight 
line, you will be unable to distinguish this from being stationary with respect to 
throwing a ball, say). In order to work out how things are for a different frame of 
reference, one must use transformations which are simple and straightforward: the 
measured time-value of the second frame will be the same as in the first; the measured 
velocity of an object in the second frame will be equal to its velocity in the first frame 
minus the velocity of the second frame relative to the first; the measured position on an 
axis of an object in the second frame will be its position in the first frame minus the 
product of second-frame velocity along that axis and duration of travel at that 
velocity. 427 This relativity was obscured on account of Newton's emphasis on an 
'absolute' inertial frame in the form of absolute space. 
Maxwell's work identified light as a variety of electromagnetic radiation with a 
certain speed. Given that electromagnetic radiation was a propagated wave, it made 
sense to ask through what it was propagated, since sound waves were well known to be 
propagated through various substances at various speeds. Thus the luminiferous rether 
424 Steve Adams, Special Relativity: An Introduction to Space-time Physics, pp.l-174 
425 David Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.3-55 
426 Particularly Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1920), but also, for example, Ulrich E. SchrOder, Special Relativity (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 1990), pp.3-58; Yuan Zhong Zhang, Special Relativity and its Experimental Foundations 
(Singapore: World Scientific, 1996) 
427 The latter-most can be seen easily in terms of SI units and definitions: a velocity is given in metres per 
second, and is in a specific direction; consequently, knowing the number of seconds travelled at that 
velocity will allow us to calculate the change in metres between the measurement of object-position in 
two frames (and hence two coordinate systems) moving relatively to each other. 
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was postulated as an all-pervading substance which allowed propagation of 
electromagnetic radiation. ''The electromagnetic field was taken to be a certain kind of 
stress in the ether, somewhat similar to stresses that occur in ordinary solid, liquid, and 
gaseous materials that transmit waves of sound and mechanical stress. "428 
However, this creates the difficulty that Galilean-Newtonian frame-relative 
mechanics seemingly cannot hold, since Galileo's transformations will mean that light 
will have various speeds depending upon how fast the observer moves through the 
ether; Maxwell's equations will then need to be different in relation to Galilean 
transformations in order to give the different speeds of light, and the laws of 
electrodynamics will have to have the 'rether frame' as their 'true frame'. The speed of 
light will work in the same way as the overtaking car example; if we move in the same 
direction as the light, but slower than it, then we should be able to measure the speed of 
light as being significantly less than if we were moving in the opposite direction. 429 
In a bid to resolve this potential block to development in mechanics and 
electromagnetics/optics, several 'rether theories' were put forward. In particular, the 
key element was the measurement of the Earth's velocity with respect to the ether; this 
would obviously be vital, since if the rether represented a privileged rest frame and the 
core frame for electromagnetism, then discovery of the Earth's motion relative to it 
would allow us to compute and correct important measurements made in laboratories. 
Much of the empirical evidence we have against rether hypotheses derives from 
astronomical factors, since it is on the largest scales that one might expect to see effects 
involving the propagation of light. For example, in 1810 Franc;ois Arago reasoned that 
in training a telescope on a star, the ratio of the Earth's velocity through the rether to 
light's velocity through the rether should allow us to calculate the Earth's velocity by 
measuring the change needed in focus to off-set the change in speed of light caused by 
the Earth's orbital motion: at some times, the Earth will be moving towards the star, and 
at some times away, such that light will have a greater or lesser velocity respectively. 
However, the experiment did not show the expected focus change; "terrestrial 
telescopes formed images as if the Earth were at rest in the ether. "430 
A famous experiment in 1887 by Albert Michelson and Edward Morley 
(building on a previous one by Michelson in 1881) attempted a different method of 
428 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.ll 
429 cf. Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, p.l9-21 
430 Adams, Special Relativity, p.42 
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discerning the rether. 431 A system of mirrors was set up so that two light beams travel 
perpendicularly to one another and are then combined so as to produce an interference 
pattern (bright/shadow striping). If light is propagated through rether, then one beam 
will travel more slowly overall than the other beam, since one beam will be slowed by 
having to propagate directly against the flow of the 'rether wind' caused by the Earth's 
movement through the rether. The idea of the experiment is that if the whole apparatus 
is rotated slowly through 90 degrees, then at some point one of the beams will be 
subject to the slowing and at some perpendicular point the other beam will be subject to 
the slowing. Because the beams combine at the end of their journey to produce 
interference fringes and the effects of light interference are very pronounced from small 
changes, a shift in the pattern of interference should be seen and when measured can be 
used to calculate the speed of the rether wind and thereby Earth's velocity through the 
ether. However, no shift in the interference patterns takes place. 
Both Arago's experiment and the Michelson-Morley experiment imply that the 
Earth is at rest in the rether. This is problematic because, at the most basic level, it 
potentially puts us back to pre-Copernican times, trying to work out how the sun (etc.) 
can be orbiting the Earth432. It is also problematic because it seems to be at odds with 
the phenomena of stellar aberration433 : if the Earth is at rest with respect to the rether 
then it is difficult to explain why we need to make small telescope adjustments to see 
the stars at different times during what was assumed to be our orbital motion. 
One attempt made to rescue the rether hypothesis was to posit an 'rether drag' 
around objects, including the Earth, so that a layer of rether would be carried with it and 
we would therefore be unable to measure any rether flow within the Earth's 
431 A A Michelson and E. W. Morley, 'On the Relative Motion of the Earth and the Luminiferous 
Aether', Philosophical MagazineS. 5, 24:151 (1887), p.449-463; A A Michelson, 'The Relative Motion 
of the Earth and the Luminiferous Aether', American Journal of ScienceS. 3, 22 (1881 ), p.l20-129 
432 Something which we have independent empirical astronomical reasons to deny, since a pre-
Copernican model would give rise to stellar parallax, which is not observed despite attempts by, for 
example, James Bradley in 1727 (for more detailed discussion see, for instance, J. D. Fernie, 'The 
Historical Search for Stellar Parallax', Journal for the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada 69 (1975), 
p.222-239). It is notable that it was Bradley's search for stellar parallax which uncovered the 
phenomenon of stellar aberration. 
433 Given the speed at which the Earth moves through its orbit, in order to train a telescope on distant 
stars, we need to make a small adjustment and the star will appear slightly to one side or the other of its 
position as measured (per impossible) by a stationary Earth, depending upon which part of the Earth's 
orbit we are currently moving through. An analogy would be as follows: If rain is falling straight down 
then the faster we move, the more we have to angle our umbrellas to stay dry. If we walk slowly, we can 
get away with holding the umbrella straight up, but if we run then we have to tilt it forward or risk a 
drenching. 
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atmosphere. 434 Consequently, to test rether drag Oliver Lodge passed beams of light 
close to spinning disks, attempting to observe changes in the light which would be 
present if the disks dragged layers of rether with their motion (remember, rether is what 
allows light to propagate, in the same way that air or some substance is required for 
sound and changes sound if it moves or the substance alters). However, no changes 
could be observed. 435 
The analysis of stellar aberration can also be seen to pose problems for the 
hypothesis of rether drag around the Earth. Bohm uses the analogy of sound waves 
from a distant source reaching a train. Remembering that light waves were thought to 
propagate through the rether in a similar way to that in which sound waves propagate 
through substances (air etc.), we note that the train- obviously- carries substance with 
it as it moves, and if the sound waves strike the side of the train parallel to that side, 
then the waves will propagate through the train in the same direction (with only a speed 
change resulting from the different substances), and this independent of the train's 
speed. Similarly, light waves incident upon a moving area of rether would cause 
parallel wave propagation within the moving rether, so that the waves reaching the 
telescope would not produce stellar aberration. Another analogy might be that if rain 
was produced equally through all points in the air, instead of falling from clouds, and if 
we carried a large section of air with us when we moved, rather than moving through 
the air, then we would be able to hold our umbrellas vertically at all times, instead of 
having to tilt them, because the source of the rain (the air) would be moving at the same 
rate that we moved. The phenomenon of stellar aberration and the null result of 
experiments such as Lodge's seem to rule out rether drag. 
Leaving behind the hypothesis of rether drag, another hypothesis can be put 
forward: perhaps the speed of light is not determined relative to the rether which 
propagates it, but relative to the source of the light. However, astronomical observation 
of binary stars leads us to reject such an hypothesis. 436 Binary stars are two separate 
stars which orbit about a common centre of gravity and which are therefore (relatively) 
close to one another. It should be clear that when observing such stars through a 
telescope parallel to their orbital paths, at some moments one star will be moving 
434 For a recent discussion of Arago's experiment in connection with the rether drag hypothesis to which it 
gave rise, see Rafael Ferraro and Daniel M. Sforza, 'Arago (1810): the first experimental result against 
the ether', European Journal of Physics 26 (2005), p.l95-204 
435 See, for example, Oliver Lodge, 'Aberration Problems: A Discussion concerning the Motion of the 
Ether near the Earth, and concerning the Connexion between Ether and Gross Matter; with Some New 
Experiments', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A, 184 (1893), p. 727-804 
436 See for example, Kenneth Brecher, 'Is the speed of light independent of the velocity of the source?', 
Physics Review Letters 39:17 (1977), p.l051-1054 
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toward the viewer rapidly and the other star moving away similarly rapidly, and that at 
other moments when the orbit has gone through 180° the situation will be reversed. 
Consequently, by observing the binary system over time we ought to be able to see the 
difference in light intensity resulting from the emission of light with added velocity in 
one case and decreased velocity in the other case, and then vice versa as the stars orbit. 
However, no intensity variation occurs and we must conclude, on the basis of the 
relevant calculations, that the light-source-relative speed of light must be given up as an 
hypothesis. 
Heinrich Lorentz began from the assumption of the rether, and then worked with 
Newtonian and Maxwellian physics to develop a new solution to the problems outlined 
above. His starting point was to work on the relationship between matter's structure 
and its movement through the rether. "Lorentz assumed that the electrical forces were 
in essence states of stress and strain in the ether. From Maxwell's equations (assumed 
to hold in the reference frame in which the ether was at rest) it was possible to calculate 
the electromagnetic field surrounding a charged particle. "437 By making a different 
calculation for this field on the basis of a charge moving through the rether, one 
discovers that the field changes from spherical to elliptical, the ellipse being in the 
direction of motion. Since the structure of material objects is such as to be directly 
related to the behaviour of their constituent elements, the result is that there will be a 
length contraction of the entire object in the direction of motion. Bohm provides a 
concise explanation of where this gets us: 
Let us now return to the Michelson-Morley experiment. Since the arms of the 
interferometer are composed of atoms, we expect them to undergo the same shift as that 
given by [ /=/ovl-(v2/c2)] 438 • However, only the bar whose length is parallel to the 
direction of movement will be shortened; the other will not be changed in length. 439 
The result of this is that the Michelson-Morley experiment is predicted to come out 
negative, since the Lorentz contraction counters the expected speed change precisely. 
This result is independent of the velocity of the Earth through the rether. 
The above is only the first step. By parallel yet more complicated reasoning and 
calculation, we can work out that the mass of a particle moving through the rether is 
greater than that of a particle at rest in the rether. A consequence of all this is that 
437 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.24 
438 Where I is the length in the moving frame, /0 is the length in the rest frame, v is the velocity of the 
object/system, and c is the speed of light. 
439 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.25 
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clocks which move through the rether slow down. Again, Bohm provides a concise 
account: 
Now the person who is moving with the laboratory is also constituted of atoms. 
Therefore, his body will be shortened in the same ratio as his rulers, so that he will not 
realise that there has been a change. Likewise, his physical-chemical processes will 
slow down in the same ratio as do his clocks. Presumably his mental processes will 
slow down in an equal ratio, so that he will not see that his clocks have altered. He will 
therefore attribute to his rulers the same length, /o, that they would have if they were at 
rest in the ether, and likewise he will attribute the same period, To, to his clocks. In 
interpreting his experimental results, we must therefore take this into account. 440 
The upshot of this is that experiments such as the Michelson-Morley, designed 
to measure the speed of light with a view to calculating the speed of the Earth through 
the rether, which use length and/or time elements, will not work. This is because the 
length contraction and clock slowing will combine in the experiment to give a result 
independent of the speed of the Earth through the rether. 'Yet it is evident that this 
speed plays an essential role in the Lorentz theory. For, without knowing it, we cannot 
correct our rulers and clocks to find out how to measure the "true length" and the "true 
time," which would be indicated by rulers and clocks at rest relative to the ether. ' 441 
Bohm asks us to consider a more straightforward method of measuring the speed 
of light and discovering the speed of the Earth through the rether. If we could 
synchronise two clocks at a distance and send a light signal from one to the other, we 
could time it and discover the relevant information. The difficulty is clearly 
synchronisation; we cannot use electromagnetic waves, because we are trying to 
measure the speed of these (so if we synchronise using them, we will get a time of zero 
when we try to measure the speed of light). However, we could simply put two clocks 
side by side, start them going together and check they were running at the same rate, 
and then we could separate them slowly to ensure no jarring or other disturbances. 
Unfortunately, it transpires that if the laboratory is moving through the rether then the 
clock that moves will go out of phase with the clock that stays by an amount 
proportional to the distance separated and the speed of the lab through the rether; if they 
are brought back together, the clocks will come back into phase. The result is that the 
laboratory observer 'who does not realise the existence of this phase shift, will call two 
events simultaneous when his two clocks A and B give the same readings. Thus, he will 
440 Bohrn, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.29 
441 Bohrn, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.3l 
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make a mistake about what is simultaneous and what is not. ' 442 If we calculate the 
corrections which must be made to account for the effects of clock slowing and failure 
of simultaneity, and then plug this into the experiment attempting to find the speed of 
light by timing the signal from A to B, we find that the resulting equation tells us that 
'the moving observer will always obtain the same measured velocity for 
light. .. independent of his speed through the ether. ' 443 
In fact, it can be shown444 that no experiment can be constructed which will 
discover the speed of the Earth through the rether through results dependent upon this 
speed. Indeed, 'because of the changes of rulers and clocks resulting from the motion 
through the ether, the Lorentz theory implies that all uniformly moving observers will 
ascribe the same velocity C to light, independent of their speed of motion through the 
ether. ' 445 This gives rise to major difficulties, as Bohm describes with great clarity: 
Nevertheless, this [Lorentz] theory formulates all its laws and equations in terms of 
"true" distances and times, measured by rulers and clocks that are supposed to be at rest 
in the ether. Therefore, the measured distances ought to be corrected, to take into 
account the effect of the movement of the instruments before we can know what they 
really mean. But if the Lorentz theory is right, there can be no way thus to correct 
observed distances and times. The "true" distances and times are therefore inherently 
ambiguous, because they drop out of all observable relationships that can be found in 
actual measurements and experiments. 
What then can be the status of these "true" distances and times that are 
supposed to be measured by rulers and clocks at rest in the ether? If we recall that the 
ether is in any case a purely hypothetical entity, not proved on the basis of any other 
independent evidence, the problem becomes even sharper. Do these "true" distances 
and times really mean anything at all?446 
In other words, we cannot translate our measurements into proper measurements 
because we cannot discover the speed of the Earth through the rether, and we cannot 
discover that speed because every time we try to allow for travelling at speed through 
the rether in our experimental set-up for measuring the speed of light, all the terms for 
the speed of the Earth through the rether drop out of the equations, leaving us with our 
experimental distances and times, and 'the' speed of light. 
442 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.34 
443 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.35 
444 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.36-38 
445 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.39 
446 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.40-41 
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Einstein's Development of Relativity 
Einstein considered the problem from a very different angle. He took the 
Galilean and Newtonian basis that the laws of mechanics are the same in all inertial 
frames, and extended this to the laws of electromagnetism. Consequently, relativity is 
founded on the position that the laws of physics work in the same way in all inertial 
frames. The speed of light thus becomes a constant: since it arises from the laws of 
electromagnetism, which are the same in every frame, the speed of light must be the 
same in every frame. This contrasts with the Lorentzian approach, where the laws of 
electromagnetism are 'right' in the rether rest frame and must be corrected for in all 
other frames. 
This resolves the Michelson-Morley experiment: light speed is constant in all 
frames and all directions, so naturally no experiment will register a variation. We do 
get the Lorentz transformations and their effects, but this time as a result of the speed of 
light being constant and the physical laws being the same in all inertial reference 
frames, rather than the constant speed of light being a result of instrumental changes 
with respect to the hypothetical rether. 
Bohm outlines the differences between Einstein and Lorentz by use of an 
example case. He asks us to consider astronauts landing on Mars and trying to contact 
us here on Earth. 'Suppose that a man on the Earth asks his friend on Mars what is 
happening "now". Because of the time needed for the signals to reach Mars and the 
signals from Mars to come to the Earth, the reply will not come for ten minutes or 
more.... So we will not know what is happening "now" on Mars. ' 447 
However, as Bohm points out, we might try to find out when the event reported 
did in fact happen on Mars. We might use image signals and have the astronaut carry a 
synchronised clock so that we can see when he is sending his message to us. 'But, 
according to the Lorentz theory, this clock would measure time differently to the one on 
the Earth, and be out of synchronism with the one on the Earth by (l0v!c2)1-../I-(Vl!c2), 
where lois the distance to Mars and v is the velocity of the clock relative to the ether. 
Since v is unknown, the "true" time of this event on Mars would, for us, be 
ambiguous. ' 448 We might try to make a direct correction on the time interval for light to 
reach us, to get around the problem caused by the astronaut having a clock display on 
Mars. 'But to make the right correction, we should have, according to the Lorentz 
447 Bolun, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.53 
448 Bolun, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.53 
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theory, to know the "true" distance l [i.e. not 10 this time], as well as the true velocity v, 
of the Earth relative to the ether to yield the correction.... Once again, we encounter 
essentially the same ambiguity in the attempt to find out precisely when an event 
happens on Mars. '449 
In short, our intuitive notions of space and time, and our perception of them, is 
challenged in such a way that we can no longer relate what we experience to the way 
the world in fact is. The problem with the original Lorentz theory is that it tells us this 
very clearly without giving us a way to deal with it (at least, not a way that can be used, 
since it depends upon knowing information that cannot be known- our speed relative to 
the rether). The solution which Einstein offers is to remove an assumption of how the 
world is, and to choose that assumption which is weakest, which does not fit with other 
things we could say about how the world is. Thus, he asks what would happen if all 
physical laws were the same in all inertial frames, instead of just the 
Galilean/Newtonian laws being the same. One consequence is that light would be seen 
to travel at the same velocity in all inertial frames - this explains the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, and others- but it requires us to give up our assumption that light behaves 
similarly to sound and medium-sized dry goods. However, there are other 
consequences which must be explored. 
There are three main consequences of the inertial-frame-homogeneity of 
physical laws and the constant speed of light. The first is time dilation ('moving clocks 
run slow'); the second is length contraction, and the third is relativity of simultaneity. I 
shall explain each in tum. 
It is vital to remember that any frame of reference, provided it is an inertial 
frame, can be used as the frame at rest and other frames will be in motion relative to the 
selected rest frame. As long as we treat the frames consistently, we can change the rest 
frame and calculate the relative data for the new case. There is no preferred frame of 
reference independent of our choice. 
Let us take an example from Adams, where we have two labs moving past one 
another at speed, both constituting an inertial frame. Either can be taken as the rest 
frame. Each contains one person with a light clock. A light clock consists of two fixed 
mirrors with a beam of light bouncing between them. Since the speed of light is 
constant, the time for a bounce cycle will be constant for all observers in that clock's 
inertial frame, and because all observers in all inertial frames know the speed of light, if 
all observers use light clocks they can calculate the relationships between the different 
449 Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.53 
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inertial frames more easily. In this case, one observer's lab will constitute the rest 
frame; thus, the other lab-frame will be moving at constant velocity relative to the rest 
lab. Thus: 
A 
B B 
Inertial frames B's frame 
In the first instance, we see what A and B see of their own inertial frames; in the 
second instance we see only what B sees of B's inertial frame and A's inertial frame. 
A's frame is moving with respect to B; because A's mirrors are moving, the light will 
have further to travel in each bounce (a diagonal, rather than a vertical; the original 
distance plus a bit to account for the motion), but the speed of light is the same; it does 
not have the speed of the lab in addition to the speed of light Consequently, it will take 
slightly longer for the light to complete a bounce cycle, and consequently, B reasons, 
A's clock is running slow. But of course everything in A's reference frame is running 
at the same rate, so B's observation will be that time is passing more slowly in A's 
frame than in B's; the light clocks simply allow B to make calculations about this. 
The difficulty is that from A's position, taking A's frame as the rest frame, B's 
lab is moving past (right-to-left) at the same speed as A's left-to-right motion in B's 
observation. Consequently, A will see the same effects in B's frame, but in the opposite 
direction (i.e. the light bounce paths will extend right-to-left on the diagram). The 
upshot is that clocks in moving frames run slow compared to clocks in rest frames. Is 
there a paradox, if A's clock runs slower than B's and B's clock runs slower than A's? 
No, because A and B are each seeing something different Adams and Bohm both cite 
similar analogies in different ways450 : when you move away from someone they appear 
smaller and smaller the further you go; to them, you too appear smaller and smaller the 
greater the distance between you. It is not as if one expects one of the observers to see 
the other get larger and larger as the distance grows. 
450 Adams, Special Relativity, p.53-4; Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, p.65 
Length contraction follows in a similar fashion . 
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A and B plan to measure the lengths of their rulers by timing how long it takes 
to move from one end to the other at a set velocity V, using the highly accurate light 
clocks. B can see that the light paths are longer for A because A is in motion; 
consequently, B will reason that when A measures the length ofB's ruler by timing A's 
motion from one end to the other, A will think that less time has passed than actually 
has, as B sees it (because A's light clock is running slow). So B will time a longer 
interval on B's clock for A to move from one end of B's ruler to the other than A will 
time on A's clock. So A will measure B's ruler to be shorter than B measures B's ruler 
to be. Now, in A's frame of reference, the positions are reversed, so A reasons that B's 
clock is running slow and that B will measure A's ruler to be shorter than A measures it 
to be. Consequently, each person will believe that they have the longer ruler and that 
the other person has mis-calculated because their clock runs slow. 
Length contraction and time dilation can both be seen to follow from the 
comparison of 'frames considered in motion' with 'frames considered at rest'. The 
nature of the relativistic physics is to define what is invariant and what is relative, and 
its insight is that motion is the determining factor. Since speed is a relation between 
'space covered' and 'time covered', we should expect that the invariant and the relative 
should be tied up with these two categories. 
Adams provides a number of practical examples, the most useful of which 
concerns muons. These are elementary particles formed in high-energy interactions, 
either experimentally or naturally. The most useful instance of the latter is when large 
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quantities are produced in the upper atmosphere (-60km altitude) as a result of 
interaction between gas nuclei and cosmic rays. Muons are subject to decay, with a 
half-life of about one and a half micro-seconds. They travel at slightly under light-
speed, so they could be expected to take about two hundred micro-seconds to reach the 
Earth's surface, which means that by the time they reached a sea-level laboratory we 
would be unlikely to detect any, the great majority having decayed. In fact, we detect 
plenty - about an eighth of the high-altitude flux. Thus, we may calculate that only 
three half-lives have passed - about four and a half micro-seconds - in the muon 
reference frame. This works with the relevant equations to display a time dilation such 
that time passes in the muon frame 'at 3/133 or a little over 2% of the rate at which it 
passes on Earth.' 451 Extensive experiments have confirmed various elements of these 
calculations. 
In the muon frame of reference, four and a half micro-seconds of travel at 
approaching light-speed covers 1.35 kilometres. Clearly this is nowhere near the sixty 
kilometre depth of the atmosphere, and yet the muons cover the distance. This is where 
length contraction comes in: the atmosphere is only 1.35 kilometres deep for a muon 
travelling at near light-speed, as the calculations once again demonstrate. 'You could 
imagine an observer in the muon reference frame to carry a 1 km measuring rod that he 
uses to measure the lengths of similar rods placed vertically in the atmosphere. Since 
about 60 of these rods stretch from sea-level to the top of the atmosphere the muon 
observer concludes that they are all much shorter than his own measuring rod which fits 
only 1.35 times into the same distance ... (Remember, according to this observer his rod 
is at rest and the atmosphere and its measuring rods are in high speed motion). ' 452 
Thus, from the example of muons, we can see the reality of the relativistic theory's 
descriptions of how the world works. 
The final, and perhaps most important, part is the relativity of simultaneity. 
Adams asks us to consider two clocks being set to zero but not started; they are then 
separated by some distance and a flashlight is placed halfway between them. The 
clocks are constructed to start when the light from the flashlight reaches them. Since 
they are all in the same frame of reference, the flashlight will successfully cause the two 
clocks to keep simultaneous time. 'in principle this process could be extended without 
limit until a uniform time frame was established throughout the universe. ' 453 Surely this 
would enable us to discover which events were simultaneous with other events, instead 
451 Adams, Special Relativity, p.59 
452 Adams, Special Relativity, p.63-4 
453 Adams, Special Relativity, p.68 
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of having all the difficulties of calculating times, light speeds, relative motion and so 
on? Well, yes, but only if everything is in the same reference frame (and, since things 
move relative to other things, this is not the case). What will happen in the case of an 
observer or event moving with respect to the synchronised clocks? Supposing A 
synchronises two clocks using the flashlight method, and B is moving relative to A's 
frame of reference, B will experience three effects. 
First of all she will disagree about the separation of A's clocks. This is length 
contraction but will have no effect on her judgement of whether the clocks are 
synchronised since she agrees that A has placed the flashlight at the mid-point between 
the two clocks. B will also see A's clocks run slow due to time dilation, but once again 
this will have no direct effect on the judgement of synchronization, since it affects both 
clocks equally (it will, however, affect her judgement of synchronisation error ... ). 
However, when light leaves the flashlight it will travel at velocity c in all directions 
relative to B (just as it does for A). If B moves to the right then she will see light 
travelling in this direction heading toward an approaching clock whilst that heading to 
the left will be chasing a clock which moves away from it at velocity v. Although light 
was emitted from a central point, B will see it arrive at the right hand clock before it 
reaches the left hand clock and conclude that the clocks are not synchronised. It is clear 
from this argument that the synchronisation error will become greater if the clock 
separation or the relative velocity of A and B is increased. 454 
Thus, simultaneity is relativised for observers and events in moving frames of 
reference. Consequently, returning to the idea of the network of synchronised clocks 
across the universe, iftwo events occur near two different clocks and are judged by the 
clocks to be simultaneous, an observer moving approximately 'left to right' with respect 
to parallel events would say that the event to the right occurred first, whereas and 
observer moving 'right to left' would proclaim that the event to the left occurred first. 
Vitally, 'All three judgements are equally valid. The statement that two events are 
simultaneous only applies to a particular inertial reference frame. ' 455 This is of course 
very difficult to get one's head around, because we intuitively want to make one frame a 
preferred, or rest, frame - and normally this is the frame in which we are at rest. 
However, we might also want to see some point in the universe as the rest frame point-
the sun, the centre of the galaxy, or some posited mid-point - and this similarly fails, 
since all frames are equally able to be considered 'at rest' or 'in motion' with respect to 
other frames, and the laws of physics are the same in all of them. 
In conclusion to the description of the development of the physical concepts of 
relativity, then, Einstein's theory completes what was begun by Galileo and Newton, in 
formulating an account of the world in which the laws of mechanics and 
454 Adams, .Special Relativity, p.69-70 
455 Adams, Special Relativity, p. 71 
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electromagnetics are invariant within inertial frames. The surprising elements of his 
theory- time dilation, length contraction, relative simultaneity- flow from this position 
and the resulting constant speed of light. Time dilation and length contraction occur 
also in Lorentz's theory, but in its earlier form (with FitzGerald) this was 'offered as an 
ad hoc explanation of the Michelson-Morley result' 456 . We shall shortly tum to the 
later, neo-Lorentzian, defence of a privileged frame of reference, but here it is sufficient 
to note that thus far the ambiguities engendered by the Lorentzian theory and our 
inherent incapacity to calculate an object's speed with reference to the rether, which 
arises on account of its dilation and contraction effects, appear to be in marked 
comparison to Einstein's theory, which seems to help us calculate and understand more 
about the universe, at the cost of some of our intuitions about how things ought to work. 
Minkowski's Development ofEinstein's Relativity 
The advance ofMinkowski was to construct a geometrical version of Einsteinian 
relativity, using Einstein's postulates and geometrical relationships. One key element is 
the capacity to display states of affairs visually by using a space-time diagram, wherein 
time is plotted as the vertical axis and space as the horizontal. We are able to convert 
three spatial dimensions into a single axis because, in most cases, what we are interested 
in is the spatial separation between two objects over time, and since we are restricting 
ourselves to uniform motion this separation can be plotted as a straight line on a single 
axis representing the relative motion along a line. The space-time geometry is possible 
because we are working from the postulate that the laws of physics are invariant across 
inertial reference frames: thus, we can represent differing reference frames using the 
same geometric structure. In the same way that Newtonian/Galilean transformations 
(from one reference frame to another) could be represented by rotation of a set of axes, 
so the Lorentz group of transformations can be represented by a different rotation of a 
set of axes. Importantly, it is possible to derive the Lorentz equations and also the three 
relativistic effects (time dilation, length contraction, relative simultaneity) from the 
geometric construction, which uses only the postulates of Einstein's relativity. 
Let us take a quick look at how this works. In the first diagram below, we have 
a space time diagram where the origin is a selected point in space-time. We then plot 
456 Adams, Special Relativity, p.66; cp Elie Zahar, 'Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede 
Lorentz's?', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24:2 (1973), pp.95-123, which emphasises 
that the development of Lorentz's research more fully considered does not warrant the label 'ad hoc' on 
relevant understandings of that term. 
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the fastest signal possible (a light ray) as a set of lines demarcating, in the top half, the 
future spatial separation possible at light speed as time progresses and, in the bottom 
half, the possible spatial separation from which light could have arrived at the origin at 
the considered moment. This divides the diagram into 'light cones', also tagged 
'absolute future' and 'absolute past' respectively of the origin point. Sets of events 
plotted within light cones represent possible causal linkage to the point of origin 
('timelike separation'); sets of events plotted outside the light cones represent events 
with no possible causal linkage to the point of origin ('spacelike separation'). 
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In the second diagram, we note that our axes are constructed so that light is 
represented as a line at 45 degrees (this being equivalent to the top-right quadrant of the 
first diagram). This also acts as a line of symmetry which enables us to construct other 
reference frames within the one we have chosen as 'at rest'. We can do this because we 
know that the speed of light is constant in all reference frames: thus, when we construct 
a new reference frame, it will not be the case that the angle of the light-line is different, 
and so we can use it to relate the new frame to the original frame. As Adams notes, 'an 
observer's self-experience is of staying put but ageing' 457, such that to plot the path of 
an observer, moving relative to the original in another inertial frame of reference, on our 
axes is equivalent to plotting the time-axis of the observer in that inertial frame. All that 
is then required to complete the addition of the second frame of reference is that 
observer's space axis, which will tell us how spatia-temporal separations translate for 
the observer on the new time axis. Since our postulate is that the laws of physics are 
457 Adams, Special Relativity, p.l40 
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invariant across inertial frames, and the constant speed of light is a correlate of this -
hence the light line at 45 degrees - the geometrical representation of the space axis 
places it at the same angle towards the light line from horizontal as the new time axis 
was from vertical. 
We can use geometrical calculations to find out how points and lines in one 
reference frame relate to others, and these take the form of the Lorentz transformations 
and provide us with the same effects of time dilation, length contraction and relative 
simultaneity as we obtained from the original non-geometrical approach. 
The most important element for current purposes is relative simultaneity, and 
this is probably also the most straightforward to see. Taking the second diagram above 
as our basis, we can see that lines of simultaneity for A will be parallel to the space axis. 
In other words, every value on the time axis will correspond to a space-axis-parallel line 
(called a hyperplane of simultaneity). This makes sense, and is just as it would be in a 
'classical' diagram of time against space. However, here we are adding in B's reference 
frame from A's viewpoint. Remembering that from B's viewpoint B's space-time axes 
look like A's do to A (i.e. forming a 90 degree angle) and that B's lines of simultaneity 
work on the same basis as A's, this means that B's lines of simultaneity are parallel with 
B's space axis. The upshot is that the set of points which A and B each consider 
'simultaneous with me but spatially separated' will clearly differ, and more acutely the 
closer B is to light-speed. 
We can see more clearly through Minkowski space-time the restrictions and 
surprises inherent in relativity physics. For example, all observers must agree on the 
temporal sequence of events within the successive light cones of those events. So if C 
is within the light cone of B and B likewise of A, then all observers will agree that B 
follows A and C follows B (note that if an event C is within B's light cone, and B is 
within A's light cone, then C is automatically within A's light cone because the angle 
involved is always 45 degrees). However, for events outside of each other's light cones, 
observers will disagree about the sequence, this depending upon the motion of the 
observer. 
It is important to note that a space-time diagram of either of the above varieties 
are not 'absolute' representations of the universe. In particular, each individual diagram 
represents a viewpoint from one frame of reference. Although as we have seen other 
reference frames can be added, they are as those reference frames are from the 
viewpoint of the selected frame - a separate diagram could be constructed for the other 
reference frame in which its axes would be the vertical/horizontal and other reference 
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frames represented as angled. This flexibility is another reason why Minkowski space-
time geometry is such a powerful tool. 
It should be noted that, even before the critics of presentism and the neo-
Lorentzian theory are given the opportunity to state their case, we can see on the basis 
of the above that a concept of presentism is likely to be in trouble when compared with 
Einsteinian relativity. For if simultaneity is relative to frame of reference, and there is 
no privileged frame, then there can be no absolute temporal sequence. It is not simply 
that our clocks - our measuring instruments for time - will disagree, in the way that my 
clock here disagrees with my cousin's clock on America's eastern seaboard (for this 
could be corrected by addition or subtraction when he or I travel to visit each other). 
Nor is it simply that we must make a transformation calculation to discover the order of 
events in their rest frame (if they have one in common), although we can do this. It is 
rather that the order of events in their rest frame- which, if relevantly related according 
to light-cones, will be absolute - does not tell us about an absolute order of events 
throughout the universe, because that rest frame is one among many frames, all of 
which could be treated as the rest frame if chosen. Since observers in other frames may 
allocate a different order of events, and since their allocation is equally valid as a 
contender for 'absolute time sequence', it is impossible to say that there is an absolute 
time and an absolute sequence into which all events in the universe can be ordered. 
Thus, presentism, which contends that only the present exists, is potentially in trouble 
since 'now' is a frame-relative concept which does not extend uniformly throughout the 
urn verse. 
Critique ofPresentism and Relativity Theory- Methodological Considerations 
Let us return to Hawley for her own comments on this topic. She succinctly 
notes that there are three options for the presentist458 : first, to reject presentism, on the 
grounds that presentness is frame-dependent on STR and existence cannot be frame-
dependent; second, to accept that existence is frame-dependent; finally, to argue in 
favour of a privileged reference frame that STR has somehow missed and which will 
allow an absolute present, thus avoiding frame-relative existence. Few people would 
want to countenance the second option459 and the first option means giving up 
458 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.46!-462 
459 For an approximation to the position, see Mauro Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the 
Objectivity of Temporal Becoming (Bologna: CLUEB Press, 1995). Craig Callender comments that 
Dorato's position nevertheless characterises tenses 'as relations among events on a 4-manifold and not as 
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presentisrn, so it IS the third option that holds our interest as the most likely 
battleground. For an extensive and detailed demonstration of the incompatibility of 
presentism with Minkowskian relativity assuming no scientifically revisionary account 
of relativity, see Sider's Four-Dimensionalism, which canvasses five separate presentist 
options and provides reasons for rejecting them all. 460 
By way of beginning her brief discussion, Hawley comments on the broad 
picture: 
Defenders of the compatibility of presentism and STR . . . argue that to suppose the 
existence of some privileged frame is merely to go beyond STR. Presentism 
supplements STR without attempting to supplant it; balking at this is supposedly the 
mark of outmoded verificationism. 461 
The question is clear for her: 'STR achieves a great deal of empirical success without 
positing an absolute frame of reference. This doesn't entail that there is no absolute 
frame of reference, but does it make it unreasonable to think that there is such a 
frame?' 462 Using the structure she has developed, the issue falls into three parts. The 
first is to achieve empirical adequacy, the second is to canvass options for Undermining, 
and the third is to assess the plausibility of Counterargument. 
The first part is easily managed by claiming that the preferred frame is 
undetectable (i.e. something like the Lorentzian rether model) or tenuously linked to 
some empirical phenomenon. DeWeese, for instance, suggests a small anisotropy in the 
cosmic background radiation which would be sufficient to locate a position in the 
universe with respect to which the rest of the universe was expanding isotropically.463 
There is still plenty of debate over what this axis- tagged 'the axis of evil' - consists in 
and whether there are other factors, such as local conditions, which are contributory for 
the phenomenon. Land and Magueijo have observed that 
There are two possible fault lines in the analysis leading to the 'AoE' effect. The first 
concerns the integrity of the data itself, that is, contamination from noise, systematics 
and foregrounds. A comparison between the first-year (WMAPl) and third-year 
genuine changes in existence.' See Craig Callender, 'Review of Mauro Dorato Time and Reality: 
Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming', The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 48: I (Mar. 1997), p.ll9 
460 Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, pp.43-52; cf earlier versions of some arguments in Mellor, 'Special 
Relativity and Present Truth', Analysis 34 (1973-4), pp. 74-77 
461 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.462 
462 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.462 
463 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.73-74, citing William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith, Theism, 
Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.71, Paul Davies, About Time: 
Einstein's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp.l28-9 & a web-link which 
is currently dead - see below for alternative. 
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(WMAP3) data releases shows that the raw data have hardly changed on large scales. 
However, there are several 'all-sky' renditions of the data and these do lead to 
significant disparities: . . . this is true regarding the intensity of the AoE, so that 
discussions should emphasize not so much [the] first-year versus third-year data, but the 
various treatments of the Galactic plane region. The second fault line concerns the 
'meaning' of the detection, and by this we mean the robustness of the statistics used. 464 
Elsewhere, Craig Callender has criticised the adoption of cosmic time (being the time 
coordinate which adopts the 'big bang' singularity as its projected origin) as a 'scientific 
basis' of a preferred frame for objective becoming: 'A problem with this is that cosmic 
time depends on a special global matter distribution, and it is counterintuitive to think of 
time as depending for its existence on the initial distribution of matter. ' 465 
Although simple empirical adequacy can still be achieved by asserting that the 
preferred frame is undetectable, clearly empirical data contributory to the assertion of a 
preferred frame affects not only the plausibility of achieving empirical adequacy, but 
also potentially the strength of the strategy of Undermining. 
The Undermining strategy is represented by attempts 'to show that the scientific 
metaphysics (in this case the claim that there is no absolute frame of reference and thus 
no absolute simultaneity and no unique present) is not really involved in the generating 
the empirical success of STR.'466 We recall that this involves demands of independent 
motivation, explanatory power and not being ad hoc. If the ad hoc approach is 
represented by simply stating a preferred frame which is undetectable, the non-ad hoc 
approach is to attempt a neo-Lorentzian theory in which compensatory phenomena 
explain our inability to detect the 'rether frame'. Because the scientific metaphysics is 
negatively couched (no privileged frame), Hawley notes that the alternative is a 'more 
expansive theory' 467 - this may have some effect on how it is criticised, as we shall see. 
We remember that Undermining is completed by independent argumentation in favour 
ofthe alternate metaphysics- we have already seen an example of this being attempted 
in the previous chapter. Hawley reminds us that 
this argument must now be done within the assumptions already made in order to 
defend the Lorentz theory (or other alternative). That's to say, presentists must explain 
the advantages of presentism in a world in which we are unable to detect which 
spatially-distant events are present. 468 
464 Kate Land and Joao Magueijo, 'The Axis of Evil Revisited', The Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society 378: I (2007), p.l53 
465 Callender, 'Review of Mauro Dorato Time and Reality', p.l20 
466 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.462 
467 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.462 
468 Hawley, 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics', p.462 
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This will be of greater importance when we tum to examine epistemological issues in 
chapter six. 
The final element is Counterargument, which in this case means that the 
presentist accepts that STR's ability to be empirically successful without positing a 
preferred frame counts against presentism, but argues that independent considerations 
overwhelm this point. Once again, we have seen in the previous chapter how some 
independent considerations have faired, and we shall look at a better example in chapter 
six, where we assess Craig's argument that belief in the present enjoys such epistemic 
privilege as to defeat anything brought against it. 
What is now required is some discussion of Craig's attempt to save presentism, 
with careful correlation of that attempt with the ideas above. 
Critique ofPresentism and Special Relativity- Groundwork 
The 'short version' of an account of Craig's defence is that he pursues a strategy 
of Undermining. However, unfortunately things are not quite that straightforward. 
Before we can consider whether his neo-Lorentzian account provides the requisite 
elements of empirical adequacy and explanatory power, we must attend to other issues 
raised. First, there is the distinction between physical and metaphysical time, and 
Craig's relating of this to physical science by appeal to Newton. Second, there is 
Craig's attempted 'debunking' of Einsteinian relativity by an attack on its/his alleged 
positivism/veri:ficationism. Finally, there is the question of whether Craig is (in 
Hawley's terminology) being an optimist or a pessimist - i.e. whether he thinks the 
presence of a metaphysical claim in an empirically successful scientific theory is a 
reason to support that claim. This final point is key to both understanding and 
criticising Craig's approach. 
A vital part of Craig's position Is the distinction between physical and 
metaphysical time. This distinction is not terribly controversial (depending upon how it 
is cashed out); as DeWeese says in his introduction, 'Metaphysical time refers to the 
succession of moments (events) through which concrete objects persist. Since there are 
possibly concrete objects that are not physical, metaphysical time is not identical to 
physical time. ' 469 Padgett relies on metaphysical time for his view that God is outside 
(physical) time but temporal (metaphysically), a position he requires because he 
supports an A-theoretical view of time and claims that God transcends our (physical) 
469 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.IO 
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time as creator of it. Craig points out that God could cause a temporal sequence by 
'counting down' to the moment of creation: this would be outside of physical time and 
space, those being as yet uncreated. 470 Elsewhere he argues that our commitment to 
'absolute time' is evident from our desire for increasingly accurate clocks.471 However, 
all of this says nothing about frames of reference or the importance of the present: it 
simply commits us to the position that the reality of time could be independent of time 
as a physical phenomenon. Additionally, it seems that physical and metaphysical time 
would have to be related in some way, if co-extant, in order for the notion of 
metaphysical time to be able to do work - for example, if God was in a metaphysical 
time entirely unrelated to physical time, it would actually sharpen the problem of divine 
knowledge of, or interaction with, the world472. 
Craig's attempt to make the concept of metaphysical time do work for him with 
respect to reconciling presentism with physics begins with Isaac Newton. He explains 
that for Newton space and time in the absolute and metaphysical sense are emanative 
from God473 : God is eternal in the sense of everlasting and omnipresent, and these give 
rise to absolute space and time. 474 I shall not go into deeper discussion here, since this 
has only passing interest for us: it assumes two attributes of God which this inquiry is 
not entitled to assume- and neither for that matter is Craig's. So Newton's theological 
views do not provide direct help in arbitrating the interaction of science and philosophy. 
Pressing on, Craig grants that Newtonian science can be corrected by relativity 
theory in that Newton's concept of physical time can be corrected: '[Newton] assumed 
too readily that that an ideal clock would give an accurate measure of metaphysical time 
independently of its motion. ' 475 However, according to Craig this leaves Newtonian 
metaphysical time untouched.476 Thus we see Craig's argument take embryonic form: 
by allowing that Newton's physical time can be corrected whilst his metaphysical time 
retains cogency, Craig leaves the door ajar for a version of relativity theory 
incorporating metaphysical time. 
To strengthen his position, Craig brings into play some suitably doomed 
positivistic complaints that Newton's absolute space and time cannot exist ('How does 
47
° Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.l23 
471 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.37 
472 CfLeftow, Time and Eternity, p.272 
473 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.44-45 
474 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.40-41 
475 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.52 
476 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.52 
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one give meaning to Newton's absolute space ... [it] is unobservable, nonexistent. ' 477), 
pointing out that this sort of challenge would not worry Newton and should not worry 
us. He concludes: 
Even if we do not go so far as Newton in including discourse about God in scientific 
theorizing, still it is clear that if we are prepared to draw metaphysical inferences about 
the nature of space, time, and spacetime on the basis of physical science, then we must 
also be ready to entertain theistic metaphysical hypotheses such as Newton deemed 
relevant. 478 
Several points arise. First, countenancing absolute metaphysical time still tells 
us nothing about either what physical time is like or how it relates to metaphysical time. 
Second, if Craig's view is to be dependent on asserting God's temporality then it seems 
unfit for the purpose of contributing to a discussion designed to decide whether or not 
God is temporal (a discussion which Craig himself has stated relies upon arbitrating the 
A- vs. B-theory debate, for which the physics of time is a key component). Third, 
regarding the idea of metaphysical time, there is nothing here other than theological 
assertion to prevent us from taking metaphysical time to be the tenselessly existing time 
of the B-theoretical view. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is not apparent why we should accept, without 
good reasons, that the capacity to draw metaphysical inferences from physical science 
should translate to a capacity to use any sort of metaphysical hypothesis we care to. In 
particular, as we saw in chapter two, theological claims are not the sort of claim that 
could find confirm~tion through involvement in an empirically successful scientific 
theory. So the claims 'God brings about absolute time and space' and even 
'metaphysical time and space exist' are not really the sort of claims that could be 
involved in a scientific theory; rather, one would need something like 'there is a 
privileged frame giving absolute simultaneity' accompanied by independent 
philosophical arguments in favour of metaphysical time and corollary arguments linking 
that time with the idea of a preferred frame. 
On a different tack, Craig pursues his assault on the positivism that he set up 
against Newton and attempts to argue that standard relativity theory 'eliminates' 
metaphysical time, space and the rether by the use of a positivistic approach in its 
theoretical development ('What justification did Einstein have for so radical a move? 
How did he know that metaphysical time and space do not exist? The answer, in a 
477 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.52 citing C. Misner, K. S. Thome and J. A Wheeler, 
Gravitation (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973), p.l9 
478 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.53 
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word, is positivism. ' 479). What he means by this is that metaphysical time (etc.) are 
eliminated from physical theory, and if one continues to hold onto positivism outside of 
physical theory then they are eliminated per se, since metaphysics is debarred from 
attributing meaning or existence to anything beyond the empirical world. On the other 
hand, Craig wishes to hold up people like Lorentz as scientists who were able to correct 
the Newtonian physical time without losing hold of metaphysical time. 480 This will be 
the next important step for Craig's reconciliation of physics and presentism. 
Craig thus expends a great deal of effort on giving a historical portrayal of 
'Einstein as positivist' 481 , dismissing his later explicit repudiation of positivism as 
'beside the point for our purposes' 482 on the grounds that he wrote his key special 
relativity papers whilst still under its sway. He complains that 'by abandoning the 
presuppositions of absolute time and space and substituting in their stead operational 
definitions, Einstein reduces time and space to our measurements of them. ' 483 The 
general tone of Craig's discussion tends towards 'it's verificationism gone mad', but we 
should note instead that Einstein is primarily interested in responding to the problem of 
making mechanics and electromagnetics/optics work together: as we saw towards the 
beginning of this chapter, on an rether theory it is likely that we will never know which 
is the preferred frame and therefore how to adapt and correct our physical theories. 484 It 
is the assumption that Einstein makes - that the laws of physics are the same in all 
frames, there being no preferred frame corresponding to absolute time or space - and 
not the philosophical methodology which may have suggested that assumption, which 
stands to gain confirmation from incorporation into an empirically successful scientific 
theory on an optimistic view. 
We might tentatively suggest an early diagnosis of the real issue here: predictive 
ability, empirical adequacy and involvement are tied together. Accepting that we ought 
not to be naive realists - accepting that empirical data does not straightforwardly entail 
479 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.54 
48° Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.54 
481 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, pp.54-69 
482 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.69 
483 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.65 
484 It is notable that one can, apparently, have verificationist tendencies oneself and still be upset with 
Einstein's relativity. Nordenson, writing in the I %0s, complains at length that Einstein's new time 
concepts are not really experimentally verifiable, even if the theory attains some empirical success, and 
that, as defined by the symbols used, they cannot be said to 'have a physical meaning ... They are in 
principle only the result of mathematical constructions.' See Harald Nordenson, Relativity, Time and 
Reality: A Critical Investigation of The Einstein Theory of Relativity from a Logical Point of View 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1969), p.l96, see also p.28 and throughout. 
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metaphysical content - does not equate to a declaration of the irrelevance of science for 
metaphysics. 485 
Another way of approaching this is to use Hawley's observation that non-
empirical content may not have equal distribution (in terms of its contribution to success 
or to error) across a scientific theory. The fact that Einstein was strongly positivistic 
when he first wrote on relativity theory may translate neither to support for positivism 
from STR nor to the position that STR does not tell us anything about metaphysical 
time. As Dorato puts it in his review of Craig's Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity: 
Granting that Einstein's criterion for synchronizing two clocks at a distance is 
verificationist in essence ... it does not follow that just because the positivist theory of 
meaning has been abandoned, we should feel justified to reintroduce in science wild 
metaphysical hypotheses with no independent support from science. 486 
We have already seen a move towards favouring those who are 'not positivistic' 
and therefore open to keeping Newtonian metaphysical time whilst correcting the 
concept of physical time. As the next preliminary to his defence of a neo-Lorentzian 
view, Craig discusses the ways in which metaphysics and physics have increasingly 
interacted. Rather than seeing this as a conjunction of the points (i) theory necessarily 
outruns empirical data and (ii) the success of scientific theory may be seen as offering 
confirmation of a metaphysical claim, he chooses to interpret metaphysics as something 
'different' which dilutes science's old-fashioned positivism. For example, he cites 
comments by John Barrow on criteria for what counts as 'science' and the entry of 
concepts such as creatio ex nihilo into scientific discussions487; he states that 'during the 
last few decades, theoretical physics has become characterized precisely by its 
metaphysical, speculative character'488 and concludes that 'like it or not, theoretical 
physics has become thoroughly impregnated with metaphysics. ' 489 
485 We might choose to see an analogy with pre-Copernican astronomy looming: if we retain absolute 
time and develop a neo-Lorentzian theory to account for it, and all of this on the basis of the need for 
metaphysical weight in our thought, then why not say that the Earth is after all the centre of the universe? 
We may have metaphysical or theological reasons for asserting it, and our advanced mathematics could 
certainly cope with the complicated system of epicycles required to explain the movements of the stars 
and planets. The problem, of course, is that this cannot match up with the laws of physics as we have 
construed them - but then, this is what Craig is claiming in favour of his approach, concerning 
metaphysical sophistication. The pre-Copernican point does not apply to discussions other than Craig's 
brand of metaphysically/theologically centred argument, since the (neo-)Lorentzian can be distinguished 
perfectly well on scientific grounds - see comments by Zahar, 'Why Did Einstein's Programme 
Supersede Lorentz's?', p.\04 n.l 
486 Mauro Dorato, 'Review of William Lane Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity', Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Modem Physics 34B: I (2002), p.\56 
487 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.81 
488 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.74 
489 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.77 
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This raises the suspicion that Craig has confused the role of metaphysical claims 
as part of theoretical content with the metaphysically speculative discussion instigated 
by certain empirically testable phenomena. But it also brings into focus a question that 
has been on the periphery of all Craig's points in this section: exactly what does he 
think metaphysical involvement in scientific theory is, and what does a scientific 
theory's success do for any involved metaphysics? In short, is he pessimistic or 
optimistic? The answer, unfortunately for Craig's position, appears to be 'both'. 
That Craig exhibits a bizarre commitment to both pessimism and optimism has 
been noted, although in different terms, by Dorato in his review of Time and the 
Metaphysics of Relativity. Observing two apparent contrasting positions in Craig's 
work, Dorato attempts to provide a concise characterization: 
According to the first, "relativity physics ... is not necessarily saying anything that is 
relevant for the metaphysician" (p. 152), a claim that tends to be advanced whenever 
evidence coming from physics is against his metaphysical views. The second position is 
that physics "confirms" certain metaphysical and theological views over others, a claim 
that is put forth whenever evidence for the existence of a privileged frame (coming for 
instance from cosmic time or quantum non-locality) seems more reassuring. 490 
We can see this very clearly in terms of pessimism and optimism: in response to 
arguments for a scientific metaphysic, Craig seems to adopt the view that (although 
metaphysical beliefs must be empirically adequate) the presence of a metaphysical 
claim in an empirically successful scientific theol)' is no reason to think the claim true. 
When promulgating his own views, the presence of an (alternate) metaphysical claim in 
empirically scientific theories is a reason to think the claim true. An outraged-sounding 
Dorato observes of the former situation: 
Since Craig assumes that only an outmoded verificationism could identify physical time 
with metaphysical time (p. 160-162, p. 170), for him the abandonment of positivism 
automatically entails the independence of metaphysics from physics. Given this 
independence, however, whf worry about physics at all and [why] write a book on the 
metaphysics ofrelativity?49 
In fact, I would argue that it is Craig's assault on the 'positivism' of standard 
relativity theory which allows him to make the move from pessimism to optimism. By 
arguing that we should 'start from scratch' and disregard positivistic tendencies whilst 
embracing the metaphysical absolute time which should not have been discarded in the 
first place, he can invoke a neo-Lorentzian theol)' and call the metaphysical claims it 
490 Dorato, 'Review', p.l56 
491 Dorato, 'Review', p.l56 
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involves 'scientific metaphysics', available for confirmation by predictive successes of 
the new theory. But this move is faulty: he accepts that standard STR is empirically 
adequate and viable, and that it is an empirically successful scientific theory, so it still 
makes sense for us to ask what sort of metaphysical claims might be confirmed by STR 
if we are to be optimistic. It makes even more sense to do so if my aforementioned 
point - that it is the assumption that Einstein makes (of no preferred frame) that stands 
to gain by confirmation, and not the positivism that influenced him to make it - is 
accurate. 
Indeed, Craig's conclusion to his discussion of modern science and its treatment 
of time states that his challenge is to show 'exactly how the relativity of physical time, 
which has been well-established empirically, is to be reconciled with the objectivity of 
temporal becoming and the absolute simultaneity that the A-theorist postulates of 
metaphysical time. ' 492 This is just as unclear as it needs to be for Craig to get the best 
possible basis for urging a neo-Lorentzian physics, but it drives the careful reader to ask 
in what 'the empirically well-established relativity of physical time' consists if not in 
the success of standard relativity theory- a theory, which, by definition, goes beyond 
merely reporting the empirical data. Having dismantled (with unfortunate but necessary 
brevity) much of the machinery that Craig has carefully constructed to lend credence to 
his strategy, we are back, finally, to the issue of Undermining and the question of 
whether Craig in fact supplies an adequate scientific position to level the scientific 
playing field. It is to the criticism of that position that we now turn. 
Critique ofPresentism and Special Relativity: Craig's Neo-Lorentzianism 
Yuri Balashov and Michael Janssen provide a response to a number of Craig's 
arguments and claims for the neo-Lorentzian approach and its alleged superiority over 
the standard interpretation of relativity theory. They are as follows: first, that Craig's 
analysis of Einsteinian, Minkowskian and neo-Lorentzian relativity as 'competitors' is 
faulty. Second, that his criticism of Einsteinian relativity by way of its ontology is 
misplaced. Third, that his arguments for the explanatory deficiency of standard 
relativity are at worst unfounded and at best also effective against thermodynamics. 
Fourth, that what he takes as 'neo-Lorentzian relativity' is inadequate to the task he 
requires of it. Finally, that an empirically viable neo-Lorentzian relativity is 
explanatorily deficient in comparison with the standard interpretation such that we 
492 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.l 04 
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should prefer the standard interpretation in a roughly equivalent way to that in which we 
should prefer Darwinism over special creation (understood as divine creation through 
processes not susceptible to scientific enquiry). In discussing these points I shall 
endeavour to supplement them with appropriate explanatory and critical material to 
improve our understanding of where Craig goes wrong. 
In the first place, then, Balashov and Janssen take exception to Craig's 
characterisation of the three types of relativity theory as competitors.493 They argue that 
it is not a straight three-way fight. Rather, the 'relativity interpretation' is not an 
interpretation of the same sort as the others; it is primarily a theory of principle - a 
foundation upon which constructive theories can be built. 
To provide a little more detail, Balashov and Janssen distinguish theories of 
principle from constructive theories in the following way: 
In a theory of principle, one starts from some general, well-confirmed empirical 
regularities that are raised to the status of postulates (e. g. the impossibility of perpetual 
motion of the first and second kind, which became the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics). With such a theory, one explains the phenomena by showing that 
they necessarily occur in a world in accordance with the postulates. Whereas theories 
of principle are about the phenomena, constructive theories aim to get at the underlying 
reality. In a constructive theory one proposes a (set of) models(s) for some part of 
physical reality (e.g., the kinetic theory modelling gas as a swarm of tiny billiard balls 
bouncing around in a box). One explains the phenomena by showing that the theory 
provides a model that gives an empirically adequate description of the salient features of 
1° 494 rea tty. 
They use the example of length contraction: Einsteinian relativity as a theory of 
principle explains length contraction if it shows that this necessarily occurs in a world 
with the relativity and light postulates. The Minkowski constructive theory explains 
length contraction by relating the length measurement to different sets of space-time 
axes arising from the relative motion of two observers; the neo-Lorentzian explanation 
relates 'dynamical effects and artefacts of measurement'. Balashov and Janssen admit 
that, viewed solely as a theory of principle, Einstein's theory gives no foundation for a 
preference of constructive theory. However, they argue, Einstein's 1905 paper shows a 
clear constructive leaning, seeing 'the effects derived from the postulates as 
manifestations of a new kinematics. ' 495 Janssen argues that Lorentz was only able to 
493 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.ll-13 and throughout 
494 Yuri Balashov & Michael Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 54 (2003), p.331 
495 Balashov & Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.332 
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reconcile his theory with the original relativity theory by looking on Einstein's theory as 
purely a theory of principle. 496 
Moving on to the issue of ontology, one might start by noting a rather unusual 
move by Craig at the beginning of his discussion in The Tenseless Theory of Time. In 
reaction to Putnam's (rather over-zealously scientifically realist497) argument498, Craig 
comments that 'Given his presentist commitments, the A-theorist's relativizing reality 
to reference frames is quite natural. ' 499 This - despite later discussion in terms of 
preferred reference frames - provides the key to understanding Craig's allegation of 
'fragmented ontology', for he has sown the seed of a link between relativity theory and 
our 'intuitive' (i.e. presentist for Craig) conception of the universe as 'what is 
simultaneous with me-now is real'. 
Craig's strategy is to affirm the strength of Minkowskian relativity as a 
competitor with Einsteinian relativity so that he can later discard Minkowskian 
relativity as explanatorily less powerful than neo-Lorentzian relativity and not 
ontologically informative. He does this by alleging that the ontology of Einsteinian 
relativity is bizarre and unsuitable. He begins: 
Now the A-theoretical attempt to relativize tense and temporal becoming to reference 
frames presupposes . . . the relativity interpretation of SR with its instrumentalist [i.e. 
anti-realist] understanding of Minkowski spacetime. But ... it is arguable that the 
resultant interpretation of SR is implausible and deficient. That is to say, Einstein's SR 
ought to be construed along the lines of the spacetime interpretation. 500 
He then argues that, because Einsteinian relativity is 'about physical objects enduring 
through time,' 501 it is clear that it involves 'the pluralistic fragmentation of reality into 
distinct spaces and times associated with reference frames. ' 502 Moreover, 'one can 
change frames, and, hence, realities just by changing one's relative motion. ' 503 
Balashov and Janssen seem a little puzzled by Craig's accusation that STR leads 
to a fragmented ontology - we will turn to their explanation of Einstein's relativity 
momentarily. I think their puzzlement stems from the fact that they miss the clever 
move Craig makes: by first implanting the idea that Einsteinian relativity is compatible 
496 Micahel Janssen, 'A Comparison Between Lorentz's Ether Theory and Special Relativity in the Light 
of the Experiments of Trouton and Noble', PhD Thesis (University of Pittsburgh, 1995), Section 4.3.1 
497 This is lampooned by Craig: 'Apparently losing all restraint in the heady atmosphere of a scientific 
convention, an ebullient Putnam declares ... ' Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.7 
498 Putnam, 'Time and Physical Geometry', Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp.240-247 
499 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.9 
50
° Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.I5 
501 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.l2 
502 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.l5 
503 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.l5 
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with presentist ontology because one can relativise existence, he is able to import the 
presentist intuition into Einsteinian relativity to show how 'reality literally falls 
apart. ' 504 But this won't wash, because Einstein did not carry presentist intuitions into 
his formulation of special relativity. In short, Craig is attempting to undermine Einstein 
with the same argument B-theorists use to reject presentism by way of relativity theory 
- i.e. relativised existence. 
Balashov and Janssen give a brief but lucid account of how Einstein actually 
went about constructing his theory: 'It is part of the nature of theories of principle that 
they avoid ontological commitments as much as possible... Rather than endorsing an 
ontology of three-dimensional objects, Einstein actually strips such objects of many of 
their classical properties. ' 505 Einstein and Minkowski both follow what Norton calls a 
'subtractive strategy' 506 : 'geometries are characterized in terms of invariants of 
transformation groups associated with them. Reality IS denied to all elements not 
invariant under the relevant group of transformations. In the case of SR this is the 
Lorentz group. ' 507 In other words, Einstein does not take normal objects and 'pop them 
in and out of existence'; rather, he says that in the absence of absolute time and space 
and where physical laws are the same in your reference frame as in any other regardless 
of your speed or location, you will judge some events to be simultaneous which may not 
be so judged if you were differently related to them. Nowhere does he say 'and, by the 
way, only what is simultaneous with you exists' because that is not an element which 
can be considered invariant under the Lorentz transformations. Now Craig could quite 
easily reply that this subtractive strategy sounds like positivism, but inserting a premise 
into a theory just because you think it should not have been removed in the first place 
gives no justification for criticising the result as being ontologically bizarre. 
Once we add to the above considerations the previous discussion of theories of 
principle versus constructive theories, we can see from a different angle that Craig 
really has little ground to stand on: if Minkowski is a development of Einstein in line 
with the constructive elements of Einstein's theory, then Craig's lirnited508 acceptance 
of Minkowski's view of reality ('on a spacetime ontology, there is thus a unified, 
504 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.16 
505 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p. 335 
506 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.335 citing J. Norton, 'Geometries in Collision: 
Einstein, Klein, and Riemann', in J. Gray (ed.), The Symbolic Universe: Geometry and Physics, 1890-
1930, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.l28-144 
507 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.335 
508 Remembering that he will eventually prefer a neo-Lorentzian view. 
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independent reality which is merely measured differently' 509) makes his rejection of 
Einstein's view even more tenuous. 
We turn now to the charge of explanatory deficiency. This has several elements: 
first, that theories of principle in general are not very empirical and are thus not good 
explanatory bases; second, that Einstein's relativity postulates in particular are not very 
empirical and therefore not a good explanatory base; third, that the Einstein-Poincare 
synchronisation method for obtaining simultaneity in a reference frame is conventional 
and therefore not a good explanatory basis for the relativity of simultaneity; finally, that 
length contraction and clock retardation are brute facts in Einsteinian relativity but have 
causal explanations in (neo-)Lorentzian relativity. 
Craig states that 'as a theory of principle rather than a constructive theory, 
Einstein's SR is based on postulates which are characterized by their very non-empirical 
character. ' 510 This is taken by Balashov and Janssen as having two points of contact: 
with theories of principle in general and with Einstein's postulates in particular. To the 
former- presumably reliant on the phrasing 'as a theory of principle' - they respond 
that thermodynamics is a theory of principle based on the postulates that 'perpetual 
motion of the first and second kind' 511 is impossible. Einstein writes 'I came to the 
conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to 
assured results. The example I saw before me was thermodynamics. ' 512 Consequently 
it is difficult to argue that theories of principle in general are explanatorily deficient, 
unless one is willing to take on both STR and thermodynamics at once. 
To clarify the point against Einstein's view in particular, Craig quotes Holton 
and Goldberg's view that Einsteinian relativity's postulates 'were postulates for which 
there was and can be no direct empirical confirmation' making them non-verifiable and 
non-falsifiable513 . This may be compared with his comment 'of course, if there are 
good empirical grounds for accepting the postulates of a theory, then we may be 
justified or even forced to regard certain phenomena deduced therefrom as natural and 
not in need of any explanation.' 514 Of course, by Craig's own arguments this sort of 
509 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.l6 
51
° Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, p.l81; Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.ll3 
511 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.331 referring to (i) a machine cannot produce 
more energy than it uses and (ii) a machine cannot spontaneously convert thermal energy into mechanical 
work. 
512 Albert Einstein, 'Autobiographical Notes', in P. A Schlipp ( ed. ), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-
Scientist, (Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), p.53, cited Balashov and Janssen, 
'Presentism and Relativity', p.332 
513 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.ll3 
514 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.33 
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thing should not trouble us at all - after all, he sees it as a strength of the Lorentzian 
view that it supports an rether frame, and invoking verificationism is outre. 
However, charitably granting that there might be a case to answer, we can 
answer it. First, it is unclear how the two postulates (invariant laws in inertial frames + 
constant speed of light in a vacuum in all frames) are unfalsifiable. Second, both 
postulates are empirical in character insofar as the experiments described in the first 
section of this chapter and the attendant reasoning gives us cause both to (at least see 
what happens if we) reject a preferred frame of reference and - in conjunction with 
Maxwell's work- suggest a constant speed of light. Balashov and Janssen comment, 
for example, that 'Einstein ([1911], p.6) ... made it clear that he saw the light postulate 
as the secure core of classical electrodynamics. ' 515 
Let us now consider the position that the conventionality of establishing 
simultaneity in a frame of reference raises a question over the explanatory power of 
relativity theory. Certain errors in The Tenseless Theory ofTime need to be cleared up 
first. 
Craig uses David Malament's work516 early on to argue that simultaneity is not 
conventional so that a preferred frame is an option. 517 He then carefully avoids use of 
Malament's work on p.95f ('The third thing to be noticed about SR's time concept is 
that it is predicated upon a definition of simultaneity which we are under no obligation 
to adopt. ' 518). These are conceptually topsy-turvy, as I will show. 
Malament's proof is designed to show that the means of specifying simultaneity 
within a frame of reference is not dependent upon a conventional stipulation of e = Y2 in 
the equation t2 = t1 + e (t3 - tt) (where ft is the time of light emission from one location, 
t2 is the time of arrivaVreflection at a second location, t3 is the time of return to the 
original location, and e will be a variable such that 0 < e < 1 ), being instead the only 
value definable under certain acceptable conditions. That is, it is not conventional that 
light travels 'there' in half the time it takes to travel 'there and back'. This is not a 
means of achieving a preferred frame, it is a means of defining simultaneity within a 
frame that will then give the result that simultaneity is frame-relative based on the 
development of relativity theory that proceeds from it. In other words, if e is 
conventional then there is a question mark over what explanatory ontological 
conclusions can be drawn from the relativity of simultaneity, because the outcomes of 
515 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.333 
516 David Malament, 'Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultaneity', Nous II (1977), 
pp.293-300 
517 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.ll 
518 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.95 
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the theoretical structure might be dependent on a conventional choice rather than a 
. d fi . . 519 uruque e Imtwn. 
It is this latter point that Craig is beginning to address when he talks about 'a 
definition of simultaneity which we are under no obligation to accept' 520 . But it is just 
here where a supporter of Malarnent would insert his proof to persuade us that we are 
under an obligation to accept it after all. 
Craig rectifies most of this in his Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, 
providing a good understanding of the debate521 and saying instead that Malarnent's 
work is dependent upon accepting Minkowskian relativity theory522; thus, it cannot be 
used to defend pre-Minkowskian relativity theory from the charge of conventionality: 
In sum, while simultaneity relations established on the basis of Einstein's clock 
synchronization procedure are not conventional within the context of SR, nevertheless 
they are conventional in the sense that within the context of discovering the structure of 
space and time the assumption that clock synchronization via light signals discloses 
relations of simultaneity between relatively stationary observers is gratuitous. ' 523 
It is here that Balashov and Janssen provide a suitable riposte: 
The problem is much more benign than Craig makes it sound. First, Craig's objection 
loses much of its force when we recognise the space-time interpretation as a 
constructive theory complementing the theory-of-principle-type relativity interpretation 
rather than as one of its rivals. We could then simply concede that a rigorous argument 
proving the uniqueness of the standard definition of simultaneity had to wait for the 
development of the space-time interpretation. Or we could try to re-write Malament's 
argument ... in terms of the relativity interpretation. We do not even have to concede or 
do that much. We can justify the standard definition without appealing to Minkowski 
space-time. Making the appropriate assumptions about homogeneity and isotropy, we 
demand that B be chosen in such a way that the velocity of light moving from A to B 
comes out to be equal to the velocity of light moving from B to A. The standard 
objection to this line of reasoning is that the one-way velocity of light can not be 
defined in the absence of a definition of simultaneity. But for the purpose of defining 
simultaneity, a necessary condition for any acceptable definition of velocity suffices. 
Making the assumptions of homogeneity and isotropy, in turn, suffices to justify that 
condition: equal distances travelled at the same velocity should take equal times. 524 
In other words, if you measure how long it takes for light to travel a round trip of a 
known distance, then if your accepted assumptions are that space is the same in all 
519 For historical review-type access to this area of debate, seeR. Anderson, I. Vetharaniam, and G. E. 
Stedman, 'Conventionality of Synchronization, Gauge Dependence, and Test Theories of Relativity' 
Physics Reports 295 (1998), pp.93-180. 
52° Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.95f 
521 Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, pp.30-35 
522 Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, p.35, cp p.42 
523 Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, p.42 
524 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.334 
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directions and not 'lumpy', and that the velocity of light is constant, it seems fairly 
straightforward to work things out. 
Notably, DeWeese addresses the issue of conventionality by arguing from a 
thought experiment which appears to suggest light velocity dependent on light-source 
velocity. As we have already seen (through the 'binary star experiment') this is not a 
sound basis for argument concerning light velocity, and indeed DeWeese notes that it is 
reliant upon a notion of substantival space, or rether. 
The final charge of explanatory deficiency concerns the alleged 'brute fact' 
status of length contraction and clock retardation in Einstein's theory. This is already 
abrogated somewhat by Craig's statement (already noted) that 'if there are good 
empirical grounds for accepting the postulates of a theory, then we may be justified or 
even forced to regard certain phenomena deduced therefrom as natural and not in need 
of any explanation.' 525 We have seen grounds already for thinking that Einstein's 
postulates have an empirical character rather than a metaphysically arbitrary one, so the 
question is over whether the phenomena are natural and not in need of explanation. 
Craig's position is expressed as follows: 
Not that the relativity interpretation [of Einstein] does not account adequately for all the 
phenomena, for it does. But a theory can account for all the phenomena without having 
much explanatory power. 526 
By gtvmg causal explanation in terms of dynamic elements, Craig deems (neo-) 
Lorentzian relativity to be explanatorily superior. We have been over the ideas 
accompanying Minkowskian relativity understood as a constructive theory to 
complement Einstein's relativity; they will not bear repeating. Instead, I will introduce 
Craig's neo-Lorentzian relativity and discuss Balashov and Janssen's argument that it is 
explanatorily deficient compared to standard relativity, rather than the other way 
around. This will automatically answer what remains of the objection above. 
In The Tenseless Theory ofTime Craig characterises a theory as neo-Lorentzian 
as follows: 
A theory might be classified as neo-Lorentzian just in case it affirms (i) the round trip 
vacuum propagation of light is isotropic in a preferred (absolute) reference frame R0 
(with speed c=l) and independent ofthe velocity ofthe source, and (ii) lengths contract 
525 Craig, The Tenseless Theory ofTime, p.33 
526 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.32 
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and time rates dilate in the customary relativistic way only for systems in motion with 
527 
respect to Ro. 
A year or so later in Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, Craig instead talks about (I 
can find nothing that he defines as his 'neo-Lorentzian theory of choice') the 
development of Lorentz's theory as described by Zahar528 which is in tum partially 
based upon work by Adolf Griinbaum to show that the length contraction and clock 
retardation hypotheses could be added as amendments to the core of Newtonian 
mechanics and Lorentz's Maxwellian electrodynamics without rendering the theory 
unfalsifiable529. Zahar also argues in his article that these not only avoid rendering the 
theory unfalsifiable, but also avoid allegations of being ad hoc on certain views of ad 
hoc-ness. 
Balashov and Janssen argue that the sort of neo-Lorentzianism that Craig is 
willing to accept is not detailed enough to accomplish the work he demands of it: in 
particular, the two additions are not sufficient to render the resulting model Lorentz-
invariant, which is what must be achieved if it is to compete empirically with the 
standard version of relativity. 530 The accounts in both of Craig's monographs cited 
above fall prey to the critical conclusion: '[Craig's account] suggests that the 
contraction hypothesis and clock retardation hypothesis are all it takes to produce a neo-
Lorentzian interpretation of SR. It actually takes a lot more. ' 531 
Using the work of Janssen on Lorentz532 to provide the empirically viable 
theoretical foundation that Craig actually requires, Balashov and Janssen go on to 
present a number of stages of argument in order to demonstrate that the neo-Lorentzian 
approach is explanatorily deficient compared with standard relativity. 
[W]hy is a rod in motion shorter than a rod at rest rather than equally long? For those 
who share the Newtonian presupposition implicit in this ... the neo-Lorentzian 
interpretation provides a very satisfactory answer... Contrary to what one would 
expect in Newtonian theory, the forces holding the rod together are not Galilean 
invariant but Lorentz invariant. As a consequence, the equilibrium state of a rod in 
527 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.l 08-9 
528 See Zahar, 'Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?', especially p.IOO 
529 See Adolf Grunbaum, 'The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis', The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10:37 (1959), pp.48-50 and 'The Special Theory of 
Relativity as a Case Study of the Importance of the Philosophy of Science for the History of Science', in 
B. Baumrin (ed.), Philosophy of Science [The Delaware Seminar, vol. 2] (New York: Interscience 
Publishers 1962-1963 ), pp. 171-204 
53° For a detailed account of the difficulties and possible amendments, see Balashov and Janssen, 
'Presentism and Relativity', pp.336-8 
531 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p. 338 
532 Janssen, 'A Comparison Between Lorentz's Ether Theory and Special Relativity in the Light of the 
Experiments ofTrouton and Noble'; Michael Janssen, 'Reconsidering a Scientific Revolution: The Case 
of Einstein versus Lorentz', Physics in Perspective 4 (2002), pp.421-446 
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motion with respect to the privileged frame is shorter than the equilibrium state of a 
rod at rest. For co-moving observers, however, it will appear to be the other way 
around since their clocks will not read the true time of the privileged frame but the 
Lorentz-transformed time of the moving frame. 533 
Alternatively, we could believe that space and time are not Newtonian: why should they 
be? The fact that everything behaves this way, not just the rod, inclines us to think that 
space and time are Minkowskian instead, and 'length contraction is part of the normal 
spatio-temporal behaviour of systems in Minkowski space-time. ' 534 
Balashov and Janssen employ an example of Roxanne seeing Cyrano's nose in 
silhouette as he turns around: the nose-silhouette goes from small to large to small, as 
befits objects undergoing rotation in Euclidean space. How do we explain it? 
Now it is true that for Cyrano's nose to behave the way it does, it is necessary that the 
forces holding it together are invariant under spatial rotation. The question is what 
explains what. Does the Euclidean nature of space explain why the forces holding 
Cyrano's nose together are invariant under rotation, or the other way around?535 
Craig shows that he understands this point with respect to Einsteinian relativity 
when he uses Griinbaum's analogy of Aristotelian and Newtonian science. Aristotle 
demands an external cause for any motion whatever, because the natural behaviour of 
all things is to be at rest; Galileo and Newton do not require a cause for uniform motion, 
only for a change in velocity. 'Galileo and Newton could only shrug their shoulders or 
throw up their hands in despair, if an Aristotelian told them that he has a solution to the 
'problem' of the external cause of uniform motion, whereas they do not. ' 536 However, 
because Craig sees Einsteinian relativity as an equal competitor with Minkowski (and 
neo-Lorentzianism), he argues that Minkowski provides more explanatory power over 
against Einstein, because Einstein's 'theory of principle' only accounts for the 
phenomena and does not provide a constructive theory explanation. 537 As we have 
seen, this is faulty reasoning. Nevertheless, he opens the door for the final argument by 
Balashov and Janssen when he says 'the issue here is not whether theoreticians are 
acting consistently within the framework of their respective theories . . . rather the 
question is ... a question of which theory or interpretation is to be adopted. ' 538 
533 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.340 
534 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p. 340 
535 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.340 
536 Gtiinbaum, 'The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology', Philosophy of Science 56 
(1989), p.386 
537 Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time, p.32-3 
538 Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.32 
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Balashov and Janssen's argument ts a 'common cause' argument based on 
Perrin's argument for molecular reality: 
In the neo-Lorentzian interpretation it is, in the final analysis, an unexplained 
coincidence that the laws effectively governing different sorts of matter all share the 
property of Lorentz invariance, which originally appeared to be nothing but a 
peculiarity of the laws governing electromagnetic fields. In the space-time 
interpretation this coincidence is explained by tracing the Lorentz in variance of all these 
different laws to a common origin: the space-time structure posited in this 
interpretation. 539 
They note that by using the description of neo-Lorentzianism that he does (which we 
have seen above to be inadequate to the task) Craig misses the full force of this 
argument: in brief, this will be because the extra assumptions needed as amendments for 
a proper neo-Lorentzian theory are more extensive and because the real emphasis for 
weighing explanatory factors is on what it is that renders a theory Lorentz-invariant. 
To put the overall point in summary terms: Craig claims that neo-Lorentzian 
relativity is more explanatorily powerful because it posits distinct causes for length 
contraction and clock retardation rather than simply relying on the nature of spatia-
temporal geometry to describe the behaviour and appearance of objects. These causes 
render laws Lorentz invariant. Balashov and Janssen reply that, au contraire, on a neo-
Lorentzian view we cannot explain why everything is subject to these causes and so we 
cannot properly explain why all the laws are Lorentz invariant, whereas on the standard 
view Lorentz invariance is a result of the structure of space-time. Craig is, in short, 
pointing out specks of sawdust in Einstein and Minkowski's eyes, whilst failing to 
notice the plank in his own. 
Craig's final attack against the standard relativity interpretation is to say of 
Minkowski relativity that 'it needs to be seriously called into question whether any such 
metaphysical reality as spacetime actually exists. ' 540 This of course goes to the heart of 
issues of endurance/perdurance, substantivalisrn/relationalism and one's view of time as 
well. But we have no need to engage this at so deep a level: the optimist's scientific 
metaphysic does not have to argue for a fully-blown spacetime ontology in which we 
allocate the status of 'reality' to every detail of Minkowskian theory, because the 
question we are trying to answer is just 'is there a preferred frame of reference available 
to support presentist claims?' To which we can reply that there seems to be reason to 
think that the denial of a preferred frame of reference is a claim which can avail itself of 
539 Balashov and Janssen, 'Presentism and Relativity', p.342 
54
° Craig, The Tense less Theory of Time, p.II3 
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some support from an empirically successful scientific theory - support which its 
detractors have been unable to neutralise. Indeed, McCall and Lowe have argued, and 
concluded541 , that although relati vised presentness and temporal passage are reasonable, 
absolute presentness and becoming as suggested by Craig (and Tooley's version of 
absolute becoming also) is ruled out if the Twins Paradox542 describes an empirically 
viable state of affairs - which we have about as much reason to think it does as we have 
reason to expect muons to behave as they do (see the first section of this chapter). 
In conclusion, we have seen a number of reasons to think that Craig's attempt at 
Undermining has failed. His challenges to the empirical adequacy, explanatory power, 
theoretical formulation, and ontological implications of standard relativity have 
foundered; his candidate for an empirically viable, explanatorily advantageous and non-
ad hoc scientific theory to carry his alternate metaphysics has not faired well. Finally, 
his 'both/and' approach to the issue of pessimism and optimism, and his submission of 
divine temporality as a reason to pursue neo-Lorentzianism for optimistic purposes, 
whilst holding that an arbitration of the A- vs. B-theory of time is a prerequisite of 
discerning whether God is temporal or atemporal, place serious methodological 
question marks over his project. I suggest that the only option left to Craig is to adopt a 
strategy of Counterargument and find independent philosophical arguments which 
outweigh the apparent incompatibility of a privileged present with relativity theory, 
relying for empirical adequacy on the ad hoc addition of the concept of metaphysical 
time. The question of what the impact of relativity theory on presentism means for the 
structure of constraints with which this thesis is concerned, I leave until the completion 
of the discussion of Counterargument in the next chapter. 
541 Storrs McCall and E. J. Lowe '3D/4D Equivalence, the Twins Paradox, and Absolute Time', p.l23 
542 Briefly, that if two space-travel capable twins follow two separate space-time paths, in virtue of one 
staying on Earth and the other making a round-trip at very high speed to some other location, then one 
will be older than the other by the end of it. 
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Chapter VI - The Status o(the Present: Epistemology. Experience. and Reality 
Introduction 
In the prevwus chapter I argued that Craig failed to defend presentism 
successfully against the scientific metaphysics arrayed against it. This defence was, I 
diagnosed, conducted through Hawley's method of Undermining: Craig attempted to 
provide an empirically equivalent and explanatorily effective neo-Lorentzian theory of 
relativity which could support the philosophical weight of absolute temporal becoming 
and the idea that only the present moment exists. 
However, this is not the end of the story. The strategy of Counterargument 
allows an alternate metaphysician to accept that a scientific metaphysic is supported by 
scientific theory, but to assert overwhelming independent philosophical argument as 
grounds for preferring the alternate metaphysic provided it is very basically empirically 
adequate. This condition is plausibly, if barely, attained by presentism through the 
assertion that there is a preferred frame of reference which is entirely undetectable, 
corresponding to 'metaphysical time', although this requires a charitable move by the 
B-theorist not to take relativity theory as confirming that Minkowski spacetime is 
straightforwardly real, but simply as confirming that there is no reason to postulate a 
preferred frame. In chapter four we saw some arguments concerning language and 
ontology, as well as an analysis of Craig's model of presentism, but concluded that they 
were unable to provide the leverage needed by the presentist for Counterargument. 
Nevertheless, there is a line of argument which Craig engages that could provide just 
the sort of independent support that he would need for Counterargument, should he 
(wisely, according to my reasoning) choose to abandon Undermining. It is to this line 
of argument that I now turn. 
The theme of this section is epistemological. Although arguments in this area 
extend across concepts of tense and temporal becoming in general, addressing such a 
wide-ranging debate in the requisite detail will not be possible. However, discussion 
thus far has concentrated on the question of the present as ontologically privileged; most 
recently the Undermining strategy was aimed at establishing grounds for an absolute 
present through revision of the standard interpretation of relativity. Consequently, to 
keep a precise match for the purposes of assessing Counterargument, it is the epistemic 
status of the present on which I will concentrate here. To begin with I shall present, in 
brief, Craig's arguments for the epistemic privilege granted to the present by our 
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expenences. I shall discuss his treatment of purported 'defeaters' of such episternic 
privilege and his conclusion concerning the importance of belief in the present. This 
comes at three levels of strength: at the first level, that belief in the present is properly 
basic; at the second level, that such a belief can defeat any epistemic challenge brought 
against it; at the third level, that belief in the present enjoys such an intrinsic and 
unassailable position in our noetic structure that its denial as urged by the B-theorist 
constitutes an act of irrationality. 
I shall then respond to this complex of arguments by Craig. I aim to accomplish 
three separate things: first, to distinguish between the episternic bases of belief in 
presentness and of belief in presentism with a view to showing that there are serious 
epistemic obstacles for any move to the latter from the former; second to uncouple 
belief in the presentness of things/events/experiences from the ascription of presentness 
as an ontological category; finally, to show that physical theory and empirical 
phenomena provide good reasons not to make the step from belief in the presentness of 
things/events/experiences to belief in a real and absolute present, and that Craig's 
response to arguments from physical theory and empirical phenomena (invoking the 
'specious' or 'elastic' present) provide even more reasons not to make the step from any 
of this to belief in a presentist metaphysics. I shall also attempt to show that the B-
theorist is not irrational in pursuing the development of a B-theory. 
Since Craig is unhappy with any A-theory other than his brand of presentism, I 
shall argue that he is not in a position to complete the strategy of Counterargument and 
provide overwhelming reasons to overrule the denial of a privileged frame of reference 
and absolute present constituting the scientific metaphysics discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
Presentist Argument from the Experience of the Present 
Craig's epistemological resource of choice is Alvin Plantinga's critique of 
classical foundationalist epistemology and development of the concept of 'properly 
basic beliefs' (often under the aegis of the term 'reformed epistemology'). The key 
difference between Plantinga's epistemology and classical foundationalism is that 
'typically classical foundationalists have maintained that p is properly basic for a person 
S if and only if p is either self-evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses 
for S. ' 543 Plantinga wants a less restrictive view of proper basicality. 
543 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.l34 
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Craig begins by sketching the basics of Plantinga's epistemology, which he 
wants to employ for his arguments concerning tense. A noetic structure is 'the set of 
propositions believed by a person together with certain epistemic relations holding 
between those propositions and that person. ' 544 Rationality can be attributed to one's 
noetic structure if it is free of epistemic defects or results from proper fulfilment of 
one's epistemic duties. The basic machinery of the epistemology is summarised as 
follows: 
In a rational noetic structure, certain beliefs will be foundational, not being accepted on 
the basis of other beliefs. In such a structure, the basis relation is both irreflexive and 
asymmetric. No proposition is believed on the basis of itself; propositions which are 
not believed on the basis of other propositions are simply taken as evidently true. 
Moreover, if a belief that p is based upon the beliefs that q, r, s, then none of the latter is 
believed on the basis of the belief that p. A rational noetic structure can thus be 
pictured as a hierarchy of levels of beliefs, such that beliefs in one level are immediately 
based on beliefs in the next lowest level, where p is believed immediately upon the 
basis of q if p is based on q in that noetic structure and there is no belief r such that r is 
based on q and p is based on r. In a rational noetic structure, if p is based on q, then the 
level of p is higher than the level of q, where the level of a belief in a noetic structure is 
its highest level in that structure. This guarantees that the basis relation is irreflexive 
and asymmetric. 545 
He reflects upon the difficulties of characterising the 'basing relation' which connects 
each level in the hierarchy, following Plantinga in referring to the concept of 'support' 
which a lower level provides to an upper level as 'provision of evidence for' 546 : 'In a 
rational noetic structure, the degree of support lent by the foundational beliefs to a 
particular non-basic belief will determine the strength of that belief. ' 547 Finally, he 
turns to the distinction between degree of belief and depth of ingression of a belief in 
giving an account of the support given by a lower-level belief for a higher-level 
belief548 . In short: 
Degree of belief has to do with the firmness with which one holds a belief A person 
holds some of his beliefs very strongly, others quite tentatively. Depth of ingression has 
to do with the impact wrought on one's noetic structure were one to abandon the belief 
. . 549 
m question. 
544 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.\33, citing Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God' in Alvin 
Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff(eds.), Faith and Philosophy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983), p.48 
545 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.\33-4 
546 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.\34 
547 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.\34 
548 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.\34 
549 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.\34 
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Although a person's basic beliefs may well be strongly held and deeply 
ingrained, this is not necessarily the case, because the beliefs admitted as properly basic 
are not restricted to those in accordance with the criteria of classical foundationalism. 
Nevertheless, they can still be properly basic. Craig quotes Plantinga's examples of 
believing that I see a tree and believing that I had breakfast this morning. In both cases, 
the belief is properly basic because I do not believe either on the basis that I seem to see 
a tree and seem to remember having breakfast respectively: although I may tum my 
attention to these experiential elements at will - and may do so if challenged in my 
belief- it is nevertheless the case that what I take as basic is that there is a tree there and 
I did have breakfast this moming550. 
When it comes to fleshing out Plantinga's concept of properly basic belief, Craig 
allows context and the idea of the rationality of a noetic structure to play their parts 
fully: 
... in order to be properly basic, beliefs must be "grounded" in certain circumstances, 
which, while not serving as evidence from which the beliefs in question are inferred, do 
furnish the appropriate contexts for the proper acceptance of the beliefs in a basic way. 
If it appears to me that I am sitting in my office reading a book, then it would be 
improper for me to form the belief that I see a tree. In such circumstances, I should 
form the belief that/ am sitting in my office reading a book. When beliefs are accepted 
in a basic way under the appropriate circumstances, then they are properly basic, and the 
person holding them is justified in so doing in the sense that he is within his episternic 
rights and exhibits no noetic defect in so believing. 551 
Craig also follows Plantinga in asserting that properly basic belief is able to be 
upheld in the absence of criteria of proper basicality. Plantinga himself has suggested 
that such criteria will require an inductive approach using examples of beliefs and 
conditions. For example: 
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from below rather than 
above; they should not be presented as ober dicta but argued to and tested by a relevant 
set of examples. But there is no reason to assume in advance that everyone will agree 
on the examples.552 
Nevertheless, Craig views it as unreasonable 'to abandon beliefs normally taken to be 
properly basic until we succeed in corning up with an adequate criterion. ' 553 
55
° Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.i35 citing Plantinga, "Reason and Belief', p.49 
551 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l36 
552 Alvin Plantinga, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology', in Michael Peterson et al, Philosophy 
of Religion: Selected Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.320 
553 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.137 
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Vitally, Craig then moves on to consider defeasibility, and the way in which 
properly basic beliefs may be separated from being 'knowledge' or 'true'. 'The relevant 
point here is that properly basic beliefs may be robbed of the justification which they 
enjoy in virtue of the circumstances in which they were formed. ' 554 In order to retain a 
belief as properly basic in the face of such an effective defeating challenge (which may 
call upon further circumstantial or exceptional evidence, or upon arguments such as, for 
example, proof of incoherence), Craig classifies three possible types of what he calls 
'defeater -defeaters'. These are rebutting-defeaters, undercutting-defeaters and 
overwhelming-defeaters. The first 'show that the alleged defeater's conclusion is false', 
the second 'show merely that the alleged defeater's conclusion has not been shown to be 
true' 555 , whilst the third emphasises and argues that the original belief has such strong 
justification compared to the challenge that it intrinsically denies the conclusion of the 
challenge without either demonstrating its falsity or its failure to provide an argument to 
the truth. Since this third is rather perplexing, an example may be in order. Craig cites 
Plantinga' s example of someone accused of a theft where all the evidence is against 
them, but where they themselves 'clearly and correctly' remember that they were not 
present at the crime and could not have committed it. Thus, the memory belief 
overwhelms the defeaters of evidence brought against it, and the person is not obliged to 
agree that they committed the crime in order to retain a rational noetic structure. 
Craig's argument in sketch, then, is 'that belief in the objectivity of tense and the 
reality of temporal becoming is a properly basic belief 556, and further that 'belief in the 
reality of tense and temporal becoming enjoys such powerful positive epistemic status 
for us that not only can we be said to know that tense and temporal becoming are real, 
but also that this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the 
objections brought against it. ' 557 If this is not possible, Craig's 'back-up' strategy is to 
show only that such belief in the objectivity of tense is properly basic and can provide 
the means to refute any defeaters with which supporters of the B-theory challenge it. In 
terms of noetic structure, he claims that 'belief in the past, present and future and in 
temporal becoming is properly basic, ... possesses an enormously high degree of belief, 
making its complete abandonment . . . virtually impossible' 558 and has a depth of 
ingression such that no-one could accommodate their noetic structure to its rejection. 
554 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p. 137 
555 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p. 137 
556 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p. 138 
557 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l38 
558 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l39 
177 
As previously noted, we here concentrate on Craig's discussion of the 
experience of the present. He writes of events that ' [ w ]e experience them as irreducibly 
present. Moreover, it is clear that we do not infer the presentness of events from our 
experience of them; we just are appeared to presently. ' 559 He argues that our default use 
of the present tense, even in the absence of indexicals, clearly implies a vantage point 
rather than a mere self-conscious inference. He takes this sort of argument to dispose 
neatly of points such as Gtiinbaum's translational schema that e at t occurs now if a 
mind-possessor M experiences e such that at t M is conceptually aware that Ms 
experience of e is simultaneous with M s experience of experiencing. 
In other words, Craig takes the 'vantage-point' nature of the presence of 
experience to defeat any position which takes an 'examination of consciousness' view 
of the presence of experience in order to accommodate the B-theory. Smith, in a similar 
example, refers to the 'unreflexive awareness of events as past, present, or future' as 
opposed to 'my reflexively grasping my own perceptual experience of the event. ' 560 
Craig places the fault in Gtiinbaum's position with the conflation of presentness and 
now-ness. Such an analysis of now-ness as mind-dependent works as a restricted 
analysis of a reflexive concept, Craig argues, but does not affect presentness, which is 
not analysed reflexively but simply perceived in reality. Thus, as an analysis of now-
ness it may work, but as an analysis of presentness it misses the mark. 
Craig concludes his opening statement by arguing that his vantage-point 
assessment of the experience of presentness means that 'e happens now' is really no 
different from simply 'e happens'. The latter is a 'basic belief grounded in part in the 
circumstances that we are appeared to injust that way.' 561 (i.e. that we are experiencing 
an event grounds our belief that it occurs). In that sense, appending our temporal 
vantage-point explicitly only serves to emphasise what is already contained within the 
simple statement. Therefore, Craig argues, if 'e happens' can be considered properly 
basic - and this is far less controversial than many examples of properly basic belief-
then the apparently more controversial 'e happens now' can also be considered properly 
basic, since it is materially no different from the simpler statement. 
I shall now tum to the various defeaters which Craig considers to be brought 
against this position. He begins with Mellor's (Real Time) arguments. This can be 
roughly divided into two points: first, that we do not observe the tense of events and that 
559 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l39 
560 Quentin Smith, 'The Phenomenology of A-Time', Dialogos 52 (1988), p.l47-148, cited Craig, The 
Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l39 n26 
561 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l40 
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our phenomenology of temporal consciousness is mistaken. Second, that our purported 
judgement of our experiences as being present is mistaken. 
Craig spends some time in the preliminary deconstruction of Mellor's argument. He 
identifies one interpretation - the claim that we do not observe tenses as sensible 
properties- as a straw man, saying that 'if he did mean to prove only that presentness is 
not a sensible property of events/things in the external world which we observe directly 
and indefeasibly, then he has proven very little, indeed. ' 562 He bases his discarding of 
this interpretation on the fact that Mellor's examples 'of our purported observations of 
presentness are not examples of our observing a sensible property' 563 - for example, 
they involve discussion of memories. 564 Thus, Craig takes Mellor as wanting 'to prove 
that we do not at all observe the presentness of events/things in the external world' 
which he transforms into 'we have no basic belief at all in the presentness of 
events/things in the external world. ' 565 Now, it is not self-evident that demonstrating 
that we do not observe external events/things as present does not equate to 
demonstrating that we have no properly basic belief in their presentness. However, we 
will bear with Craig for a while. 
He summarises Mellor's argument as the claim that '[w]e have confused our 
observing the events to be present with the events themselves being present. ' 566 Thus, 
he quotes Mellor as saying 'I observe a number of events, and I observe the temporal 
order in which they occur ... I do not observe their tense. ' 567 Mellor invokes examples of 
physical theory correcting basic beliefs, such as for astronomical observation: there is 
nothing about the view through a telescope that tells the viewer how long ago the 
viewed event occurred. 
Craig alleges major difficulties with Mellor's argument, claiming that it does no 
work against the position that he, Craig, has framed and stating that 'Mellor's analysis 
of the phenomenology of temporal consciousness is plainly unrealistic and 
contrived. ' 568 He begins by re-emphasising the point that we typically have no reflexive 
belief (that I am experiencing observations of an event), but simply a belief (that the 
event is happening). I must admit that I do not see how this answers Mellor's point that 
we have confused 'experiencing E to be present' with 'E being present'; if anything, it 
562 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.142 
563 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l40 
564 Me1Ior, Real Time, p.25 
565 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.142 
566 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.142 
567 Me11or, Real Time, p.26, cited Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.143 
568 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.143 
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seems like a confirmation of it. Presumably Mellor would agree that we have no 
reflexive belief but simply a belief, and would go on to argue that in order to correct 
such a belief we need to add a reflexive belief; i.e. believing (i) 'E is present' and then 
(ii) 'I am experiencing E to be present' allows us to deny (i) on the grounds of new 
evidence without thereby calling into question our noetic structure. By turning our 
attention to our experience we can differentiate between our experience of an event and 
the event itself. 
We might make an analogy with temperature: I walk barefoot across the cold 
tiles of a bathroom and get into the shower; the water feels very hot against my feet, but 
then I realise I have set the temperature too low when it feels cool against my chest. I 
require the belief 'I experience the water to be hot on my feet' in order to make sense of 
denying the belief 'the water is hot' when I subsequently attain the belief 'the water is 
cool'. Further reflection may lead me to the belief 'I experience water on my feet to be 
hotter than it is when my feet are very cold.' Admittedly none of this disproves that we 
believe events to be present, it simply diagnoses the first part of the reason that we are 
wrong; the second part is correction of the belief by physical theory. 
Craig responds to the physical correction analogy by arguing that 'all this proves 
is that our basic belief that certain events are presently occurring is defeasible and 
sometimes defeated.... But just as Mellor is not. .. prepared to abandon the general 
veracity and proper basicality of the deliverances of our senses, neither should he 
abandon the general veracity or proper basicality of our observations of things and 
events. ' 569 He goes on: 'the fact that under extraordinary circumstances our basic belief 
in the presentness of some event/thing should tum out to be false is no proof at all either 
that we have no basic beliefs concerning the presentness of events/things in the external 
world or that such beliefs are not properly basic. ' 570 
We might summarise this argument as somewhat of a dead heat; Mellor's point 
is that because, apparently, experience cannot fail to be 'present' we have a prima facie 
belief that events are present, but this does not mean we experience presentness in 
events, just that we experience events presently. Craig's response is that this is no 
reason to give up a properly basic belief in the presentness of events; if we experience 
things presently then most of the time we can assume it matches up to experiencing 
present things. Perhaps the most we can say is that Craig's comments are unfair insofar 
as they take Mellor to be disproving that we have beliefs in the presentness of things 
569 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l43 
57° Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l43 
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rather than simply giving an account of why presentness is not after all something we 
experience of an event. 
Given the importance of the concept of the presence of experience in the above 
discussion, it would be wise to move on, with Craig, to consider Mellor's arguments 
against the basic belief in the presentness of experience being veridical. The starting 
point is the contention that we observe our experiences to be present (not as external 
events, but through introspection), but in fact they are not. 'Judging my experience to 
be present is much like judging it to be painless' insofar as we cannot be wrong, but 
therein lies the problem; for, Mellor argues, this renders belief in the presentness of our 
experiences tautologous, and therefore trivial. 
More carefully, then: although the proposition 
(1) 'The experience which I am now having possesses the property of being present' 
is not tautologous on a tensed theory, using the B-theory of language from Real Time511 
it can be rendered into a different proposition, one which is true but trivial: 'The 
experiences which S has at the time of the tokening of (1) possess the property of 
existing at the time of the tokening of (1 ). ' 572 This is a rendering of the tenseless truth-
conditions of (1), and it shows that, since it would not be possible to have experiences 
which were non-extant, we gain no information by affirming their existence. 
Consequently, we cannot conclude anything about the ontology of presentness by citing 
a proposition affirming the seeming presence of experience, because it is trivially a 
feature of our experience that it seems present. 
There are five criticisms which Craig offers of the argument. The first is that 
Mellor creates his tautology by stipulating present experiences as present. However, he 
could simply have used rigid designators or definite descriptions to stipulate the 
experience; how, asks Craig, is 'My experience of seeing the supernova is present' (a 
proposition sharing the form of (1 )) reducible to a tautology in this way? 
In the second place, Craig argues that even the original proposition ts not 
tautologous if considered de re rather than de dicta: 'If "the experiences which I am 
571 Which is not the most recently developed theory from Real Time II which we considered in chapter 
four. Rather it says that the truth conditions for a sentence can be expressed tenselessly and are all that is 
required- there are no tensed facts, only tensed beliefs with tenseless truth conditions. If I believe 'I 
should meet my supervisor in an hour' all that is required is that it is true if I ought to meet my supervisor 
one hour later than when I token the belief, and false otherwise. 
572 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l45 
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now having" picks out certain experiences de re, then the ascription of presentness to 
those experiences out of all one's experiences across time is not trivial. ' 573 
In the third place, Craig challenges the conclusion of the argument with the 
tautology granted. He uses an analogy to argue that it fails to show the presentness of 
experience to be trivial. Citing someone who denies that anyone has any experiences 
whatsoever, Craig argues that 
We might point out to him that we have a basic belief that we have experiences, and 
perhaps he will admit that this belief is incorrigible. What value, then, would his reply 
have that 
3. My experiences are my experiences. 
is tautologous and therefore the belief that one has experiences is trivial?574 
Craig argues that, just as the having of experiences is not denied by (3), so 
neither is the presentness of experiences denied or otherwise explained away by crafting 
a tautology from (1 ). 
In the fourth place, 'the stating of tenseless truth conditions for a belief in the 
presentness of one's experiences does not constitute even a prima facie defeater of that 
belief. ' 575 Craig argues that the content of one's belief is not the content of the truth 
conditions - even allowing that the truth-conditional account is correct - but rather one 
simply 'believes that one's experience has the present tense,' making the statement of 
the truth-conditions for the belief 'just irrelevant to the proper basicality of that 
belief. ' 576 Craig pushes this further, arguing that unless (l) and (2) meant the same (i.e. 
unless we support the old 'translational' B-theory of language577), that (2) is trivial does 
not show that (l) is. 578 
Craig also argues that Mellor recognises that tenseless truth conditions alone 
cannot demonstrate the falsity of a tensed theory, because he allows that the B-theorist 
can give an account of what is happening in the presentness of experience without that 
constituting a demonstration of the falsity of A-theories - such a demonstration is only 
573 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l45 
574 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l45 
575 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.l46 
576 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.l46 
577 For discussion and bibliographical resources, see Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, pp.23-65 
578 Presumably Craig would admit that it is more plausibly irrelevant (to the proper basicality of belief in 
the presentness of experience) in the absence of good arguments for the mind-dependence of tense. If our 
purpose is to explore ontology, it is reasonable that a distinction be made between the ontologically 
tenseless location of a belief and the content and context of that belief. In other words, truth conditions 
may provide part of an account for why we want properly basic belief in presentness and why we are 
wrong. 
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supplied by McTaggart's Paradox. Craig reads this as allowing that 'the belief in the 
presentness of our experience is not defeated merely by the stating of its tenseless truth 
conditions but remains properly basic until some further defeater is proposed. ' 579 
Finally, Craig points out that the B-theory of language expressed in Real Time 
has been (in his opinion) thoroughly debunked580, such that there is no viable alternative 
to the A-theory view of our beliefs in the presentness of experiences. He concludes that 
Mellor has entirely failed to defeat a properly basic belief in the present resulting from 
either external or internal events. 
It is notable that Craig does not consider Mellor's discussion of the presentness 
of experience in Real Time 11581 - a discussion which takes into account, among other 
things, the new development of the B-theory of language which Mellor defends in that 
work. I shall provide some exploration of it below before assessing how it fares against 
Craig's critical arguments, noted above. 
Mellor is clear about the grounds of his discussion: 'When I see a past event, 
like a solar flare, it is the perceptible fact that my seeing it is present which tells me that 
the flare must be as far into the past as it is earlier than my seeing it... So the presence 
of experience is the crux. ' 582 Mellor then constructs an argument as to why it is 
necessarily true but not trivial that the experiences one now has are present, without 
implying any sort of ontological effects. 
Comparing the experience of presentness with the experience of painlessness, 
Mellor makes an analogous argument about painless experiences first: 'since this now-
belief [that my experiences are now painless] is about my present experiences, it will be 
true at any timet if and only if all my experiences at tare painless. ' 583 Thus, we do not 
have to perceive that an experience is painless, or present, but if we reflect on 
experiences and perceive that they are painless, or present, we are bound to be right. 
However, 'there is one big, and suspicious, difference between our perceptions of 
presence and of painlessness. Whereas only some experience is painless, all of it is 
present. ' 584 We might say to this 'so far so Craig', but Mellor asks us to consider the 
now-belief 'the experiences I am having are now present'. 
579 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l46 
580 In Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, pp.66-96 
581 Mellor, Real Time II, pp.39-46 
582 Mellor, Real Time II, p.41 
583 Mellor, Real Time II, p.43 
584 Mellor, Real Time II, p.44 
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This now-belief does not ascribe presentness to all my experiences, past, present and 
future, only to the ones I am having now, i.e. at the B-time at which I have this belief. 
But their being so located will automatically make this now-belief about them true. So 
if these B-facts are what make this now-belief true, then it must be true, since its B-
truthmakers stop it being anything else. 585 
But experiences are experiences at any time. It is the now-belief that is doing the work 
of presentness, not the experience. Experiences, then, are just like other events, being 
neither past nor present nor future, and their being located at times constitute the B-facts 
which make true tensed (i.e. now-)beliefs about them at those times. One might argue 
that a 'discovery' that whenever I judge my experiences to be present, they are, is no 
more a discovery of the real inherence of presentness in experiences than a 'discovery' 
that whenever I judge murder to be wrong, it is, constitutes a discovery of the real 
inherence of wrongness in murders. There are events, and some of them will conform 
to the definition of murder, and it may be that when I judge such to be wrong I cannot 
fail to be correct, and that the events which constitute the murder are the truthmakers for 
the claim that it is wrong, but none of this should persuade us that the events which 
constitute the murder include a fact of wrongness. 586 
Does Mellor's Real Time II account fare any better against Craig's position than 
his original account? On the one hand it seems more successful at breaking the link 
between a belief in presentness and the ontological ascription of presentness -
particularly in concert with the idea that physical theory can correct the ascription of 
presentness to events in some cases. It defeats Craig's first counter-argument because it 
succeeds in reducing 'My experience of seeing the supernova is present' to a tautology 
by giving it the form 'experience E at t is had at t'. It defeats the second counter-
argument because it admits that picking out 'certain experiences de re out of all one's 
experiences across time is not trivial ' 587 but shows that picking them out at the time they 
occur by ascription of presentness amounts to saying that they occur when they occur, 
which is tautologous and only saved from triviality by implicitly providing the B-
information that certain experiences occur at a specific time (the implication is 
accomplished by the picking out de re - these experiences imply that location). The 
fourth and fifth counterarguments are not appropriate to the account in Real Time II, 
585 Mellor, Real Time II, p.44 
586 1bis is clearly a very difficult example, since how persuasive one finds it will rely in part upon one's 
sympathy with certain meta-ethical arguments. However, it is the best analogy I can come up with to 
illustrate Mellor's argument without invoking properties or concepts which are directly questionable in 
the context of presentism. 
587 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.l45 
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although we might note that they amount to a request for a defence of Mellor's B-theory 
of language, which we have seen in chapter four to be tricky. 
On the other hand, there is the third counterargument which essentially poses the 
question of whether Mellor's account really eliminates the epistemic force of 'properly 
basic belief' in the presentness of events and our experiences. It seems that this is a 
similar situation to that in chapter four regarding Mellor and Craig's demands within the 
language debate; perhaps, we are tempted to say, it is an acceptable account if we accept 
B-theory, just as Craig's account is entirely reasonable if we accept presentist premises. 
In short, Mellor's account says that a properly basic belief in the presentness of 
experience amounts to a belief that we have experiences when we have them; it 
unsettles the presentist, but does not overthrow them. 
Craig addresses other proposed defeaters of the proper basicality of belief in the 
present, taking Clifford Williams as an instance of a 'spatial tense' type argument 
against such belief. The argument proceeds as follows: we experience 'here' in a 
similar way to that in which we experience 'the present'; the former has no objective 
status in reality, and therefore neither can the latter have. So our belief in the objectivity 
of 'now' is as misplaced as a belief in the objectivity of 'here'. 
Craig puts forward several points in response. First, he argues that Williams 
con:flates the experience of 'here and now' with the experience of 'here and the present'. 
The actual content of this point must be constructed from one of Craig's footnotes588. 
Craig is arguing that now-ness, as a mind-dependent, ego-centric phenomenon, is 
distinct from presentness, since this latter requires no introspective element whereas 
being aware of now-ness is a reflexive exercise. Consequently, it must be the case that 
Craig would match 'here' to 'now', and argue that there is no correlate of 'presently' in 
spatial terms. 
His second point is that 'here' may be 'analysed in A-theoretical terms as the 
spatial location of l-now'589, and he adduces to this the various occasions on which 
Williams employs present-tensed verbs in his charcterisation of 'here' as 
demonstrations ofthe integral tense elements experienced in 'hereness'. This, naturally, 
goes some way to explaining why there is no correlate of 'presently' in spatial terms, 
since presumably Craig would say that any experiences had by the '1-now' would occur 
at the spatial location of the '1-now', and since no spatial location is ontologically 
588 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l39 n26 
589 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l47 
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favoured there can be no spatial equivalent of the present. Craig argues that if his work 
on the analogy of spatial indexicals590 is correct, then Williams' defeater is undercut. 
However, it seems to me that he should not even require a defence of the above 
analysis in order to get around Williams' argument. Craig's point is that we have a 
properly basic belief in the presentness of events and experiences; if Williams criticism 
holds, then we have a properly basic belief in the here-ness of events and experiences. 
Regardless of either how straightforward these are to defeat or how easy it is to break 
the link between them and the positing of 'absolute hereness', there will still be the 
problem of defeating the properly basic belief in presentness or breaking the link 
between it and the positing of an absolute present. In short, saying 'I bet you don't have 
a belief that events are local' is not the best way of challenging a belief that events are 
present. 
Craig concludes that, given that he has voided all putative defeaters of the 
basicality of 'belief in the presentness ofthings or events' 591, it can be taken that such a 
belief is properly basic. There are two final points that he makes to strengthen his 
position. First, he argues that 
it is hard to imagine how any beliefs could be more powerfully warranted for us than, 
say, our belief in the presentness of experience ... What argument for the unreality of 
tense or temporal becomin~ could possibly be based on premisses more evident than our 
basic belief in that reality? 92 
This suggests to us, he claims, that this properly basic belief is an intrinsic defeater of 
any defeaters brought against it. Second, 'unlike many properly basic beliefs, such as 
perceptual or memory beliefs or beliefs grounded in testimony, the belief in the reality 
of tense and temporal becoming is universal. ' 593 Consequently these beliefs are 
properly basic for everyone, not just for A-theorists who have other arguments for their 
position, thereby rendering those who reject it (i.e. B-theorists) irrational as a result of 
having a flawed noetic structure. 
Critique of the Argument from the Experience of the Present 
My strategy in this critical section of the chapter is as follows: first, to observe 
that a properly basic belief in the presentness of events/things and our experiences 
59° Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, pp.97-130 
591 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l48 
592 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.165 
593 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.165 
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thereof does not equate to a belief in the structure of time as the presentist construes it; 
this issue will be key throughout the section. Following directly on from this, I will 
propose a way in which we may have beliefs, which are not corrections by physical 
theory but spontaneous developments of properly basic beliefs that nevertheless 
contradict presentism. The consequence is that we can have properly basic temporal 
beliefs which happily sit side by side with the beliefs Craig supports but which debar 
the development of a presentist metaphysic as opposed to supporting it. This places 
some preliminary distance between Craig's epistemic basis and his support of 
presentism. 
In the second place, I will argue that the fact that Craig allows for the limited 
correction of our beliefs by physical theory is the thin end of a rather sizeable wedge, 
leading to serious problems for his position. The consequence is that his episternic 
grounds are more thoroughly challenged than in the first part of this chapter, and even 
more distance is placed between his epistemological arguments and his presentist 
episternic commitments. 
Finally, I will argue that his throwaway use of the specious present to 
accommodate a properly basic belief in the presentness of events/things/experiences to 
empirical data hides a m~or difficulty for his position. In consequence, regardless of 
any difficulties laid at the door of A-theories in general, the capacity to argue for 
presentism as an overwhelmingly preferable metaphysical option is seriously curtailed. 
Craig arranges his discussion of the epistemology of time in such a way that to 
debate with him on his own terms is to need to provide either defences of the views he 
demolishes, or further defeaters of 'the basicality of beliefs in the presentness of 
things/events/experiences'. However, although this basicality is a necessary episternic 
condition of affirming Craig's presentism (i.e. that if presentism is to be true then there 
is something that is present), it is not a sufficient condition, since presentism also denies 
existence to anything which is not present. Consequently, we require not simply a 
properly basic belief in presentness, but also a belief in the non-existence of the past and 
the future. This already introduces some difficulties for the presentist wishing to pursue 
epistemic arguments; it is (as we have seen) comparatively easy to introduce belief in 
the presentness of things, events and experiences as plausibly properly basic, but belief 
in the non-existence ofthe past and future is more problematic. In particular, we have a 
tendency to think of the past as in some way more real than the future (this being one of 
the draws of views such as Tooley's), but at the end ofmy analysis of Craig's version of 
presentism at the end of chapter four, I noted that there is a question mark over whether 
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his theory can account for this differential. The question of epistemic support for 
presentism, as opposed to the present, should be foremost in our minds. 
As we have seen, Craig allows that in certain cases our physical theories can act 
as a corrective to our properly basic beliefs; for instance, he says 'just as to the unaided 
eye a star which has in fact ceased to exist appears to be present, so the proverbial stick 
in the water appears to be bent. In both these cases, physical theory serves to defeat and 
correct erroneous basic beliefs. ' 594 However, here I shall start by arguing for a more 
primitive correction: his example of physical theory correction is the stick that appears 
bent in water in fact being straight, but I would argue that we need no physical theory to 
make this correction, although if we have access to the physical theory the correction 
can certainly be made from it. Rather, I want to argue that we often develop (not defeat 
and correct) our properly basic beliefs spontaneously a posteriori (in this case from 
suitable experience of sticks and water). 
Does this play into Craig's hands? On the contrary, smce one of these 
spontaneous development contexts is that of judging temporal relations on the basis of 
sound and light perception: if I see a jogger far off in the park on a quiet day, I observe 
that the sound of training shoes impacting gravel reaches me at a time other than when I 
see the jogger's feet impact the ground. From suitable experiences, I realise that the 
sound I hear does not keep time with what I see; it is past with respect to what I see. 
This realisation does not have to be a reflexive process. More relevantly, but less 
obviously unless I work in a scientific context, I learn that if things are far enough away 
then what I see when I look at them is not what is happening there now, but what was 
happening some time previous (dependent upon how far away they are). Consequently, 
my properly basic beliefs are altered to the form that, when I believe things are far 
away, I also believe that what I am experiencing of them is their past. Do they not 
thereby cease to be properly basic beliefs because they are based on other beliefs? I 
argue not: the development of such properly basic beliefs is spontaneous and non-
reflexive; I may not even be aware of it. I will now attempt to strengthen and develop 
this position with respect to Craig. 
At this point, someone whose sympathies are with Craig's position has three 
options, which I address in tum. First, one could accept that alteration of properly basic 
beliefs occurs in the way posited: we spontaneously develop properly basic beliefs 
about experiences at a distance being experiences of the past. Remember that here we 
are talking about the sort of properly basic beliefs that we develop, and not 'the truth'; 
594 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l43 
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these properly basic beliefs can still be defeated by physical theory, and indeed will be, 
since as Craig points out we do not instantaneously experience what is happening at 
astronomical distances, we instantaneously experience the light from them. 
Nevertheless, without knowing the details of physics we can have the belief that we are 
not experiencing present events, just as without ever experiencing events at a distance 
we would retain our belief that all events experienced are present. 
How does this help my critique of Craig's epistemology? Because by accepting 
spontaneous development of properly basic beliefs in this way one would be accepting 
that we can quite happily develop properly basic beliefs that directly oppose presentism 
by having among their contents or derivations the belief that the past exists because it 
can be perceived (since one can easily mistakenly believe that one is looking/listening 
literally rather than figuratively into the past). Consequently Craig is reduced to the 
position that while we have no experiences of events at a distance we can be presentists, 
but after such experiences we can only be non-presentist A-theorists. 
What are the alternative options for the presentist? The second option is to 
accept that such alteration occurs, but argue that spontaneous alteration of properly 
basic beliefs would actually be in line with correction by physical theory (remember, we 
are following a different argument here to the one enjoined by considering such 
correction simpliciter). Thus, my new properly basic belief will be that it is still the 
case that what I experience is present, with the corrective that it takes time for signals to 
travel, and consequently the present signals I perceive derive from a past moment or 
event. This runs into a major difficulty: it seems a bit of a stretch to claim that quite 
subtle facts about the physical universe could be naturally spontaneously 
accommodated into our properly basic beliefs; for example, in the case of a mirage, is it 
really the case that people spontaneously incorporate sequential refraction into their 
properly basic beliefs about visual perception? Surely we just say 'in some contexts we 
see pools of water that are not really there'. 
The third option is to deny that this sort of spontaneous alteration to one's 
properly basic beliefs actually occurs. One stands by the claim that, universally, people 
have a properly basic belief in the presentness of all events they perceive, and it is 
sometimes defeated by physical theory. But again it must be asked whether we undergo 
this process of a beliefs defeat and correction by physical theory. Do I really get 
confused by the jogger in the park and need to reflect on my beliefs in line with physical 
theory to correct a belief which has been defeated? Or do I just spontaneously 
incorporate more information about the world into my noetic structure? 
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It is also difficult to see why a solipsist properly basic belief is, on this view, 
ruled out as quickly as we would expect in practice, since if we are disallowing non-
physical-theory spontaneous belief development then I have no reason to believe that 
anything not within my experience exists at all until I am apprised of suitable scientific 
or metaphysical argument for it. This seems a bit much to accept. So even though 
Craig says of Mellor's astronomical example that all it proves 'is that our basic belief 
that certain events are presently occurring is defeasible and sometimes defeated '595 , 
nevertheless I would ask why we have to take this position, talking about a properly 
basic belief being defeated by physical theory, over the position that we have 
spontaneously adjusted properly basic beliefs about experiencing things/events at a 
spatia-temporal distance. 
Finally, it is notable that many of the spontaneous alterations we make to our 
beliefs (properly basic or not) are functional but wrong596 (i.e. they allow us to operate 
within the world but do not describe truths about it), whereas many physical theories 
have apparently counter-intuitive outcomes that we would be unlikely ever to hold as 
beliefs spontaneously. 597 Why, then, should we trust our properly basic beliefs as a 
guide to truth - as opposed to contextual success - and why should we attach 
ontological importance to our having a properly basic belief in presentness? One might 
also ask why we should think it ought to be accompanied by a belief of the type 'that 
which we experience as present is all that exists'. In conclusion then, I suggest that the 
idea of spontaneous belief development (in contrast with explicit correction by physical 
theory), whilst not removing the possibility that we have properly basic belief in the 
presentness of things/events/experiences, rather casts doubt on the link between this and 
presentist metaphysics. We might have properly basic beliefs about perceiving the past, 
and we might not believe that the beliefs we have about the present correspond to the 
truth about reality (rather than simply allowing us to function in it). 
Moving on to my second main point, I would argue that Craig in fact gives away 
more than perhaps he thinks by allowing that physical theory can correct some instances 
of a basic belief in the presentness of an event. For we must keep in mind that what is 
595 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l43 
596 E.g. that being cold and catching a cold have a direct (rather than indirect) causal relation; or that there 
is a 'sod's law' governing the fact that one waits ages for a bus and then two come along at once (which 
has a physical/statistical basis not related in any way to the person waiting for the bus); or that there is a 
centrifugal force which throws one out from the centre of a spinning system (whereas in fact there is a 
centripetal force pushing one in and around). 
597 E.g. that after a certain height, how far away from the ground you are if you fall will not affect the 
speed at which you hit the ground; or that it is possible to dip your hand briefly into molten lead without 
harm, if your hand is damp; or that diamonds, coal and modern pencil cores comprise the same elements, 
just arranged differently. 
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at stake for Craig is not the general veracity of beliefs in presentness, as he seems to 
suggest, but the general veracity of presentism as a doctrine. As it is, Craig argues that 
if some beliefs can be corrected by physical theory then we are still far from a decisive 
defeat of a concept of the privileged present. I would like to push against this point 
using two separate arguments. 
First, I will argue that there are corrections by physical theory which not only 
contextually defeat the belief that some events are present, but which also defeat the 
belief that the past and future do not exist. Consequently, although A-theories in 
general may not be epistemically ruled out, presentism is. 
Second, the amount of work that our brains do in presenting as a coherent 
present experience a selection of data which has no such attribute constitutes an 
argument for the mind-dependence of the presentness of things/events/experience which 
is prior to other considerations of mind-dependence (e.g. of becoming etc.). In other 
words, there is a potential empirical defeater for the presentness of experiences as well 
as events/things. 
If physical theory can correct some beliefs about, e.g., the presentness or 
simultaneity of events, such that this logically contravenes presentism - i.e. that only 
the present exists as a temporal ontological category - then Craig is in more serious 
trouble than he has thus far been from arguments against the move from the 
epistemology of temporal experience to the metaphysics of presentism. He accepts that 
physical theory can correct beliefs about the presentness of events; what correction 
might physical theory offer at this point against these beliefs and the belief that only the 
present exists? 
As we have seen, special relativity in its classically developed form shows that 
the simultaneity of two events can be dependent upon the frame of reference of the 
observer. This, coupled with the idea that no reference frame is privileged, leads to the 
result that two events can be 'present' -can exist- whilst being temporally separated 
for some observers; or, that two events which are simultaneous for some observers are 
in fact temporally separated, leading to the conclusion that at least the temporal span of 
their occurrence is equally extant. If, as I have argued, the neo-Lorentzian approach 
Craig adopts is not up to the challenge of providing an alternative to the view that there 
is no preferred frame or absolute present, then allowing (as seems reasonable) the 
correction of our beliefs by physical theory appears likely to rule presentism out on 
broader epistemic grounds as well as on grounds of scientific theory. I noted at the 
beginning of the chapter that to allow a fair attempt at Counterargument I intended to be 
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charitable in not assuming that the scientific metaphysic had demonstrated the reality of 
Minksowkian spacetime, but only provided a reason to believe that no preferred frame 
or absolute present exists. The above argument is epistemically effective against 
presentism with just the strength of that reason; I suggest that on the basis of the 
previous chapter, this makes it significantly effective. Perhaps it does not thoroughly 
debunk a properly basic belief in the presentness of experience, but this is surely small 
comfort to the presentist. 
Let us tum to the issue of the brain's interpretation of sense data and what it 
might tell us about the epistemology of the present. 598 Before I begin I should like to 
note two things: first, the issue of optimism and pessimism and the question of whether 
a metaphysical claim is present in an empirically successful scientific theory is not an 
issue here - at least, not in terms of the use that I am making of the empirical data; if I 
wanted to say something about the philosophy of mind, this would be a very different 
story. But this is not about the philosophy of mind, and I am not attempting to 
demonstrate anything other than some facts about the way we experience things; even if 
I am a Cartesian mind, my brain represents to 'the real me' certain things in certain 
ways, and here my interest is in those things and those ways. 
Second, and consequent upon the above, it should be clear that this is not an 
Issue akin to the interpretation of relativity theory. Empirical facts may not entail 
straightforwardly any interesting metaphysical or epistemological view, but the demand 
for empirical adequacy extends no less to epistemology than to metaphysics: as Craig 
says, 'if it appears to me that I am in my office reading a book, then it would be 
improper for me to form the belief that I see a tree. ' 599 Likewise, most of the time we 
would reject the possibility of properly basic beliefs of the sort 'the chord being played 
on the piano is red', but empirical study of synresthesia shows that it is possible for a 
human being to have such a belief (and it would be properly basic in the way 'I see a 
tree' is). Reporting experiences of synresthesia is not a question of interpreting a 
theory; it is simply a question of interpreting experiences. So also for experiences of 
presentness, simultaneity, etc. 
598 I am indebted to a (currently) unpublished paper by Craig Callender (Craig Callender, 'The 
Subjectivity of the Present', 
http: //philosophy2. ucsd. edul--callende/index files/Subj ecti vi ty%20of0/o20the%20Present I 7. doc last 
accessed 30/09/07] for some pointers in the direction of bibliographical material and directions of 
argument. The arguments relating to synresthesia and the uses of the material in criticism of Craig's 
position are entirely original to me. 
599 Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time, p.l36 
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The argument can be summarised as follows: what we judge to be present not 
only varies between individuals but also has high 'plasticity' for an individual under 
certain conditions related to our beliefs about what we are causally affecting. Not only 
can we 'fill out' the present, we can also 'focus it down'. This suggests that the 
experience of presentness is dependent upon ourselves and is not a 'reading off by us 
of an ontological category. 
I shall take the phenomena in tum. First, Stone (et a/.)600 conducted experiments 
using paired stimuli of light and sound temporally separated. Subjects were asked to 
identify whether the stimuli occurred simultaneously. The result was a span of 
'subjective simultaneity': as well as the basic (intuitively expectable) result that events 
which were not perfectly simultaneous were judged to be so, the experiment found that 
some subjects would judge simultaneity to hold within a longer or shorter span than 
other subjects. Nevertheless, each subject was remarkably consistent in the limits of the 
span within which they would judge events to be simultaneous. In summary, you may 
judge two events to be present where I judge one to be present and the other to be past. 
This is pushed further by the second phenomenon. Cunningham (et a/.)601 asked 
subjects to move a pointer on a screen using a computer mouse. A time lag was 
gradually introduced between mouse movement and screen movement; after a while, 
subjects reported that the two were once again experienced as simultaneous. When the 
lag was suddenly shut off, for a while they reported the screen-point moving prior to 
their moving the mouse. Haggard (et a/.)602 claim to show that the intention of the 
subject actually affects the experience of simultaneity. They found with respect to 
reported experience 'that voluntary actions and their effects are attracted together across 
time, whereas shifts in the opposite direction occur when an involuntary movement is 
followed by the same effect' 603 or, in other words, that when voluntary action is 
involved cause and effect are temporally 'contracted' to bring them within simultaneity, 
but otherwise 'expanded' to be distinguishable. 
Dennett and Kinsboume604 discuss phenomena related to the brain's ability to 
censor temporal information (such as the time lag between deciding to clench one's fist 
600 J. V. Stone, N. M. Hunkin, J. Porrill, R. Wood, V. Keeler, M. Beanland, M. Port, N. R. Porter, 'When 
is Now? Perception of Simultaneity', Proceedings of the Royal Society B 268:1462 (2001 ), p.31-38 
601 D. W. Cunningham, V. A Billock and B. H. Tsou, 'Sensorimotor Adaptation to Violations of 
Temporal Contiguity', Psychological Science 12 (200 I), pp. 532-53 5 
602 Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark, and Jerry Kalogeras, 'Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness', 
Nature Neuroscience 5 (2002), pp.382-385 
603 Haggard et al., 'Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness', p.383 
604 D.C. Dennett and M. Kinsboume, 'Time and the Observer' Behavioural Brain Science 15:2 (1992), 
pp.183-247; see especially p.190 & p.21 0 
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and the fist clenching) in order to provide the 'right' sense of present action - i.e. we 
generally experience such things as instantaneous. On the other hand, the present can 
also be 'filled out', as in the case of chronostasis - the experience of a clock, or other 
object undergoing regular movement, appearing to stop very briefly when one turns 
one's attention to it. Yarrow (et. a/.)605 undertook various experiments to show that this 
is measurable and pronounced: 'in fact subjects appeared to extend the time that they 
thought they had seen the first target back in time to approximately 50ms prior to the 
start of eye movement. ' 606 In other words, we extend the present moment to off-set 
potential experiential inaccuracies caused by movement of our sensory structure. 
The overall argument, then, is that these phenomena act as epistemic defeaters 
for the belief that events/things are present, both because I may disagree with someone 
else over what is contained in 'the present' and because I can perceive things as present 
which are not. They also potentially act as a defeater for the belief that my experiences 
are present, since both the plasticity of presentness and the case of chronostasis mean 
that I may mistake the presentness of my experiences or their sequence. 
The presentist's response may well be that this does not remove the properly 
basic belief that my experiences are present - just as Mellor giving an account of the 
presentness of experiences being tautological did not remove that belief- even if it is 
effective against the view that events/things are present. The plasticity or flexibility of 
presentness with respect to my experiences does not, Craig might say, detract from the 
point that when I have them they seem present to me. However, the argument I have 
just given has an advantage over Mellor's account, in that it places the properly basic 
belief that my experiences are present on (roughly) the same episternic footing as the 
properly basic belief that the piano chord just played was red: that the piano chord is 
given to me redly is no reason to think that sound is really coloured as opposed to just 
being sound; that my experiences are given to me presently is no reason to think that 
they really are absolutely present as opposed to just being experiences. 
To summarise key points thus far: if we have spontaneously developed properly 
basic beliefs, then we may have properly basic beliefs which block the move from our 
experience of things/events/experiences as present to a belief in presentism. Further, if 
we allow the correction of beliefs by physical theory then belief in presentism may be 
ruled out on episternic grounds derived from science. Moreover, physical analysis of 
605 Kielan Yarrow, P. Haggard, R. Heal, P. Brown, and J. C. Rothwell, 'Illusory Perceptions of Space and 
Time Preserve Cross-Saccadic Perceptual Continuity', Nature 414 (2001), p.302-305 
606 Yarrow et al, 'Illusory Perceptions of Space and Time Preserve Cross-Saccadic Perceptual 
Continuity', p. 303 
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how we experience things in relation to temporality may lead to large-scale defeat of 
our basic belief(s) in the presentness of things/events and even experiences; at any rate 
it opens a gulf between such beliefs and the attribution of an absolute present as 
required by Craig for his presentist metaphysics. 
There is a response which Craig can give to all the examples of physical theory 
correcting our view of beliefs in the present: 
in most cases, the things and events we observe are contained within a brief temporal 
interval which is present, for example the so-called "specious present," and our basic 
belief that "E is presently occurring" makes no reference to instants, so that such a 
belief remains properly basic even for scientifically educated persons like ourselves. 607 
In the final critical part of this chapter I will argue that this is emphatically not a 
response he should opt for as a way of saving his presentist project. 
We can begin by recalling the discussion of the specious, or 'elastic', present at 
the end of chapter four. The core of Craig's position can be expressed by the following: 
'We can maintain that the extent of the present depends upon the extent of the entity 
described as present. '608 We can note immediately that this is more expansive than the 
contention that we can adapt our epistemology of the present to physical theory ('in 
most cases, the things and events we observe are contained within a brief temporal 
interval'). The criticism made of Craig's 'elastic present' in chapter four could be 
summarised thus: if events which require large durations can be considered present, 
even if divisible down to an instant, and presentism says that only what is present exists 
then there is a big question over what in fact exists. If one expands the event and 
duration under consideration - say, the present universe - then it is unclear how the 
resultant view of 'only the present existing' differs onto logically from a B-theoretical 
view, except insofar as one might posit an extra property of presentness which inheres 
in all events/things. This latter is represented by Smith in Language and Time, and 
Craig makes it clear this is not a view which he accepts.609 
I suggest there are actually two main problems for Craig's position now: first, 
the problem from chapter four, canvassed already above; and second, an epistemic 
problem of what our properly basic beliefs about the present are. For if Craig is 
allowing that properly basic beliefs about the present are adapted to physical theory by 
the specious present, and if he does not place suitable constraints on the latter (which he 
607 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.l43 
608 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.245 
609 Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.82-83, for example. 
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does not appear to) then he seems committed to the view that we can have a properly 
basic belief in the presentness of 'the present stage in the evolution of the sun'610 
understood as the duration being present, rather than as the more charitable view that 
the event is co-occurrent with my belief. 
Let us take the more charitable case first, in case anything can be salvaged from 
it. 'An event E of duration d is present' means that the belief 'E is present' is true at 
any moment oftime in d. We might see this as restricting the scope of presentness toE 
and selecting the duration as a logical domain; thus, of every time in the domain it is 
true that E is present. When I say 'Wimbledon is happening this (i.e. in the present) 
fortnight', I simply mean to refer to the tennis that is occurring at the time of discussion. 
This is quite sensible and fits with how we use the language of presentness for long 
durations. However, it relies on matching the time of my assertion with the event of 
Wimbledon and checking that both the time and the event fall within the duration 
specified. This sounds suspiciously like a B-theory type account of my belief, making 
talk about beliefs, events and durations into talk about their tenseless relations. We 
have seen no evidence to suggest that Craig desires such an account of my belief in the 
presentness of long-durational events, and none to make us think that it would be 
welcome to him. It also suggests that it would be as compatible with a B-theory 
ontology of time as with a presentist ontology, if not more so. Finally, in the logical 
structure of domain and property scope which I posited above it appears strange and 
arbitrary that E has presentness at every time in the domain d. 
The second option, then, would be that a belief that 'an event E of duration dis 
present' constitutes a belief in the presentness of d. Here one might posit that the scope 
of presentness is inclusive of both E and d, in order to illustrate the difference logically. 
What can be said of this option? In the first place, it is not clear that people have such 
beliefs in the same way that they have beliefs in the presentness of reading this 
sentence, for instance. It seems far more reasonable to think that this week is present in 
the derivative sense that I recognise the presentness of my reading this sentence occurs 
within a certain span of time which I can freely select out of many possible spans of 
time. 
In the second place, if people somehow do have such beliefs it is not clear that 
they are properly basic; rather it seems likely that they depend upon a properly basic 
belief in the presentness of experience, for example, with an additional temporal 
projection. But this temporal projection relies on a B-theoretical intuition; what else 
61
° Craig, The Tensed Theory ofTime, p.245 
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could the content of a belief that this week is present rely on if not the idea that the bits 
of 'this week' that I do not currently experience are nevertheless 'there', if only as 
entertained in my imagination? 
In conclusion, we could summarise the arguments as follows: if we are talking 
about presentist ontology, an 'elastic present' concept potentially undermines the whole 
enterprise, as we saw earlier in the thesis. If we are talking about properly basic belief 
in the presentness of experience/events/things, an elastic present leads to noetic 
structures which are just as plausibly B-theoretical as presentist, if it does not render 
such beliefs inadmissible as properly basic in the first place. An elastic present is not, 
therefore, a good way to get around problems posed by physical theory for a presentist 
epistemology - i.e. for the view that the past and future do not exist - because the 
ontological and interpretative strain placed on the resulting position makes it very 
difficult to use it as a basis for presentist metaphysics. 
Before drawing the chapter to a close, something needs to be said on Craig's 
charge of irrationality; we recall that Craig accused B-theorists of irrationality insofar as 
they deny a properly basic belief that is universal to all people and therefore rational for 
all people. Even if my arguments to date have not succeeded in dislodging the proper 
basicality of a belief in the presentness of experience/events/things, but only in showing 
that such belief can regularly be defeated and should not in any case lead to a presentist 
metaphysics, still we can certainly defend the B-theorist against the charge of 
irrationality. 
Could Craig's vtew of our tensed beliefs (and their proper basicality) be 
compared to a belief that the earth is flat? After all, a spirit level will generally tell us 
that it is, and if we take calculus seriously then we must allow at least that an 
infinitesimal section on which we stand can be treated mathematically as flat. 
Nevertheless, patently the Earth is approximately spherical. Yet this is not something 
that the typical ant, for example, will ever have any chance of comprehending. Does it 
thereby follow that we ought to affirm with the ant a properly basic belief that the Earth 
is flat? Surely not; we have physical theory to help us defeat such a belief. Is the super-
intelligent ant who develops conceptual and linguistic structures to cope with a 
spherical Earth irrational? Perhaps, but not wrong. 
By analogy, I would argue that even if it seems irrational for us to attempt to 
develop conceptual and linguistic structures which deny the ontological primacy of 'the 
present', it does not mean that we will be wrong to do so. Given that physical theory 
provides us some reasons, at least, for thinking that we may be right to do so, then we 
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are not really irrational to do so. To develop a previous example, the person with 
synresthesia who lives in a closed society in which everyone has synresthesia has a 
properly basic belief (shared by everyone) that, e.g., B-flat major chords are 
experienced redly. That person is not necessarily irrational to pursue an account of the 
world in which B-flat major chords have no real colour, because it is plausible that 
everyone's properly basic belief does not accurately describe reality. The more physical 
theory gives reason to doubt the link between properly basic belief and reality, the more 
rational it is to explore the alternatives. I conclude that B-theorists are quite within their 
epistemic rights to pursue their theories. 
Where does the critical section of this chapter place us within the overall 
debate? We can certainly admit that beliefs about presentness have a powerful position 
in our noetic structure. However, I have argued that this does not translate into truths 
about things, events and experiences being (in a real and absolute sense) present. 
Neither does it translate into the more tenuous metaphysical claims that the past and 
future do not exist and that presentism is true. 
Why do we persist in having these beliefs about presentness? For the same 
reasons that we persist in having beliefs about centrifugal forces and being cold giving 
us colds: because it is useful and sometimes because it approximates reality. It is useful 
to make assumptions about presentness (or, from another point of view, subjective 
simultaneity) because it means not having to make constant corrections that do not 
matter in the world of medium-sized dry goods. On the other hand, it is useful to 
experience chronostasis so that we have better opportunities to analyse moving systems 
that we interact with. It is useful to assume that rotating systems 'throw us out from the 
centre' ~ until we have to design safety systems for fairground rides. 
Whether or not we are B-theorists or A-theorists, however, is not about being 
useful; we are trying to work out what ought to be included in a description of reality. 
To this end, I suggest that Craig has not given us the overwhelming philosophical 
argument(s) necessary to complete the strategy of Counterargument or persuaded us 
that, irrespective of what contemporary science says about preferred frames of reference 
or the structure of space-time, we should be presentists. In the next chapter I shall 
discuss what the failures of Undermining and Counterargument in Craig's case mean 
for the wider debate of A-theory versus B-theory, how it shapes the system of 
constraints for the methodology that I am advocating, and which philosophical 
foundations it might suggest to the defender of divine timelessness. 
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Chapter VII- Philosophical Foundations: Temporal Ontologv and the Divine Nature 
Introduction 
Over the last three chapters we have seen a complex of arguments concerning 
language and ontology, science, and epistemology, all in relation to the debate over the 
importance of 'the present' in our philosophical description of reality. In terms of the 
broadest distinctions, more scientifically reliant material has been bracketed by what 
might be considered 'independent metaphysical arguments'. However, a more 
sophisticated structure has also been at work. Having identified presentism (as the view 
that the present exists while the past and future do not) both as the fastest way around 
McTaggart's paradox and as the metaphysical view most likely to constrain theology to 
the point of concluding that God is temporal, we have seen the presentist arguments of 
chapter four (regarding language and ontology) to be independent arguments which 
would support a process of Undermining- i.e. to be more successful if the presentist 
could establish a level scientific playing field. The arguments of chapter five concerned 
the attempt to establish just such a level scientific playing field. Chapter six, on the 
other hand, concerned arguments that would support a process of Counterargument -
overwhelming independent claims for the ontological uniqueness of the present which 
would still hold in the face of the difficulties of the previous two chapters. These, too, 
were subject to severe criticism. 
The time has come to return to the bigger picture and ask what impact all of this 
has had within our methodological concerns. What sorts of constraint are formed for 
the theology of eternity? What philosophical foundations for a defence of divine 
timelessness will arise from such constraints? The content of this final chapter is as 
follows: First, I recapitulate the flow of discussion from science to metaphysics and 
through to theology. Second, I provide a brief account of what has and Gust as 
important) has not been settled by the previous discussion. Third, I characterise this in 
terms of philosophical foundations and constraints that are formed for a defence of 
divine timelessness. Fourth, turning to theology I provide examples of these constraints 
in action, and address issues from theology and philosophy of religion which are not 
affected by or reliant on the constraints but which might constitute philosophical 
foundations of a defence of divine timelessness. 
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Constraints and Foundations in Summary 
We saw in chapter three that the B-theory and divine timelessness were 
inextricably linked, as were the A-theory and the view of divine temporality. Two 
things were of note: first, that it was the status of the present which had the most 
impact; if the present moment was held to be all that existed, and the past and future 
were non-extant, then divine timelessness would be nigh on impossible to defend. 
Second, the major defence of divine temporality by Craig relied upon a defence of just 
this sort of presentism and was therefore a main resource for the debate. If Craig's 
arguments for the ontological importance of the present carried through, the constraints 
placed upon the theology of divine eternity would in all likelihood remove the option of 
a defence of divine timelessness. 
Consequently, we saw, the philosophical foundations for a defence of divine 
timelessness must centre upon a denial of the ontological importance of the present as 
construed in presentist metaphysics, leaving the way more open for the development of 
B-theories of time which could form their own constraints on the theology of divine 
eternity- in favour of divine timelessness. 
We also saw that, in terms of Hawley's schema, the B-theory has a claim to be a 
'scientific metaphysics' -i.e. that there is a prima facie case to suggest that the present 
is not ontologically favoured, which receives some support from contemporary science. 
Consequently, A-theorists - especially presentists - need to pursue a strategy of 
Undermining or Counterargument: either levelling the scientific playing field by 
showing that their position is scientifically tenable and/or that there is not scientific 
support after all, so as to give more force to independent arguments, or finding an 
overwhelming argument in favour of presentist metaphysics that outstrips any scientific 
considerations brought to bear. Successful Undermining or Counterargument, then, 
would establish the ontological importance of the present and give the upper hand to the 
A-theorist (including non-presentist A-theorists, who would generally stand to gain 
from arguments demonstrating the importance of the present). This in tum would make 
it difficult to conduct a defence of divine timelessness. 
Fortunately for the defender of divine timelessness, neither of the strategies met 
with success; no arguments were successfully upheld to secure the ontological 
importance of the present or the victory of a presentist metaphysics a Ia Craig. The task 
now is to show what conclusions can be reached, in terms provided by the 
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methodological structure of the thesis, and therefore which philosophical foundations 
are emergent for the defender of divine timelessness. 
Mellor's Real Time II account, which demands a proposition P to be indexed to 
a time t, makes more sense if there is no preferred frame of reference and no absolute 
present. Truth-makers for tensed propositions will have to be indexed to frames of 
reference and times related to observers and observations. This is perfectly plausible 
within Mellor's structure. Consequently, the failure of Craig's neo-Lorentzian approach 
to provide a scientific basis for a presentist metaphysical system means that there is a 
reason to arbitrate in favour of Mellor's B-theory account of language, rather than 
Craig's presentist account of language. This provides, therefore, a philosophical 
foundation for a defence of divine timelessness by providing a basis from which to 
defend an indexed B-theory of language - an important element of a B-theory, and thus 
a component of the constraints and resources placed on divine eternity if a B-theory is 
successful. 
Sider argues that the presentist must be unduly reductionist about cross-time 
spatial relations, and that accounting for the grounds of facts about the past is 
problematic, presentist options leading to an insufficiently robust ontology. This lends 
some support to a B-theory of time, but would also be compatible with A-theoretical 
models which do not deny the reality of the past. Thus, the criticisms by Sider do work 
primarily on weakening the A-theoretical position by ruling out the presentist end of the 
A-theoretical spectrum. 
We saw that Craig's own model of presentism was highly problematic. This in 
itself is an important step in setting aside presentism as a viable ontology and closing 
the door further on divine temporality. However, we also saw that at certain points 
Craig's model was in danger of collapsing into what looked more like a B-theory -
particularly with respect to the 'elastic present' and his account's seeming inability to 
distinguish properly between the past and the future, ontologically, as well as 
potentially in the areas of cross-time relations and quantification. We could choose to 
take this as circumstantial evidence for the B-theory as a reasonable alternative to 
presentism. 
In the discussion of science, I chose to adopt a cautious position rather than 
presume a level of support which does not necessarily obtain. Thus, I centred 
consideration on the denial of an absolute frame of reference and absolute present. As 
well as thereby avoiding extended debate over how far we should be realists over (e.g.) 
the Minkowskian interpretation of relativity - an issue, among several, which the B-
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theorist and defender of divine timelessness may need to deal with in due course- this 
also enabled me to concentrate on the core issue with respect to presentist metaphysics, 
in both chapters five and six. I have already concluded that the strategy of Undermining 
cannot be completed by Craig, and it is clear that this adds further damage to the 
presentist position in addition to the factors we have considered so far. However, the 
material in chapter five has a wider importance, since support of a neo-Lorentzian 
physics is an important step in the Undermining strategies that could be followed by 
other A-theorists (for example, DeWeese cites it as an important factor in relation to his 
support for Tooley's theory611). Thus, the arguments and conclusions of chapter five 
may be considered an important philosophical foundation for a defence of divine 
timelessness, insofar as they count against A-theories of time in general and thereby 
deny the move from an A-theory to a theological constraint in favour of divine 
temporality. We should note that the more successfully the B-theorist can argue for 
more extensively realist interpretations of Minkowskian relativistic physics, the more 
support is garnered for Sider's arguments against presentism and in favour of four-
dimensionalism, the natural bedfellow of B-theories in the area of persistence. 
Consequently one might suggest, m vtew of Hawley's arguments concermng an 
optimistic approach to science as a guide to metaphysics, that the B-theorist and 
defender of divine timelessness may be better off defending a cautious form of scientific 
realism - understood at least as a commitment to the view that better scientific theories 
give us a better chance at describing reality. 
It is important to note, however, that my arguments do not rely upon a naive 
realism about Minkowskian relativity - I am not, as Padgett puts it, 'confusing the 
logical with the physical . . . the mathematical (for example the Minkowski diagram) 
with the physical' 612 because I am not simply 'assuming the sufficiency ofthe Special 
Theory of Relativity for ontology, in particular the theory of time' 613 in the sense that 
Padgett intends - i.e. I am not contravening the wisdom of Hawley's 'acceptable 
pessimistic core' by thinking that empirical data straightforwardly entails interesting 
metaphysical theories. Rather, I am arguing that special relativity theory provides some 
reason to think that there is no absolute present, that the neo-Lorentzian approach does 
not provide so easy an alternative as one might think, and (following Balashov and 
Janssen) that the Minkowskian interpretation of special relativity provides a better 
explanation for Lorentz invariance than the neo-Lorentzian approach. So I do not 
611 DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, p.72-3 
612 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.l21 
613 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature ofTime, p.92 
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assume that this is sufficient for ontology, I provide arguments for it; and the 
conclusions reached are not sufficient for a complete temporal ontology, only for the 
ontological job required: supporting the denial of the ascription of an absolute present 
and preferred reference frame to reality. 
In the area of epistemology, the primary concern was to block the strategy of 
Counterargument, which would have potentially allowed the assertion of a presentist 
metaphysics in the face of the criticisms of chapters four and five. This block was 
obtained in two ways: first, by breaking the link between belief in the presentness of 
things/events/experiences and belief in presentisrn, and second by weakening the link 
between belief in the presentness of things/events/experiences and belief in the 
ontological importance of the present. 
The former was aided by the possibility of physical theory (in the form of 
relativity as discussed in chapter five) defeating belief in presentism, and the argument 
that our beliefs have the potential to contradict presentist denials of the reality of the 
past, as well as the weakness of Craig's own theory in accounting for our intuition of 
the difference between the past and the future. The latter was aided by appeal to certain 
scientifically investigable phenomena to do with our perception of the world and of 
time, and the argument that different spans of time may be experienced, or determined, 
as present. Experiencing something 'presently' is not an airtight reason to ascribe 
ontological value to the concept of the present; there is room to pursue an argument of 
'mind-dependence' for tense. 
We saw, then, that a B-theoretical account was available for the presentness of 
experience, both from the angle of mind-dependence and from the angle of language 
and ontology, although the latter offers a 'coherence' account, ideally requiring separate 
reasons for holding a B-theory. 
What can we say about philosophical foundations, in summary? The core can 
be expressed negatively: the denial of ontological favour to 'the present'. It is this, 
above all, which will secure a philosophical position that keeps theories of eternity free 
of constraints barring the development of concepts of divine timelessness, and which 
may allow the introduction of constraints barring the development of concepts of divine 
temporality. There are more detailed elements, some of which support that basis and 
some, perhaps more tenuous, which derive from this basis. 
The basis of the position is in methodological terms: the demand for empirical 
adequacy and the view that empirical data does not straightforwardly entail interesting 
metaphysical claims; the idea that an empirically successful scientific theory may 
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(challengeably) support a metaphysical claim involved in it; the concept of a logical 
constraint upon theology that comes from outside of its own domain of discourse. 
These have interacted to form the context of arguments against the ontological 
favouring of the present. 
Derivative considerations have been in the direction of B-theoretical views: in 
the realm of language and ontology, a commitment to tenseless facts as truth-makers for 
both tensed and tenseless beliefs, propositions (etc.); the concept of 'ontological 
equality' across all moments of time, and the idea that our perception of temporal 
inequalities is rooted in our status as observers with perspectives and interpretative 
modes of experience. 
Having covered these elements, there are two important questions left to answer: 
first, how does all of this actually work when it comes to arguments about divine 
eternity? Second, are there any candidates for major philosophical foundations which 
come from 'within' the theological domain - i.e. are there considerations about God 
which can form logical constraints on what we say about God and time? In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will address these issues: in the next section I will show how 
we can analyse some examples of 'arguments for divine timelessness', and their 
critiques, in a constructive and diagnostic fashion, showing their proper resolution to be 
dependent upon the arguments of this thesis. In the final section I shall look at two 
arguments for divine timelessness that give us potential insights into 'independent' 
philosophical foundations that might be developed, but which still fit within the 
broadest structure of constraints that I am proposing. 
Examples of Arguments Dependent Upon the Main Constraints of the Thesis 
In chapter three we saw arguments concerning the 'match' of B-theoretical 
views of time with divine atemporality, and of A-theoretical views of time with divine 
temporality. These naturally provided some limited examples of arguments in favour of 
divine temporality or atemporality which could be shown to be reliant upon the relevant 
constraints of philosophy of time. However, here I want to consider arguments whose 
problems or unforeseen complexities might be diagnosed using the methodological 
resources of the thesis. In other words, what insights are available from the contents 
and relations of scientific, philosophical and theological material that we have been 
discussing, when it comes to identifying underlying issues of importance for arguments 
in the divine eternity debate? 
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Below, I look at two arguments for divine timelessness provided by Leftow, and 
the criticisms of them given by Craig. The first is an argument from the view that what 
is temporal is also spatial; the second is an argument concerning knowledge of the past. 
Leftow makes an argument for divine timelessness based on the idea that 
modem science has shown that what is temporal is also spatial 614. He begins by stating 
that we should, and do, deny that God has a specific location in space (we do not get 
closer to him by physical movement) and that we should deny that omnipresence entails 
literal physical location in all points of space (it does not make sense to say that we 
literally walk through God every time we walk anywhere). Rather, Leftow's 'Zero 
Thesis' entails that God is contiguous with every point in space and occupies none of 
them. This interpretation of omnipresence need not detain us: it is sufficient to note that 
Leftow believes he can accommodate omnipresence without asserting that God is 
spatial. 
The meat of the argument centres on Leftow's acceptance that 'according to 
contemporary physics, only spatial things are temporal. ' 615 He is willing to put this as 
strongly as 'something has a location in time if and only if it has a location in space.'616 
This results in the argument that if God is temporal then God is spatial as well; we do 
not want the consequent, so we must reject the antecedent. The basis of this argument 
is clearly whatever Leftow takes contemporary physics to have shown. His 
understanding is as follows: 
Contemporary physics treats time as one more extensive dimension in addition to the 
dimensions of space (whatever else time may be). Now whatever is located in one 
dimension is ipso facto located in all other dimensions of the same continuum ... So if it 
is correct to represent time as another dimension, it follows that whatever is in time is 
I . 617 a so m space. 
So the argument is that if God can be located temporally then God can be located 
spatially - whether we like it or not, as it were. Since we do not like it, we should not 
claim God is temporal in the first place. What responses are available to this argument, 
and how does the material of the foregoing chapters shed light on it? 
Leftow himself considers two critical options, based on the view that God is 
temporal, but 'not in a time that is a fourth dimension of an extensive continuum. '618 
The first option is to argue that God's time is separate from our time; the second option 
614 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.271 
615 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.227 
616 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.271 
617 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.35-6 
618 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.272 
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is to argue that our time is not actually as contemporary physics describes it. Leftow 
argues that the first option is unattractive because we cannot say when God acts, and 
because he has previously argued that separate time series cannot causally interact. He 
identifies the second option as the greater threat. 
Leftow's response to the tactic of challenging contemporary physics' description 
of the world (as he sees it) is twofold. First, he says: 
that the finite speed oflight reveals to us that simultaneity is relative does not entail that 
simultaneity is relative only for beings who depend on physical signals for their 
knowledge. One can say instead that the finite speed of light shows us that space and 
time have a certain structure, that this structure accounts for the relativity of 
simultaneity, and that if space and time do have this structure, they have it objectively619 
and, second, that having to deny that relativity theory is literally true in order to support 
divine temporality shows that the original argument is effective. 
Craig objects strongly to these replies, complaining that Leftow is making huge 
metaphysical assumptions by taking relativity theory in its standard interpretation as 
'literally true' as a description of reality. He argues that we can straightforwardly see 
that a non-spatial temporal series is possible by considering a sequence of mental events 
generated by God prior to the creation of physical time and space. 
I contend that the argument provided by Leftow is not going to do any work for 
the defender of divine timelessness independent of the methodological considerations of 
this thesis. He implicitly acknowledges the key issue when he says that an 'object with 
a space-time location is a physical object. Hence if the time in which God exists is the 
same physical time in which we exist, then God is a physical object with a spatial 
location. ' 620 This immediately raises the question of metaphysical time, since even if 
we were to go back to a Newtonian description of time and space it would be possible to 
say that there is physical space and physical time and if God is in either then God is a 
physical object, which presumably (in line with classical theism) we do not wish to 
affirm. In the Newtonian system, as we saw in chapter five, we can still have absolute 
space and time. So the real issue must be the relationship between physical and 
metaphysical time. By assuming 'the literal truth' of relativity theory, Leftow is leaving 
himself open to a charge of naive realism. By insisting that his defence of divine 
timelessness is independent of the A-lB-theory position one holds, he is robbing himself 
619 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.272 
620 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.36 
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of the resources to resolve the issue of the nature of (metaphysical) time and its relation 
to physical time. 
My suggestion, then, is that the only way for Leftow to conduct an argument in 
the terms that he desires (spatiality and temporality) is to consider the issues as I have 
presented them in this thesis - unless he simply wants to make the point that God is not 
a physical object and therefore is not inside of the structure of time and space that our 
physical theories describe. Any attempted move directly from relativistic science to 
divine timelessness is liable to be mauled by critics such as Craig unless it can 
circumvent the obstacle of 'metaphysical time'. I argue on the basis of the preceding 
chapters that the most cautious way to do this is to take the empirical success of 
relativity theory as a reason to reject the concept of an absolute present as an integral 
part of a metaphysic of time, thereby making a B-theory more appealing (among other 
effects). A more risky strategy is to argue for some sort of space-time realism, but even 
that option will not secure the result that Leftow urges with the immediacy he supposes 
possible, given the extent of the effort required to attain such a position in the first 
place. In any event, it seems unlikely that one could make Leftow's specific argument 
regarding spatiality and temporality at the metaphysical level, since the metaphysics of 
space and time are not geometrically dependent. So Leftow's specific argument is 
effectively eclipsed by the issues that I have raised above. 
Under the heading 'timelessness and perfect knowledge of the past', Leftow 
constructs the following argument. 
1) God is the perfect knower 
2) The best justification for knowing beliefs is direct cognitive contact. 
3) A timeless God has direct cognitive contact with what is past for us. 
4) A temporal God has indirect cognitive contact with the past through memory. 
5) If God is temporal, but possibly timeless, God's mode of knowledge of the past 
is less perfect than it could be. 
6) God is possibly timeless. 
7) If God is the perfect knower, God is timeless rather than temporal. 
8) Therefore God is timeless rather than temporal. 
Craig provides, essentially, two responses. First, he says that an omniscient God does 
not have the restrictions that humans have when it comes to knowledge of the past; what 
was experienced as present for God remains just as vivid and complete. Second, he 
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attempts to tum the argument around, reasoning that if it is more perfect to be in direct 
cognitive contact with events, we should affirm divine temporality. He asks 'what does 
it mean for a timeless God to be in "direct cognitive contact" with past events? They 
are not past for Him since He is timeless. So He must know them only as past in 
relation to us. '621 What Craig is aiming at here is the idea (which we saw in Chapter 4) 
of irreducible tense. The argument for comparison would be as follows: 
1. God is timeless. 
2. God is omniscient. 
3. A temporal world exists. 
4. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows tensed facts. 
5. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts. 
Since (2) is essential to theism and (3) is evidently true, (1) must be false. 622 
Craig admits that by subscribing to a tenseless theory of time the defender of divine 
timelessness can argue that by knowing all the tenseless facts God is perfectly 
omniscient (thus debunking (4.) above). However, Craig is playing this for an 
advantage against Leftow, and consequently it appears that he is trying to suggest that 
'direct cognitive contact' is more direct if one is in the same mode of temporality as the 
object of cognition. Once again we find the same tensions resurfacing: is Craig saying 
that Leftow's argument is faulty because there are tensed facts which necessitate an 
omniscient God being temporal (and hence able to be in direct cognitive contact with 
facts in the right way - i.e. a tensed way)? Is Craig saying that temporal direct 
cognitive contact is superior because God would know what it is like to know 
something as past? If the latter, it is difficult to see how a temporal omniscient God is 
advantaged, given that Craig's other counter-argument is that omniscience provides 
perfect memory, so that God would not have the usual human experiential content of 
something being past apart from the factual knowledge that it was 'before now'. But 
the first option leaves open the possibility of supporting a tenseless view of time in 
which there are not tensed facts. So despite an apparent deeper criticism, all we are left 
with is simply that there are tensed facts or not. 
However, in the circumstances this is precisely the issue. Leftow picks it up 
again in his chapter on ornniscience623 , and it is clear from that discussion that, although 
621 Craig, God, Time & Eternity, p.39 
622 Craig, God, Time & Eternity, p.IIS-6 
623 Leftow, Time and Eternity, pp.313-337 
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he claims to rescue omniscience and divine timelessness for the case in which time is 
tensed, he nevertheless relies upon moves which are more aptly made in defence of a B-
theoretical position. In particular he says, for example, that the difference in content 
between tensed facts and their tenseless counterparts derive only from the mode of 
access knowers have to tensed facts. Consequently: 
even ifl never know that it is now 3 P.M., if I know all other facts about 3 P.M. and also 
know that it was then 3 P.M .... , I know all the facts about 3 P.M. For I know a truth 
based on and expressing the [tensed] fact which expresses it as fully, and is as close in 
content to "it is now 3 P.M.," as is possible at times other than 3 P.M.624 
Craig points out in response to this position: 
The fact that renders such a proposition true must therefore be tenseless, even if that 
tenseless fact generates a tensed proposition at 3 P.M. Since there are no facts that 
escape God's omniscience and the only temporal facts God knows are tenseless facts, it 
follows that tensed facts do not exist. 625 
Or, more correctly given Leftow's view, do not exist after all, since what was proposed 
as a tensed fact is, if Craig's diagnosis is right, actually just a tensed belief. 
Putting aside Craig's observation that 'at any rate Leftow's explanation of God's 
knowledge of tensed facts is system dependent upon his theory of divine eternity' 626, we 
can see from the (necessarily) limited material above that an approach predicated on the 
denial oftensed facts (and more importantly of the ontological favouring of the present) 
as enabled by the structure of this thesis is more likely to meet the challenges facing 
Leftow's position. 
This point can be made all the clearer when applied to a more fundamental 
manoeuvre which he makes in defending his view. Bringing relativity theory in once 
again, he argues that because the present is relativised to frames of reference, tensed 
facts are framework-relative. Thus: 
a timeless God can know all the facts of simultaneity that obtain in other reference 
frames. Thus He can know what the essentially tensed facts of these other reference 
frames are, though He cannot be directly presented with these facts. 627 
624 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.336 
625 Craig, God, Time, and Eternity, p.l25, in the context of the wider argument of pp.ll2-126 
626 Craig, God, Time, and Eternity, p.l26 
627 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.334 
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As Craig points out, if we are assuming that there are tensed facts then what God knows 
is the collection of simultaneity relations for every frame or observer, but 'He cannot 
know what point on the world line of that observer or which simultaneity class of events 
is present in that frame. ' 628 Consequently God cannot really know tensed facts; we 
might add (to match up with the previous criticism ofLeftow on tensed facts) that what 
God knows is the location and simultaneity relations of all tensed beliefs, but this is 
only useful if we first support a tenseless theory of time in order to affirm that there is 
no absolute present (frame relative or otherwise) of which God requires knowledge. 
In summary, it seems that Leftow's arguments here either rely on accounts of 
facts that will ultimately demand a B-theoretical approach to be effective, or on moves 
employing relativity theory that will ultimately demand greater care over use of those 
scientific resources (to help deny the possibility of an absolute present being affirmed 
metaphysically), if not outright comprehensive rejection of A-theoretical positions in 
favour of B-theoretical ones. Once again, my argument is that, for the defender of 
divine timelessness looking for firm foundations, a grasp and suitable use of the 
structures I have tried to develop in this thesis eclipses piecemeal defences of arguments 
such as those I have discussed in this section. 
Arguments Independent of the Main Constraints of the Thesis 
In the previous section I gave examples of arguments where the substance 
(methodological and otherwise) of the previous chapters demonstrated where certain 
problems arose, and allowed us to see how an approach in line with the structure of 
constraints that I have developed would provide a more sensible course of action for the 
defender of divine timelessness. In this section, I want to address two major arguments 
where, for various reasons (to be explored), the issues are comparatively independent of 
previous material and may need to be incorporated into the philosophical foundations of 
a defence of divine timelessness. Nevertheless, I intend to show that the arguments still 
fit within the wider structure of constraints that I have argued for, being examples of 
cases where there are logical constraints formed within theology as a result of other 
(philosophical-theological) commitments that one may take on. 
This has echoes of concerns expressed in the first chapter, where we saw that, 
historically, there are issues which are more clearly theological without necessarily 
depending upon external philosophical arguments to form them. However, stripped 
628 Craig, God, Time, and Eternity, p.l25 (my italics) 
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back to premises which must be defended with philosophical rigour, they may well 
qualify as suitable philosophical foundations for a defence of divine timelessness. The 
arguments concern, in the first place, God as a necessary (or perfect) being, and, in the 
second place, the idea of the divine perfect life (the roots of which can be seen in 
Boethius' discussion of eternity as, among other things, 'perfect life'). The potential 
philosophical foundations they give rise to therefore concern divine necessity, the nature 
of the divine life and correlatively the distinction of transcendence and immanence. 
Leftow puts forward an argument that necessary existence entails timeless 
existence for God. He turns to the concept of divine perfection first, to argue that the 
importance of 'security of existence' is such that we can say that if a perfect being 
exists, its perfection requires that it necessarily exists. From this and the premise that 
time is contingent, Leftow derives the argument that what exists necessarily, exists 
timelessly; God must, as a necessary being, therefore be timeless. 
Craig construes this argument as follows: 
1) God exists necessarily. 
2) Time is contingent. 
3) If God is temporal, God is necessarily temporal. 
4) Time would therefore exist necessarily. 
5) We have a contradiction; thus, God must be atemporal. 
We can see the difficulty more clearly (Craig coasts over it) if we present the argument 
as follows: 
I) God exists necessarily. 
2) Time is contingent (i.e. in some possible world time does not exist). 
3) If necessarily something is temporal, then necessarily time exists. 
4) If a is a necessary being, then a's properties are necessarily instantiated. 
5) Assume what is to be negated: God is temporal. 
6) Temporality is necessarily instantiated (i.e. m every possible world, 
something is temporal) - from 1, 4 & 5. 
7) Necessarily time exists- from 3 & 6. 
8) Contradiction from 2 & 7. 
9) It is not the case that God is temporal - 5 (discharged) & 8 (thus rests on 
1,2,3,4). 
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Our premises need defending. We seem to be taking the first and second .as by 
hypothesis, so we'll leave these for now. The third seems solid: if something temporal 
exists in all possible worlds, then time exists in all possible worlds (it might be possible 
to have time without temporal existents629, but temporal existents without time seems 
contradictory). 
The key premise is the fourth. There is a superficial appearance of it just being a 
question of scope (the scope of 'necessarily'), but this is illusory. This is because it 
seems that 'necessarily a's properties are instantiated' denies that a could have had 
different properties, whereas 'a's properties are necessarily instantiated' seems to 
suggest that a might have had different properties, but whichever properties it has 
partake of a's necessary existence. However, brief reflection allows us to see that both 
in fact say that a will have the same properties in all possible worlds (perhaps the 
illusion is grounded in the historically richer meaning of 'necessary existence' as akin to 
a degree of existence, i.e. of the sort that a property might partake of). 
Craig realises that a defence is needed of God being temporal in all possible 
worlds if God is temporal at all, and finds in Leftow only the argument that transworld 
identity will not be plausible if a God is temporal in one possible world and atemporal 
in another because 'temporal and timeless beings will have to have properties so 
radically different' 630 . One might well ask why I have opted for a more general (and 
thus even less defensible?) formulation. I think it allows one to see clearly another 
possible defence of the premise, and in such a way that one might as well go the whole 
hog. 
Why, then, should a necessary being have the same properties in all possible 
worlds? Because we are drawing the concept of necessary existence from the idea of 
divine perfection (if God exists, God exists in all possible worlds; this is more perfect); 
and since various antiquated luminaries have argued that a perfect being cannot change 
in that it would either mean becoming less perfect (problematic) or more perfect (in 
which case it wasn't perfect in the first place and so not God), why can we not adapt 
this argument to the possible world context? In this context, it would say that 
whichever properties a perfect being has, it has in all possible worlds. If it had a 
different/opposing property, it would be either less than perfect (problematic; it would 
no longer be the perfect being) or more perfect (in which case, the first being considered 
629 Depending upon whether one is willing to countenance a substantivalist view of time. 
630 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.44 
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was not the perfect being). Since the perfect being exists m all possible worlds, 
transworld identity will not hold up if different worlds' perfect beings have different 
properties - not because of some vague difficulty leading to implausibility, but because 
at least one being in question is not perfect after all, and therefore not identifiable as 
'perfect being/God'. 
If the above defence holds up at all, then it succeeds in patching the argument up 
thus far. It is a pity, then, that Craig moves on to challenge the second premise - or, 
rather, that he claims that an argument which has as its conclusion 'necessarily time 
exists' (as entailed by God's necessary existence and temporality) is not problematic 
What Craig misses is that 'God is temporal' is assumed for the purposes of 
obtaining contradiction; converting the argument to show that time is necessary would 
involve 'God is temporal' as a premise which must be justified independently- in short, 
the ball would be placed squarely in Craig's court here. Considering the inversion of 
this - that 'time is contingent' is a premise which must be argued for - does not 
necessarily produce the same effect upon the original argument: let us see how this 
might play out. An intuitive (for some) starting point may be that we have a better 
prima facie case for accepting 'in some possible world God exists and time does not' or 
at least 'time is contingent'. Some reasons might be (i) There seems to be no logical 
difficulty in considering a possible world without time - certainly it is easier to imagine 
than a non-spatial possible world. (ii) We would like to see God as 'Lord of time' such 
that time at least is contingent upon God's existence (iii) We would like to build on (ii) 
with the idea that God at least could be timeless if He wanted to be, making time 
thereby contingent. 
Perhaps the difficulty with (ii) & (iii) is that they highlight the problems faced in 
mixing 'necessary being' theology with other 'possible world' philosophy. The 
pertinent question is 'To what extent is God's choosing His own nature an exercise in 
choosing to actualise a possible world, and to what extent does it represent a situation 
prior to a possible world context?' The theological tension, then, is between God's 
necessary being and God's freedom. For example, say God can choose whether He is 
omniscient. If so, then the argument that whichever properties a necessary being has it 
has in all possible worlds seems to entail that if God is omniscient then God is 
omniscient in all possible worlds. This 'if is an epistemic 'if: if it transpires that God 
is omniscient, then necessarily He is so. But this implies that God cannot choose not to 
be omniscient; God never had access to a possible world in which he was not 
omniscient, and so could never actualise it. 
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One potential response, in line with our previous defence of premise ( 4) above, 
would be that God could still give up a property, since giving it up is a different case to 
not having it in the first place, and does not represent a violation of the transworld 
identity of perfect beings. There would not be a possible world in which 'God is 
omniscient' was false; rather 'God is omniscient' would be true, as would 'God 
restricts/gives up His omniscience'. However, on the argument that all that is required 
for time is a succession of two (logically incompatible) mental states in the mind of 
God, this situation regarding omniscience would possibly mean that God was temporal, 
and mutatis mutandis necessarily so; we could not without further defensive work posit 
a timeless God who gives up/restricts His omniscience. Again, without further 
defensive work characterising timelessness and omniscience, this also raises the 
difficulty that God appears to have been able to choose to be temporal by choosing to 
actualise a possible world in which He gives up another divine property; how then is 
God necessarily timeless (or necessarily temporal) in all possible worlds as required by 
the defence of(4) above? 
This leads one to think that - at least in the case of omniscience - perhaps God 
cannot choose to give up a divine property after all; certainly this would seem to follow 
from the basis of divine perfection. I argue that it would need to be assessed on a 
property-by-property basis: it is less clear that restricting omnipotence would lead to 
temporality, for example, and equally it is less clear that restricting omnipotence would 
alter divine perfection; it might be commensurable with divine omnibenevolence to 
restrict omnipotence for certain circumstances (which may only arise in some possible 
worlds), thereby maintaining divine perfection. Note also, that the plausibility of God's 
being able to choose to give up a divine property as outlined depends upon the premise 
that God is capable of actualising any possible world. In this respect, it overlaps with 
the idea of creation as the actualising of possible worlds- however, a defence is not, to 
my mind, required in order to make sense of time's contingency being reliant on God. 
The conclusion of the core line of reasoning is that if God is timeless, He could 
not have chosen to be temporal, and if temporal could not have chosen to be timeless. 
This removes point (iii), but not (ii): God could still be responsible for a universe being 
temporal or atemporal through God's being responsible for creating time in one possible 
world and not creating time in another possible world (creational content not being a 
property of God, and therefore open to variance across possible worlds), but if God is 
timeless, there is not a possible world in which He chooses rather to be temporal, and 
vtce versa 
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This leaves us with the result that, if God is temporal then time necessarily 
exists, whereas if God is atemporal then time is contingent. There are two points of 
interest arising. First, if we have a strong intuition that time is contingent, then we are 
encouraged to support a view of divine atemporality if we subscribe also to the 
necessary being arguments which formed our premises originally. Second, in 
supporting the use of 'time is contingent' as a premise in the original argument, we 
must be careful not to beg the question, because we are looking for the conclusion that 
God is not temporal. Thus, we must press on in our discussion of the contingency of 
time. 
One option is to use our findings thus far to turn the tables on Craig's position. 
If God is temporal, then He is necessarily so, so Craig's idea of a God who is atemporal 
sans creation but temporal with creation631 (i.e. that there might be a world where God 
never created, in which he would be atemporal) is threatened, since we are saying that if 
God is temporal in any possible world then God is temporal in all possible worlds. But 
Craig's point is that there is a possible world in which God is atemporal and time does 
not exist; thus, time is contingent. If he chooses to defend this, then he defends the 
prima facie acceptability of the premise that time is contingent, and incidentally makes 
it more difficult to defend 'God is temporal' as a premise which is not simply assumed 
for the purposes of deriving a contradiction. The result is that there is more pressure on 
Craig to defend the temporality of God as an acceptable premise to show that time is 
necessary. There is also more pressure to reject his overall position: that God could be 
atemporal sans creation, and that our original argument should be replaced with the 
argument that time is necessary, time's contingency having been discounted as a good 
prerruse. 
In short, then, we have an argument that goes from God as perfect (necessary) 
being and the contingency of time to the conclusion that God is atemporal, the key 
move being that a perfect being's properties are its properties in all possible worlds. A 
corollary of the argument is that if God is temporal then time cannot be contingent, for 
only an atemporal God results in time's contingency. This leads to a second argument, 
that if God is temporal then there is no possible world in which time does not exist; 
consequently, the (Craigian/Ockhamist) position that God is atemporal sans creation 
does not work. God is either temporal or atemporal: in each case there is either creation 
or not, but God's temporality does not change. Rejection of this constitutes support for 
631 See for example his concise account in 'Timelessness and Ornnitemporality', in Gregory E. Ganssle 
(ed.), God and Time: Four Views, pp.l29-160 
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the contingency of time; thus one cannot reject both this argument and the contingency 
premise of the first argument. 
In conclusion, this argument provides a philosophical foundation for a defence 
of divine timelessness which is independent of the main philosophical issues with which 
this thesis has been concerned, but which is dependent on being able to defend a perfect 
being theology (or other basis of arguing God's necessary existence) and to some extent 
the contingency of time. The former, in particular, can be considered to form a good 
basis for a potential logical constraint on divine eternity favouring divine timelessness. 
I shall turn now to consider the issue of 'the divine perfect life', which we recall 
has some historical roots in Boethius definition of eternity ('the complete possession all 
at once of illimitable life'632), and the argument that has been put forward for divine 
timelessness based upon it. 
The argument essentially moves from the concept of a divine perfect life to the 
conclusion that such a life must be timeless. The 'sharp end' of this argument is put by 
Leftow in the following way: 'the past itself is lost, and no memory, however complete, 
can take its place- for confirmation ask a widower ifhis grief would be abated were his 
memory of his wife enhanced in vividness and detail. ' 633 The atemporal being loses 
nothing, possessing all of its life perfectly and timelessly. 
To add some detail, it is worth beginning by noting that Leftow carefully 
distinguishes two motivations for this argument. He refers to a suggestion by Hasker 
that arguments in favour of God's timeless experience of the world over against 
temporal experience will draw on a metaphysical predisposition to changelessness over 
against change. 634 Leftow argues that, although he believes such a preference can be 
supported, the argument in question relies not on this preference to motivate it, but on 
the 'very concrete and very intuitive claim, that it is better to be with those one loves 
than to remember them. '635 
Craig observes that one strength of the argument is that it relies upon the 
experience of, rather than a reality-objective account of, temporal becoming. This 
means that adoption of a tenseless theory of time in which all moments are 
ontologically equal does not get a temporal God off the experiential hook; events will 
still be lost or inaccessible dependent upon the moment being experienced by such a 
temporal deity. As Paul Helm puts it, 'the idea that God is subject to the vicissitudes of 
632 De Consolatione v, prosa 6. 
633 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.278 
634 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.279; Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), p.l79-183 
635 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.279 
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temporal passage, with more and more of his life irretrievably over and done with, is 
incompatible with divine sovereignty, with divine perfection and with that fullness of 
being which is essential to God'. 636 
Leftow also notes that invoking God's omnipotence by arguing that God has the 
option for replication of any events or persons lost to memory (an option canvassed by 
Cook and Swinbume637) will not work to circumvent the issue, since it makes God 
either self-delusional or crass in his relation with his creatures. 638 
Craig considers another possible response to the argument for those wishing to 
reject divine timelessness: the expansion of God's specious present (i.e. the time 
interval experienced as 'now') to take in the whole of time. The benefit of this would 
be to allow the specification of God as temporal, whilst retaining the strength of 'whole 
and perfect possession of infinite life all at once' by making what is experienced as 
present for the temporal deity identical with all events across time. However, as Craig 
points out, the price is too high. A temporal God with an infinite specious present 
would be entirely unable to react to anything, since time would have ended precisely at 
the point at which the 'next' specious-present moment would begin. Quite apart from 
concerns over whether we want to admit of God having temporal parts (which position 
Craig suggests is implied by this view) or of how God's specious present could be so 
extended (since the usual explanations for a specious present require physical cognitive 
elements, such as finite velocity of neural signals), the main consequences for God's 
perception of and interaction with the world seem sufficient to lead us to reject this 
'infinite specious present' argument. 
Craig considers another way out of this situation for the temporalist, employing 
our concept of the specious present as a more general analogy of God's experience of 
time: 'God just has at every point of time a specious present which takes in the whole of 
time' 639. The thought here is that God's specious present is not one of a sequence of 
different specious presents, or a single specious present restricting God's experience of 
the world. Rather, at every moment of time God has a specious present, but this is the 
same specious present since it encompasses all of time. However, Craig objects to this 
idea on the grounds that, although God undergoes tense changes and temporal becoming 
636 Helm, 'Divine Timeless Eternity', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views, p.30-3l 
637 Robert Cook, 'God, Time, and Freedom', Religious Studies 23 ( 1987), p.86; Richard Swinburne, The 
Coherence ofTheism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.220 
638 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.279- This has no small relevance to the debate concerning bodily 
resurrection, since if the resurrected person is technically to be regarded as a replica rather than the real 
person, Leftow's remark effectively destroys any position which entails this interpretation to be the case. 
639 Craig, God, Time & Eternity, p.36 
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(on a tensed theory of time), God nevertheless cannot, seemingly, know enough to act in 
a timely fashion, since - having the same all-encompassing specious present at each 
moment - God cannot apparently distinguish one moment from another and thus cannot 
know which temporal location He currently inhabits. 
If we embrace a tenseless theory of time, says Craig, matters are just as bad, 
smce the temporal God has no moment-relative now-awareness to distinguish one 
location in the time series from another, and so again cannot act in a timely fashion. In 
short, it seems that this response to the argument solves the problem for a temporal God 
who only wishes to know the contents of His creation, but not for a God who wishes to 
interact with it. This puts a big hole in the temporalist position, since one assumes that 
a key motivation in adopting divine temporalism is securing a foundation for God's 
interaction with the world. 
Consider Wolterstorffs criticism of the 'divine fullness' argument: he suggests 
that it is timelessness that is the impoverished existence compared to temporality, rather 
than vice versa. 'Change, and the changing experiences of change, makes possible a 
fullness in the totality of one's life experiences that would be impossible without 
change.' 640 
However, the examples Wolterstorff employs are examples which would be 
problematic on a number of levels, and not necessarily problematic for the idea of 
divine timelessness. He talks about watching children grow up and seeing Hagia 
Sophia from different angles as things that a timeless God could not do. However, a 
timeless God might be able to do them, dependent upon how we construe God's 
omnipresence as a mode of experience. And it is unclear how a timeless God has more 
of difficulty than a temporal God here in certain key respects; if a temporal God is not 
omnipresent, then what might God's experience of seeing Hagia Sophia from different 
angles consist in? Does God need to be spatial and/or physical to appreciate fully either 
Hagia Sophia or children growing up? Similarly, the example Wolterstorff gives of 
building a piece of furniture raises questions of God's physicality and omnipotence; 
why should God's temporality be the key issue here? 
The only example with any bite seems to be the experience of listening to a 
piece of music. However, this equally raises questions of physicality (how can a non-
physical God experience sound?) and suggests that, if we can give an answer as to 
God's experience of music (such as direct non-physical experience) then we could 
640 Wolterstorff, 'Unqualified Divine Temporality', in Gregory E. Ganssle ( ed. ), God and Time: Four 
Views, p.73 
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equally give an answer to timeless experience of music, such as through non-temporal 
sequence, which does not demand a leap of imagination of a different order to that 
required by God's non-physicality when it comes to music appreciation. 
Craig's own response to the key 'argument from divine perfect life' is in some 
ways frustrating, for reasons that will become readily apparent. He makes the following 
points: 
When we recall that God is perfectly omniscient and so forgets absolutely nothing 
of the past and knows everything about the future, then time's tooth is 
considerably dulled for Him ... A fatal flaw in Leftow's analysis is his assumption 
that God, like the widower, has actually lost the person He loves and remembers. 
But according to Christian theism, this assumption is false. Those who perish 
physically live on in the afterlife where they continue to be real and present to 
God... So it is far from obvious that the experience of temporal passage is so 
melancholy an affair for an omniscient God as it is for us. 641 
There are three things that can be said of this response. First, we can still extend 
Leftow's argument that the widower would not be entirely reassured by the prospect of 
perfect memory clarity regarding his wife, and that a parent can still mourn the 'loss' of 
a stage in a child's life642 , to make the point that the temporal God still loses something 
that cannot be regained. 
Second, invoking a concept of the afterlife seems to raise more questions than it 
answers; we have already seen that we must be careful about using God's omnipotence 
to get around the problem of loss, and we would need a very well-developed theology 
and philosophy of post-mortem survival to secure the kind of proofing against loss that 
Craig's response might require. 
Finally, Craig needs to be careful not to drag his position accidentally into the 
path of a kind of criticism normally levelled at divine timelessness. The critic of divine 
timelessness occasionally argues that one consequence ofthat position is God's timeless 
and unvarying possession of experiences of all the suffering of his creatures- i.e. that 
even in the joy of the eschaton, the suffering is not transformed or eliminated because it 
exists tenselessly. The divine temporalist asserts that a strength of their position is that 
the suffering experienced by God is transformed into joy; that it passes much as our 
experience of it passes. In short, divine temporality is 'less cruel to God'. However, 
Craig's argument here runs a risk of eliminating this advantage; to the extent that time's 
tooth is dulled, one might say, time's healing effect is also dulled. The parent loses the 
641 Craig, God, Time & Eternity, p.38-39 
642 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.278 
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joy of the child growing up, but retains a perfect memory of those moments; the parent 
is no longer in the midst of the child's suffering of a desperate illness, but has a perfect 
memory of what it was to go through it. We shall return to this potential 'cannot have 
one's cake and eat it' very shortly. 
Let us look at the aforementioned criticism of divine timelessness more 
carefully. The argument goes as follows: a timeless God experiences all the suffering 
and joy of history tenselessly outside time; the crucifixion is an eternal event in the 
experience of God, say, and so is the eschaton. What, then, are we attributing to God? 
It seems that the suffering of the crucifixion is de-fanged, because it is tinged with the 
knowledge of the joy of eschatological salvation, whilst the joy of the eschaton is 
diminished because it is tinged with the suffering of the crucifixion. The result is two-
fold: first, how can God really be 'the fellow sufferer who understands' when he has 
constant 'privileged access' which we do not have- namely, He knows of the eschaton, 
whereas we 'here in the middle' suffer the more acutely for not knowing the joy of the 
end as certain. Second, God is deprived of being truly joyful with us at the eschaton, 
because the suffering of the crucifixion never passes away. The former, then, attacks 
our relationship with God, whilst the latter is an attack by way of what our theology 
effectively inflicts upon God. 
The temporal God, by contrast in this argument, suffers through the crucifixion 
and can empathise fully with our suffering, but, as for us, this suffering passes away to 
be transformed into joy at the eschaton - a joy that we share fully with God, in 
presumably sharing the experience of the passing away of sin and suffering, and their 
replacement with joy and blessedness. 
This argument is the flip side of the 'divine fullness' argument. We are now in a 
position to compare the two and draw a more specific tension out of them. The most 
obvious conclusion to draw is that employing 'the divine perfect life' as a philosophical 
foundation for a defence of divine timelessness is a dangerous path to take. One reason 
might be that it is difficult to provide a rigorous philosophical account of what 'the 
divine perfect life' might mean. But we shall set this aside, since it is clear that the 
primary reason, to put it bluntly, is that theologians have rather different ideas about 
what it would be for God to have a perfect life. The perfect divine life for the 
atemporalist is a terrible prospect for the temporalist, and vice versa. 
I would contend that taken together these atemporalist/temporalist options 
represent the essential tension between the demand for a transcendent God (understood 
as a demand for 'otherness' from the world) and the demand for an immanent or more 
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human God (understood as 'likeness' or involvement with the world); the atemporalists 
are arguing the line that 'if God is like us, then God can't be God', whilst the 
temporalists are arguing 'if God isn't like us, God can't be God'. The atemporalist is 
reacting against a concept of a God who must await the time to act, who might be 
restricted in propositional omniscience and universal omnipotence, who suffers the loss 
of moments or persons which cannot be regained, who is more like a creature than a 
creator. The temporalist is reacting against a concept of a God who cannot truly 
empathise with the human condition, who seems alien in mode of being and experience, 
and on whom is inflicted, in virtue of being related as Creator to His Creation, an at 
once impoverished, static and supremely turbulent mental life. To adapt Oscar Wilde to 
the theological point in hand: the theological rejection of the immanent is the rage of 
Cali ban seeing his own face in a glass; the theological rejection of the transcendent is 
the rage of Cali ban not seeing his own face in a glass. 643 Can we do anything with this 
to salvage a philosophical foundation of use to the defender of divine timelessness? 
I would suggest that the only real option here is to put in a bid for transcendence 
as being (i) desirable and (ii) not as bad as one would think if one were a temporalist. 
To begin with, it is surely worth observing that the language of otherness and 
transcendence is very hard to pin down logically. Nevertheless, a few points are worth 
exploring. We might consider the distinction between contrastive and non-contrastive 
transcendence suggested by Kathryn Tanner644. In the former, God''s otherness is 
categorised by starting with the world. As Steven Crain puts it: 
If we are to assert God's transcendence by way of contrast, we take every property of 
the world and deny it of God, so that, once the contrast is complete, God is seen to exist 
in no sense within the world. 645 
This, Tanner and Crain suggest, results in a God who is 'not in the world by virtue of 
being parallel to the world. '646 The alternative model of transcendence is 'non-
contrastive', and involves the rejection of 'this mode of non-identity through 
contrast'647; in short, it denies also that God is a thing in a specific state of separation 
from the world. This is taken to show that the contrastive model really considers God 
643 CfOscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford World's 
Classics edition 1998), p.xxiii 
644 Kathryn E. Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988), see especially Chapter 2. 
645 Steven Crain, 'God Embodied in, God Bodying Forth the World: Emergence and Christian Theology', 
Zygon 41:3 (2006), p.669 
646 Crain, 'Emergence and Christian Theology', p.669 
647 Crain, 'Emergence and Christian Theology', p.669 
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as one more thing in the world in order to be able to make comparisons and finally show 
that God must be outside the world, for- as William Placher puts it- if 'God were one 
of the things in the world - as implied by a contrastive model of transcendence - then it 
would be natural to ask where God is located - in the world or outside it?'648 This is 
difficult material to make sense of: presumably God is either in the world or not; if so 
then God is not separate from the world, if not then God is separate from the world. 
One cannot have both. Luckily, some elucidation of a more philosophically rigorous 
approach is available. 
Leftow states a 'Zero Thesis' respect to God; might this provide a suitable 
philosophical characterisation for transcendence? Leftow suggests that the assertion 
'there is no distance between God and any spatial entity' 649 be construed as 'there is a 
distance-relation between God and any spatial entity and the distance between them is 
zero'
650 
as opposed to 'it is not the case that there is a distance-relation between God 
and any spatial entity' 651. In brief, he defends this by arguing that to say that there is a 
distance relation is not to say that there is a positive distance; zero is not positive, after 
all. So the difference between the second and third statements above is constituted by 
the fact 'that when one says that there is no distance between God and spatial things, 
one talks about the distance between them. One does not say there is no such 
relation. '652 Thus God is not spatially located, but is in a sense spatially contiguous 
with any and all places. 
Now, Leftow takes this as a basis for a defence of divine timelessness, and 
combines it with the 'very general property of time (its being a fourth dimension of an 
extensive continuum)' and a further thesis to provide the core of his theory. We have 
seen the problem (which is commuted to his theory of timelessness) that the general 
property of time is a property of physical time and that Leftow has ruled himself out of 
the resources required to get around the critical responses - for so I have argued already. 
However, Leftow himself notes that the strength of the Zero Thesis is that it resolves the 
issue of how God could be omnipresent even though God is supposed to be without 
spatial location. 
This sounds like it could be a good basis for affirming the transcendence (and 
compatible immanence) of God. For if God is not spatially located and yet 1s 
648 William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking About God Went 
Wrong (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1996), p.ll2 
649 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.222 
650 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.222 
651 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.223 
652 Leftow, Time and Eternity, p.226 
222 
omnipresent, then God is not 'in the world' but, if God is causally responsible for the 
world, is in an important sense not entirely dissociated from the world. 
Clearly this sort of philosophical foundation for transcendence will require some 
defence, much as the concept of a necessary or perfect being requires some defence if 
that is to be used as a philosophical foundation. Leftow provides some defensive 
manoeuvres himself. 653 The basic motivation for affirming any sort of transcendence in 
the first place seems unproblematic (after all, we no longer find the idea of the 
Olympian gods attractive, and I suggest this is not just because we are polytheism-
averse)- the question is one of degree. So the issue boils down to giving an account of 
transcendence that does not deny immanence - which I suggest we have begun to do -
and showing that the relevantly transcendent timeless God is not such a distressing idea 
as the temporalist thinks. 
How can we assure the temporalist that transcendence and timelessness are not 
as bad as they might think? Perhaps by arguing that the fact that a timeless God's mode 
of experience takes in equally both the vile and the joyful should only worry us if we 
believe that mode of experience to have to be similar to our own in important respects. 
Naturally it would be upsetting for a temporal being to conceptualise the situation in 
temporal perspective: in imaginative analogy, we can only think of two events being 
spatially co-extant at the same moment, and for that moment to be unending. Clearly 
imagining timelessness in this way makes it difficult to see how either of the opposed 
experiences could retain their full meaning when contrasting with each other in such a 
way. 
However, a timeless God has a timeless mode of experience: we should expect 
this to be a very different situation, but should we therefore reject it? We could 
illustrate this with respect to omnipresence or omniscience. One might ask the question, 
how can an omnipresent or omniscient being, who is immediately aware of a great joy 
in one place and a great tragedy in another, be able to deal with the experiential 
immediacy of such a combination? Would it not be like taking a telephone call in the 
middle of a sibling's wedding celebration and discovering that one's best friend had 
been horrifically murdered? But just as we seem to think that God can deal with such 
situations without our having to deny that God is omniscient or omnipresent, so 
presumably ought we to think that God can deal with a timeless mode of experience. 
Does this attack our idea of our relationship with God, even if it evades the problem of 
what timelessness inflicts on God? I suggest it only affects our relationship with God in 
653 Leftow, Time and Eternity, pp.223-226 
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the way that any philosophical account of divine attributes, or any ascription of 
'otherness', poses problems for how we relate to God; exploring this is, surely, one of 
the many tasks that theology must undertake. 
In summary then, there are two lines of argument from within theological issues 
that potentially supply philosophical foundations for a defence of divine timelessness. 
The first runs from the concept of God as a necessary being to the concept of divine 
timelessness (with options on arguing from time's contingency), and may constitute a 
logical constraint in favour of divine timelessness from inside of theology - pending a 
coherent outworking of perfect/necessary being, and so forth. 
The second involves a move from the nature of the divine life to the ascription 
of a timeless mode of existence to that life. We have seen that, as an argument that 
might form a constraint on divine eternity in favour of timelessness or against 
temporality, this is likely to be a two-edged sword. However, a philosophical 
characterisation of divine transcendence and immanence can provide an account which 
potentially copes with the side of the argument that cuts against divine timelessness. So 
although a direct constraint is not formed, we may choose to see that characterisation as 
a plausible philosophical foundation for a defence of divine timelessness insofar as that 
defence must take account of temporalist concerns about the divine life. I suggest, 
therefore, that both potential philosophical foundations from 'within' the domain of 
theology are admissible and should take their place with the foundational material 
centred on the denial of an absolute and ontologically favoured present in the 
philosophy of time. 
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Conclusion 
From the starting point of needing to say something about 'time' if we are to say 
something about 'God and time', I have attempted to develop some philosophical 
foundations for a defence of divine timelessness. Methodologically, these foundations 
may be considered equally appropriate for any discussion of God and time - temporalist 
or atemporalist - and have concentrated on developing a systematic structure to 
facilitate the interactions of science, philosophy and theology through describing 
constraints, boundaries, and conditions for involvement, particularly concentrating on 
the plausibility of logical constraints introduced on divine eternity from 'outside' of 
traditional theology and philosophy of religion. 
On the other hand, I have attempted to isolate and examine the key issue of the 
ontologicaVmetaphysical status of the present as a primary determining factor within the 
methodological structure. This examination has ranged over issues of science, 
language, facts and ontology, and epistemology. Finally, I have considered 
philosophical foundations that might be found from a consideration of 'God' rather than 
of 'time' per se; these I characterised as fitting into the overall methodological structure 
as potential constraints on divine eternity derived from 'within' theology- the nature of 
God - rather than 'outside' of it, as with logical constraints arising from the study of 
time. 
What has all of this achieved, and what does it provide a groundwork for? 
There are two topics of discussion here: first, the topic of divine eternity itself and, 
second, wider applications in the field of philosophy of religion. The ramifications for 
divine eternity are by now, I hope, clear enough. Even the defender (or critic) of divine 
timelessness who wishes to concentrate their efforts on arguments concerning perfect 
being theology, say, must be aware that they will probably require, sooner or later, some 
philosophical commitments in the area of the philosophy of time, and that these cannot 
really be avoided. Having certain views about time and rather contrasting views about 
eternity is liable to create intellectual problems that demand hard work to resolve. 
Even once the defender of divine timelessness has incorporated relevant 
positions on the status of the present and the constraints that are formed, the task is far 
from over. There are many arguments which may need to be addressed, ranging fTom 
the usefulness of McTaggart's paradox in defeating A-theories of time, through 
extended treatments of the epistemology of 'temporal becoming' and change, through to 
the question of how things persist through time. The defender of divine timelessness, 
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by taking certain positions as foundational (and especially in developing constructive B-
theoretical arguments), must be ready to engage with critical resources and responses 
from these topics as and when they arise: this is no small commitment. The thorniest 
problem likely to be faced is the demand for an account of causation, a problem which 
is made more vital by way of its forming a traditional topic of debate in the philosophy 
of religion. The defender of divine timelessness (and no less the defender of divine 
temporality) will eventually need an account both of how causation works in concert 
with the positions adopted in the philosophy of time, and of how God is causally 
efficacious as Creator. 
In terms of wider applications for issues in the philosophy of religion, we might 
distinguish issues which might benefit from the methodological analysis as well as the 
topic-specific content of this thesis, from issues which are affected by the view that one 
holds on divine eternity its foundations. In the latter camp, the most interesting 
consequences (in my view) are for the topics of petitionary prayer and divine dialogue, 
since in both of these the exponent of divine timelessness must address the 'illusion of 
temporal interaction', and for the topic of free will and the reality of the future, since 
embracing an 'ontological equality' thesis about time together with certain versions of 
divine timelessness will raise questions about determinism. 
The obvious connection to be made, both in the above terms and from the 
methodological viewpoint, is with the topic of omniscience. Many of the same 
positions and lines of argument that have been relevant in this thesis can be commuted 
to the debate about God's knowledge, although in methodological structure the 
constraints formed concerning temporality are prior to the issue of God's knowledge of 
a temporal reality, and the question of whether that knowledge is in temporal or 
atemporal mode. 
Methodologically speaking, the mam tssue (to which I have on occasiOn 
alluded) which I judge could benefit from the structural analysis of this thesis is the 
debate over post-mortem survival, and in particular the coherence of belief in bodily 
resurrection. It seems to me that the same nexus of science, philosophy and theology is 
present in that debate: neuroscience, the philosophy of diachronic personal identity and 
the theology of bodily resurrection form a comparable structure whereby to answer the 
question 'what must be true of me if I am to survive my death?' we must identify a 
similar system of constraints. 
Although there are undoubtedly more, the various issues I have presented above 
are those I take to be most immediate or interesting in their connections with this thesis, 
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and to demonstrate its wider import for the philosophy of religion. I would nevertheless 
hope that its intended contribution to the debate over divine eternity is the most notable: 
to persuade theologians and philosophers of religion of the desirability of a rigorous 
methodological structure integrating science, philosophy and theology, and of the 
plausibility of philosophical foundations for a defence of divine timelessness. 
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